The Nicomachean Ethics

BOOK I

1. Everything Aims at Something Good

Every skill, every investigation, and every action or choice we make seems to be aiming for some kind of good result. That’s why people have correctly said that the good is what everything is trying to achieve.

However, there’s a difference in what we mean by “ends” or “results”:

• Sometimes, the end is the activity itself.
• Other times, the end is a product separate from the activity that made it. When there are products separate from the actions, those products are naturally better or more important than the activities that create them.

Think about it: there are many kinds of actions, skills (arts), and areas of knowledge (sciences). This means there are also many different ends:

• The goal of medicine is health.
• The goal of shipbuilding is a ship.
• The goal of military strategy is victory.
• The goal of economics is wealth.

Sometimes, several skills fall under one main skill. For example:

• Making horse bridles and other horse equipment are all part of the art of horse riding.
• Horse riding itself, and any military action, falls under military strategy.
• Similarly, other skills fall under still other, broader skills.

In all these cases, the goals of the main, “master” skills are more important than the goals of the skills underneath them. People pursue the lesser goals because they help achieve the main goals.

It doesn’t matter if the end goal is the activity itself or something else produced by the activity (like in the sciences we just mentioned). The principle is the same: some goals are pursued for the sake of other, higher goals.

2. Finding the Main Goal: The Chief Good

So, if there’s a final goal for everything we do—something we want for its own sake, with everything else wanted only to achieve this one thing—then this must be the good, the most important good of all. (If we didn’t have such a final goal, and we chose everything only for the sake of something else, we’d go on forever, and our desires would be pointless and empty.)

Wouldn’t knowing this main goal greatly affect our lives? If we knew what we were aiming for, like archers with a target, wouldn’t we be more likely to achieve what’s right?

If this is true, we need to try to understand, at least in a general way, what this chief good is. We also need to figure out which area of knowledge or skill is concerned with it.

It seems like this chief good would be the concern of the most authoritative and truly “master” skill. Politics appears to be this kind of skill. Here’s why:

• Politics decides which sciences should be studied in a society.
• Politics determines what each group of citizens should learn and how much they should learn.
• We see that even the most respected skills—like military strategy, economics, and public speaking (rhetoric)—are under the authority of politics.

Since politics uses all the other sciences, and since it also makes laws about what we should do and not do, its main goal must include the goals of all the other skills. Therefore, the end goal of politics must be the good for human beings.

Even if the good is the same for one person and for a whole society (a state), the good of the state seems much greater and more complete, whether we’re talking about achieving it or preserving it. It’s worthwhile to achieve this good for even one person. But it’s a finer and more noble thing to achieve it for a whole nation or for city-states.

So, our current investigation aims to understand these ends, because it’s a kind of political science.

3. How We Should Discuss This Topic

Our discussion will be good enough if it’s as clear as the subject allows. We shouldn’t expect the same level of exactness in all discussions, just like we don’t expect it in all crafts.

The topics that political science investigates—actions that are admirable and fair—have a lot of variety and disagreement about them. This might even make people think these ideas exist only by social agreement (convention), not by nature. Goods, like wealth or courage, also cause similar disagreements because they can sometimes harm people. For instance, some people have been ruined by their wealth, and others by their bravery.

So, when we talk about such topics and start from these kinds of observations:

• We must be satisfied with showing the truth roughly and in outline.
• When we talk about things that are only true for the most part, and use reasons that are also only true for the most part, we should expect our conclusions to be of the same kind (true for the most part).

We should accept each type of statement in this spirit. It’s the sign of an educated person to look for exactness in each subject only as much as the subject itself allows. It’s clearly just as foolish to accept a mathematician using only probable arguments as it is to demand scientifically precise proofs from a public speaker.

Who Can Understand Political Science?

Each person judges well the things they know. They are a good judge of those specific things.

• Someone educated in a particular subject is a good judge of that subject.
• Someone with a well-rounded education is a good judge in general.

This is why a young person is not ready for lectures on political science.

• They don’t have experience with the actions that happen in real life, but political science discussions start from these actions and are about them.
• Also, young people tend to follow their feelings (passions). So, their study would be pointless and not helpful, because the goal here is not just knowing things, but acting on them.

It doesn’t matter if the person is young in age or just immature in character. The problem isn’t about how much time has passed. It’s about living by feelings and chasing after whatever passion directs them at the moment.

• For such people, knowledge brings no real benefit, just like for people who can’t control themselves (the incontinent).
• But for those who desire things and act based on thoughtful reasoning, knowledge about these topics will be very helpful.

These points about the student, what kind of discussion to expect, and the purpose of our investigation can serve as our introduction.

4. What is Happiness?

Let’s get back to our main question. Since all knowledge and every activity aims at some good, what is the specific good that political science aims for? And what is the highest of all goods we can achieve through action?

Most people, both ordinary folks and highly educated individuals, generally agree on the name: they say it’s happiness. They also agree that “living well” and “doing well” are the same as “being happy.”

But when it comes to defining what happiness actually is, they disagree. The average person doesn’t give the same explanation as wise people do.

• Many people think happiness is something plain and obvious, like pleasure, wealth, or honor.
• They often disagree with each other.
• Sometimes, even the same person will say happiness is different things at different times:
  • Health, when they are sick.
  • Wealth, when they are poor.
• Being aware of their own lack of knowledge, these people often admire those who talk about some grand idea of happiness that is beyond their understanding.

Some philosophers in the past believed that besides all these many good things, there is another, separate Good. This Good exists on its own and is the reason why all the other things are good.

It would probably be a waste of time to examine every single opinion that has ever been held about happiness. It’s enough to look at the opinions that are most common or seem to have some reasonable arguments behind them.

Starting Points in Our Reasoning

We should remember that there’s a difference between arguments that start from basic principles and arguments that lead to basic principles. Plato was right to ask this question: “Are we on the way from basic principles, or to them?” It’s like on a racetrack – there’s a difference between the path from the judges to the turning point, and the path back.

We must begin with what is known. But things are “known” in two ways:

1. Some things are known to us (personally, through our experience).
2. Some things are known without qualification (objectively true).

So, we should probably start with things that are known to us.

This means that anyone who wants to listen intelligently to talks about what is noble and just (the topics of political science) must have been raised with good habits.

• The fact (that something is good or just, based on good upbringing) is the starting point.
• If this starting point is clear enough to a person, they won’t initially need to know the “why” behind it as well.
• A person who has been well brought up either already has these starting points or can easily get them.

But for someone who doesn’t have these starting points and can’t get them, let him listen to the words of the poet Hesiod:

“That person is best who figures out all things for himself; Good is the one who listens when others advise him well; But whoever neither knows himself, nor takes to heart Another’s wisdom, is a useless person.”

5. Different Ideas About the Good Life

Let’s pick up our discussion where we left off. Looking at the kinds of lives people lead, most people, especially the crudest sort, seem to think that the good, or happiness, is pleasure. This is why they love a life full of enjoyment.

We can identify three main types of life:

1. The life of enjoyment (focused on pleasure).
2. The political life (focused on public service and honor).
3. The contemplative life (focused on thinking and understanding – we’ll discuss this later).

The majority of people clearly have rather unrefined tastes, preferring a life fit for animals. However, they find some justification for their view because many people in positions of power share these same tastes (like Sardanapallus, an ancient king known for his luxurious and indulgent lifestyle).

Now, let’s consider what refined and active people think. They tend to identify happiness with honor. Honor is, generally speaking, the goal of the political life. But honor seems too superficial to be what we’re really looking for. Why?

• Honor seems to depend more on the people who give it rather than on the person who receives it.
• But the good we are trying to find should be something that truly belongs to a person and cannot easily be taken away.

Furthermore, people seem to seek honor so they can be sure of their own goodness.

• They want to be honored by people who have practical wisdom.
• They want to be honored by those who know them well.
• They want to be honored because of their virtue (their good character). So, clearly, according to these people at least, virtue is better than honor.

Perhaps one might even think that virtue, rather than honor, is the true goal of the political life. But even virtue seems somewhat incomplete as a definition of happiness. Consider these situations:

• It seems possible to possess virtue while being asleep.
• One could possess virtue while being inactive your whole life.
• One could possess virtue while experiencing the greatest suffering and misfortune. No one would call a person living like that “happy,” unless they were just trying to win an argument at all costs. But we’ve said enough about this, as it’s a common topic in discussions.

The third type of life is the contemplative life, which we will examine later.

The Life of Making Money

The life of making money is a life chosen out of necessity, not freely. And wealth is clearly not the good we are looking for.

• Wealth is merely useful; it’s a means to get something else.

So, one might be more inclined to think that the things mentioned before (pleasure, honor, virtue) are ends, because they are loved for their own sakes. But it’s clear that even these are not the final, ultimate end. Many arguments have been made in their favor, but they fall short. So, let’s move on from this topic.

6. Examining the Idea of a Universal “Good”

Perhaps it’s better to consider the idea of a universal good and thoroughly discuss what is meant by it. This is a difficult task because the theory of “Forms” (or “Ideas”) was introduced by people who are our friends (Plato and his followers).

However, for the sake of truth, it’s probably better, and indeed our duty, to challenge even things that are close to us, especially since we are philosophers (lovers of wisdom). While both truth and friends are dear, our respect for what is right (piety) requires us to honor truth even more than our friends.

Arguments Against a Single “Form” of Good

The people who introduced this idea of Forms did not suggest that there were Forms for groups of things where there was a natural order of priority (e.g., first, second, third). This is why they didn’t propose a single Form that covered all numbers. But the word “good” is used in different ways (categories):

• It’s used to describe a substance (what something is, e.g., God is good, reason is good).
• It’s used to describe a quality (e.g., virtues are good).
• It’s used to describe a quantity (e.g., the right amount is good).
• It’s used to describe a relation (e.g., something useful is good). And that which exists in itself (substance) is naturally prior to what is relative (which is like an offshoot or secondary characteristic of being). So, there couldn’t be one common Idea or Form of “good” that covers all these different types of goods.

Furthermore, “good” is used in as many ways as “being” is.

• It can refer to a substance (like God or reason).
• It can refer to a quality (like the virtues).
• It can refer to a quantity (like a moderate amount).
• It can refer to a relation (like something being useful).
• It can refer to time (like the right opportunity).
• It can refer to place (like the right location), and so on. Clearly, “good” cannot be some single, universally present thing in all cases. If it were, it couldn’t be talked about in all these different categories; it would only fit into one.

Also, for things that fall under one Idea or Form, there is one science or area of knowledge. So, if there were one Form of Good, there would be one single science of all good things. But in reality, there are many sciences even for things that fall under just one category.

• For example, “opportunity” in war is studied by military strategy, while “opportunity” in health is studied by medicine.
• The “moderate amount” in food is studied by medicine, while the “moderate amount” in exercise is studied by gymnastics.

One might also ask: what do they really mean by “a thing itself” (e.g., “man himself”)? If the definition of “man” is the same for “man himself” and for any particular man, then they don’t differ in being man. If this is so, then “good itself” and particular good things will not differ in so far as they are good. And “good itself” won’t be any more good just because it’s eternal. Something that lasts a long time isn’t any whiter than something that only lasts for a day.

The Pythagoreans (ancient Greek philosophers) seem to offer a more believable account of the good when they place “the One” (unity) in their list of good things. It seems Speusippus (Plato’s nephew) followed their thinking.

Are Some Goods Good in Themselves?

But let’s discuss these specific philosophical points elsewhere. Someone might object to what we’ve said by pointing out that the Platonists (followers of Plato) weren’t talking about all goods. They might say that only those goods pursued and loved for their own sake are called “good” by reference to a single Form. Things that produce or preserve these primary goods, or prevent their opposites, are called good in a secondary, derivative sense.

If this is the case, then clearly “goods” must be spoken of in two ways:

1. Some goods are good in themselves.
2. Others are good because of these primary goods (i.e., they are useful).

Let’s separate things that are good in themselves from things that are merely useful. Then let’s consider if the things that are good in themselves are called “good” by reference to a single Idea or Form.

What kind of goods would we call “good in themselves”?

• Are they things that are pursued even when they are separated from other things, like intelligence, sight, and certain pleasures and honors?
• Even if we sometimes pursue these for the sake of something else, one would still usually classify them as things good in themselves.
• Or is it that nothing is good in itself other than the Idea of Good? If so, then the Form of Good would be empty and useless, not applying to any real things.

But if the things we named (intelligence, sight, etc.) are also good in themselves, then the definition or explanation of “good” would have to be the same in all of them, just like the definition of “whiteness” is the same in snow and in white paint. However, the explanations of why honor is good, why wisdom is good, and why pleasure is good are distinct and different from each other when we consider their specific goodness. Therefore, the good is not some common element that corresponds to one single Idea.

What Do We Mean by “Good” Then?

So, what do we mean by “the good”? It’s surely not like things that just happen to have the same name by chance. Are goods “one” in one of these ways?

• By being derived from one specific good?
• By all contributing to one specific good?
• Or are they “one” by analogy? For example, sight is to the body as reason is to the soul, and so on in other cases.

But perhaps it’s best to leave these detailed questions for now. Getting perfectly precise answers about them would be more suitable for another branch of philosophy.

The same applies to the Idea of Good. Even if there is some one good that is universally true of all goods, or that can exist separately and independently, it’s clear that such a good could not be achieved or obtained by humans. And right now, we are looking for something that is attainable.

Perhaps someone might think it’s still worthwhile to know about this universal Good. They might argue that if we have it as a kind of model or pattern, we will be better able to know the goods that are good for us. And if we know them, we will be more likely to attain them.

This argument has some appeal, but it seems to conflict with how the sciences actually work.

• All sciences aim at some particular good and try to provide what is lacking for that good.
• But they all leave aside any knowledge of this universal “Good itself.” It’s not likely that all experts and craftsmen would be ignorant of such a great help, and not even look for it, if it were truly useful.

It’s also hard to see how a weaver or a carpenter would be better at their craft by knowing this “good itself.” How would someone who has contemplated the Idea of Good itself become a better doctor or a better general? A doctor doesn’t seem to study “health itself” in this abstract way. Instead, they study the health of human beings, or perhaps more specifically, the health of a particular person. It is individuals that a doctor heals.

But enough about these topics.

7. The Good We Seek: The Final End

Let’s return to the good we are actually looking for and ask what it could be. It seems to be different in different actions and skills:

• In medicine, the good is health.
• In military strategy, it’s victory.
• In architecture, it’s a house.
• In any other field, it’s something else.
• In every action and choice, it is the end or purpose. This is because everyone does everything else for the sake of this end.

Therefore, if there is one end for all the things we do, this will be the good that can be achieved by action. If there is more than one such end, then these will be the goods achievable by action.

So, our argument has come back to the same point through a different path. But we must try to state this even more clearly.

Identifying the Final End

Since there are clearly many different ends, and we choose some of them (like wealth, musical instruments, and tools in general) for the sake of something else, it’s clear that not all ends are final ends. But the chief good, the most important good, must be something final.

So:

• If there is only one final end, this will be what we are seeking.
• If there are more than one final end, the most final of these will be what we are seeking.

Now, we call something that is worth pursuing for its own sake more final than something that is worth pursuing for the sake of something else. And we call something that is never desirable for the sake of something else more final than things that are desirable both for themselves and for the sake of that other thing.

Therefore, we call something final without qualification if it is:

• Always desirable in itself.
• Never desirable for the sake of something else.

Happiness as the Final End

Happiness, above all else, seems to be this kind of thing.

• We always choose happiness for its own sake and never for the sake of anything else.
• On the other hand, things like honor, pleasure, reason, and every virtue:
  • We do choose them for their own sakes (if nothing else resulted from them, we would still choose each of them).
  • But we also choose them for the sake of happiness, because we believe that through them we will become happy.
• Happiness, however, is something no one chooses for the sake of these other things, nor, in general, for anything other than itself.

This same idea of happiness being the ultimate goal seems right when we think about self-sufficiency. The final good is thought to be something that makes life complete on its own.

When we say “self-sufficient,” we don’t mean enough for a person living all alone. We mean enough for that person and for their parents, children, spouse, and generally for their friends and fellow citizens. This is because humans are naturally social creatures, meant to live in communities.

However, there has to be a limit to this. If we include grandparents, great-grandparents, grandchildren, and the friends of our friends, the list would go on forever! We can look into this specific point more another time. For now, let’s define self-sufficient as something that, all by itself, makes life desirable and lacking in nothing. We believe happiness is like that.

Furthermore, we think happiness is the most desirable of all things. It’s not just one good thing among many that get added together. If it were, you could clearly make it more desirable by adding even the smallest other good. That added bit would become an extra amount of good, and when it comes to goods, more is always better. So, happiness is something final and self-sufficient. It is the ultimate aim of everything we do.

Finding Happiness: The Role of Human Function

Now, just saying that happiness is the main good might seem a bit obvious, like stating something everyone already agrees on. We still need a clearer explanation of what happiness actually is.

We might find this clearer explanation if we can first figure out the specific function of a human being. Think about it:

• For a flute player, a sculptor, or any artist – and generally for anything that has a function or a specific activity – their “good” and their “doing well” seems to lie in performing that function. It seems likely this would also be true for humans, if humans have a function.

Do carpenters and shoemakers have certain functions or activities, but humans have none? Was humanity born without a purpose? Or, just as our eyes, hands, feet, and every other part of our body clearly have a function, can we say that a human being also has a function separate from all these individual parts?

If so, what could this function be?

• Life itself seems to be common even to plants, but we are looking for what is unique to humans. So, let’s exclude the life of just getting nutrition and growing.
• Next, there would be a life of perception (sensing things). But this also seems to be common to horses, cows, and every other animal.
• What remains, then, is an active life of the part of us that has a rational principle (the ability to reason).
  • One part of this rational element involves being obedient to reason.
  • Another part involves actually possessing reason and using it to think. Since “life of the rational element” can also mean two things (either possessing it or actively using it), we must state that we mean life in the sense of activity. This seems to be the more correct meaning.

Now, if the function of a human is an activity of the soul that follows or involves a rational principle, let’s consider this: We say that any “X” and “a good X” have a function that is the same in kind. For example, a harpist and a good harpist both have the function of playing the harp. The “good” harpist is just better at it – excellence is added to the function. If this is true, then:

1. We can say the function of a human being is a certain kind of life. This life is an activity or series of actions of the soul that involve using reason.
2. The function of a good human being is to do these rational activities well and nobly.
3. Any action is done well when it is performed in accordance with its appropriate excellence or virtue.

Therefore, human good – which is happiness – turns out to be an activity of the soul in accordance with virtue. If there is more than one virtue, then it is activity in accordance with the best and most complete virtue.

The Need for a Complete Life

But we must add one more thing: this activity must occur “in a complete life.” Just as one swallow doesn’t make a summer, and one warm day doesn’t either, similarly, one day or a short period of good activity doesn’t make a person truly blessed and happy.

Let this serve as a general outline of what the good is. We should probably sketch it roughly first, and then fill in the details later. It seems that anyone is capable of continuing and explaining more clearly what has been well outlined. Time is a good discoverer or partner in such work. This is how advances in skills and arts happen: anyone can add what is missing.

We also need to remember what we said before: don’t look for the same level of precision in all subjects. In each area, seek only the amount of precision that fits the subject matter and is appropriate for the investigation.

• For example, a carpenter and a geometer (a type of mathematician) both investigate right angles, but in different ways.
  • The carpenter is interested in the right angle only as much as it is useful for his work.
  • The geometer wants to know what a right angle is or what kind of thing it is, because he is an observer of truth. We must act in the same way in all other matters, so that our main task doesn’t get pushed aside by smaller, less important questions.

Also, we shouldn’t demand to know the cause or the “why” in all matters equally. In some cases, it’s enough that the fact itself is well established. This is true for first principles (basic truths). The fact is the starting point, the primary thing. We come to understand first principles in different ways:

• Some through induction (observing patterns and drawing general conclusions).
• Some through perception (direct observation).
• Some through a kind of habituation (getting used to them through practice).
• And others in other ways.

We must try to investigate each set of principles in the way that is natural for them. And we must take care to define them clearly, because these starting principles have a great influence on everything that follows. The beginning is often thought to be more than half of the whole project, and many of the questions we ask are cleared up by understanding the beginning properly.

8. Checking Our Definition Against Common Beliefs

We need to consider our idea of happiness not only based on our logical conclusions and the points we started with, but also based on what is commonly said about it.

• If a view is true, all the available information will fit together with it.
• If a view is false, the facts will soon clash with it.

Now, goods have often been divided into three types:

1. External goods (like wealth, friends, reputation).
2. Goods relating to the body (like health, strength).
3. Goods relating to the soul (like knowledge, virtue). We call those goods that relate to the soul the most properly and truly “goods.” And we classify mental actions and activities as relating to the soul. Therefore, our definition of happiness (as an activity of the soul) should be sound, at least according to this old view that philosophers agree on.

Our definition is also correct because we identify the end goal (happiness) with certain actions and activities. This way, happiness falls among the goods of the soul, not among external goods.

Another common belief that matches our account is that the happy person lives well and does well. We have pretty much defined happiness as a kind of good life and good action.

The characteristics that people usually look for in happiness also seem to all belong to what we have defined happiness as:

• Some identify happiness with virtue.
• Some with practical wisdom (good judgment in actions).
• Others with a kind of philosophical wisdom.
• Still others say it’s one of these things, either accompanied by pleasure or not without pleasure.
• And some also include external prosperity (good fortune).

Some of these views have been held by many people for a long time. Others have been held by a few well-known thinkers. It’s not likely that either group is completely wrong. It’s more probable that they are right in at least one respect, or even in most respects.

Our account fits well with those who identify happiness with virtue or some particular virtue, because virtuous activity belongs to virtue. But there’s probably a big difference between thinking the chief good is:

• The possession of virtue (just having it as a state of mind), or
• The use of virtue (actively putting it into practice).

A state of mind can exist without producing any good result. For example, a person might be virtuous but asleep, or inactive in some other way. But activity cannot be like that. Someone who has the activity (virtuous activity) will necessarily be acting, and acting well. It’s like in the Olympic Games: the ones who get crowned are not the most beautiful or the strongest, but those who compete. It is some of these competitors who are victorious. In the same way, it is those who act who win, and rightly win, the noble and good things in life.

The Pleasure in a Virtuous Life

The life of these active, virtuous people is also pleasant in itself. Pleasure is a state of the soul. For each person, whatever they are said to be a “lover of” is pleasant to them.

• For example, a horse is pleasant to a horse lover.
• A show is pleasant to a lover of sights.
• In the same way, just actions are pleasant to a lover of justice.
• And generally, virtuous actions are pleasant to a lover of virtue.

Now, for most people, their pleasures often conflict with each other. This is because the things they find pleasant are not pleasant by their very nature. But for those who love what is noble, they find pleasure in things that are pleasant by nature. Virtuous actions are like this. So, these actions are pleasant for such people, and also pleasant in their own nature.

Therefore, their life doesn’t need pleasure added on as some sort of extra charm or bonus. It has its pleasure within itself. Besides what we’ve already said, consider this: the person who does not enjoy performing noble actions isn’t even a good person.

• No one would call a man “just” if he didn’t enjoy acting justly.
• No one would call a man “generous” if he didn’t enjoy performing generous actions.
• The same is true in all other cases of virtue.

If this is so, then virtuous actions must be pleasant in themselves. But they are also good and noble. And they have each of these qualities (pleasantness, goodness, nobility) to the highest degree, because the good person judges these qualities well. His judgment is as we have described.

So, happiness is the best, noblest, and most pleasant thing in the world. These qualities are not separated, as suggested in the inscription at Delos:

“Most noble is that which is justest, and best is health; But pleasantest is it to win what we love.” In fact, all these properties (being best, noblest, and most pleasant) belong to the best activities. And we identify happiness with these best activities, or with one of them – the very best one.

The Role of External Goods

Yet, it’s clear, as we said before, that happiness also needs external goods. It is impossible, or at least not easy, to do noble acts without the proper resources or equipment.

• In many actions, we use friends, wealth, and political power as instruments.
• There are some things whose absence can take the shine off happiness. Examples include:
  • Good birth (coming from a respected family).
  • Good children.
  • Beauty. A person who is very ugly, or born into a bad family, or is solitary and childless is not very likely to be happy. Perhaps a person would be even less likely to be happy if they had thoroughly bad children or friends, or if they had lost good children or friends through death.

So, as we said, happiness seems to need this kind of external prosperity as well. This is why some people identify happiness with good fortune, while others identify it with virtue.

9. How Do We Get Happiness?

This also leads to the question: is happiness acquired through:

• Learning?
• Habit (getting used to it through practice)?
• Some other kind of training?
• Or does it come through some divine gift or blessing?
• Or simply by chance?

Now, if the gods give any gifts to humans, it’s reasonable to think that happiness would be god-given. It would surely be the most god-given of all human things, since it is the best. But this particular question might be better suited for another type of investigation. However, even if happiness is not sent by the gods, but comes as a result of virtue and some process of learning or training, it still seems to be among the most godlike things. This is because the prize and ultimate goal of virtue seems to be the best thing in the world, something godlike and blessed.

If happiness is acquired this way (through virtue, learning, and training), it will also be very widely shared. All people who are not damaged or incapable regarding their potential for virtue can achieve it through a certain kind of study and effort.

And if it is better to be happy this way (through effort) rather than by chance, it is reasonable that this is how things actually are.

• Everything that depends on the action of nature is by nature as good as it can be.
• Similarly, everything that depends on skill (art) or any rational cause is as good as it can be, especially if it depends on the best of all causes. To leave what is greatest and most noble to chance would be a very flawed arrangement.

The answer to the question we are asking (how happiness is acquired) is also clear from our definition of happiness. We have said it is a virtuous activity of the soul, of a certain kind. Of the other kinds of goods:

• Some must necessarily exist beforehand as conditions for happiness.
• Others are naturally helpful and useful as instruments for achieving happiness.

This will also be found to agree with what we said at the very beginning. We stated that the aim of political science is the best aim. And political science spends most of its efforts on making citizens into a certain kind of character: specifically, good and capable of performing noble acts.

It is natural, then, that we do not call an ox, a horse, or any other animal “happy.” None of them is capable of participating in such (virtuous) activity. For this reason, a child is not happy either. Because of his age, he is not yet capable of such acts. When we call boys happy, we are really congratulating them based on the hopes we have for their future. For, as we said, happiness requires not only complete virtue but also a complete life. Many changes occur in life, and all sorts of chance events can happen. Even the most prosperous person can fall into great misfortunes in old age, as the stories tell of Priam (the king of Troy). And no one calls a person happy who has experienced such chances and has ended life miserably.

10. Can We Call Someone Happy While They’re Alive?

So, must we say that no one at all can be called happy while they are still living? Must we, as Solon (a wise Greek statesman) said, “wait to see the end”?

Even if we accept this idea, does it also mean that a person is happy when they are dead? Or isn’t that completely absurd, especially for us, since we say that happiness is an activity?

But if we don’t call the dead person happy, and if Solon didn’t mean that, but rather meant that one can then safely call a person “blessed” because they are finally beyond evils and misfortunes, this idea also leads to more discussion. It is thought that both good and evil can exist for a dead person, just as they can for someone who is alive but not aware of them. For example:

• Honors or dishonors given after death.
• The good or bad fortunes of their children and descendants in general.

This also presents a problem. A man might have lived happily right up to old age and died in a way that was fitting for his life. But many misfortunes could happen to his descendants:

• Some of them may be good people and achieve the life they deserve.
• With others, the opposite may be true.
• And clearly, the degrees of relationship between them and their ancestors can vary endlessly. It would be odd, then, if the dead person were to share in these changes, becoming happy at one time and miserable at another. It would also be odd if the fortunes of the descendants did not, for some time at least, have some effect on the happiness of their ancestors.

Returning to the Main Difficulty

But we must return to our first difficulty: can we call someone happy while they are alive? Perhaps by thinking about this, our current problem (about the dead and their descendants) might be solved.

Now, if we must “wait to see the end” and only then call a man happy – not as being happy then, but as having been happy before – surely this is a strange idea (a paradox). It means that when he is actually happy, the quality that belongs to him (happiness) cannot truly be said of him. This is because:

• We don’t want to call living people happy due to the changes that might happen to them.
• We have assumed happiness is something permanent and not easily changed, while a single person can experience many ups and downs of fortune.

Clearly, if we were to keep changing our judgment based on his fortunes, we would often call the same man happy and then later miserable. This would make the happy man seem like a chameleon, constantly changing and insecurely based.

Or is this idea of constantly tracking his fortunes completely wrong? Success or failure in life does not ultimately depend on these fortunes. Human life, as we said, needs these external things as mere additions. It is virtuous activities, or their opposites, that truly make up happiness or the reverse.

Virtuous Activity and Lasting Happiness

The question we have just discussed actually confirms our definition of happiness.

• No function of man has as much permanence as virtuous activities. (These are thought to be even more durable than knowledge of the sciences).
• And of these virtuous activities, the most valuable ones are more durable because those who are happy spend their lives most readily and most continuously engaged in them. This seems to be why we do not forget them (the value of such activities).

This quality of permanence, then, will belong to the happy man. He will be happy throughout his life.

• He will always, or by preference over everything else, be engaged in virtuous action and contemplation (deep thought).
• He will bear the chances of life (good or bad luck) most nobly and in a completely fitting way, if he is “truly good” and “foursquare beyond reproach” (meaning solid and faultless).

Now, many events happen by chance, and these events differ in importance.

• Small pieces of good fortune, or its opposite, clearly do not tip the scales of life one way or the other.
• But a large number of great events, if they turn out well, will make life happier. (Not only are they themselves good, but the way a person deals with them can be noble and good).
• If great events turn out badly, they crush and maim happiness. They bring pain with them and hinder many activities.

Yet, even in these bad situations, nobility can shine through. This happens when a man bears many great misfortunes with calm acceptance (resignation) – not because he doesn’t feel pain, but because of his nobility and greatness of soul.

The Happy Person and Misfortune

If activities are, as we said, what give life its character, then no truly happy man can become miserable. This is because he will never do the acts that are hateful and mean. We think that the man who is truly good and wise:

• Bears all the chances of life in a becoming way.
• Always makes the best of his circumstances. He is like a good general who makes the best military use of the army he has, or a good shoemaker who makes the best shoes out of the leather he is given. This applies to all other craftsmen too.

If this is the case, the happy man can never become miserable. However, he might not reach a state of “blessedness” (supreme happiness or spiritual bliss) if he meets with fortunes like those of Priam (extreme, tragic misfortunes).

Also, the happy man is not many-colored and changeable.

• He will not be moved from his happy state easily or by any ordinary misfortunes. He would only be deeply affected by many great misfortunes.
• If he has suffered many great misfortunes, he will not recover his happiness in a short time. If he recovers it at all, it will only be after a long and complete period in which he has achieved many splendid successes.

When Can We Call Someone Happy?

So, why shouldn’t we say that a person is happy who is:

• Active in accordance with complete virtue?
• Sufficiently equipped with external goods?
• And this is true not just for some random short period, but throughout a complete life?

Or must we add: “and who is destined to live this way and die in a way that befits his life”? Certainly, the future is unclear to us. But happiness, we claim, is an end goal and something that is in every way final and complete.

If so, we shall call happy those among living men in whom these conditions are currently met, and are expected to continue to be met – but we call them happy men (implying a current state, not just a past or future one).

So much for these questions.

11. Do the Fortunes of Others Affect a Dead Person’s Happiness?

To say that the fortunes of a person’s descendants and all their friends should not affect their happiness at all seems very cold and goes against what most people believe. So many things happen in life, and they affect us in different ways – some events touch us closely, others less so. It would be a long, maybe even endless, task to talk about each one in detail. A general overview will probably be enough.

Think about it this way:

• Some of a person’s own misfortunes have a real impact on their life, while others are lighter.
• The same is true for the misfortunes of our friends as a group.
• It also makes a difference whether suffering happens to people who are living or to those who are dead. This difference is very significant. (It’s an even bigger difference than whether terrible deeds in a play are just talked about or actually shown on stage.)

We need to consider this difference. Or perhaps, more importantly, we need to address the doubt about whether the dead share in any good or evil at all. From thinking about this, it seems that even if anything good or bad does reach them, it must be something weak and insignificant, either in itself or in how it affects them. Or, if it’s not weak, it must at least be of a kind and an amount that would not:

• Make happy those who are not already happy.
• Or take away the blessedness from those who are blessed.

So, the good or bad fortunes of friends do seem to have some effect on the dead. But these effects are of such a kind and degree that they don’t make a happy person unhappy, nor do they cause any other similar major change in their state.

12. Is Happiness Praised or Prized?

Now that we’ve settled those questions, let’s consider whether happiness is something that is praised or something that is prized. It’s clear that happiness is not just a potential waiting to be realized; it’s something actual.

Everything that is praised seems to be praised for two reasons:

1. Because it is of a certain kind or quality.
2. Because it is related in some way to something else.

For example:

• We praise a just or brave person, and good people and virtue itself, because of the actions and positive roles involved.
• We praise a strong person, a good runner, and so on, because they have a certain quality and are related in a specific way to something good and important (like strength for athletic achievement).

This idea also becomes clear when we think about praising gods. It seems absurd for gods to be measured by our human standards. But this happens because praise always involves a reference to something else, a standard of comparison.

Now, if praise is for things like qualities and relationships, then clearly what applies to the very best things is not mere praise, but something greater and better. This is obvious.

• For gods, and for the most godlike of humans, we don’t just praise them; we call them blessed and happy.
• The same is true for good things. No one praises happiness in the same way they praise justice (which is a virtue). Instead, they call happiness blessed, recognizing it as something more divine and better.

Eudoxus, a philosopher, also seemed to be right when he argued for the superiority of pleasure. He thought that the fact that pleasure is a good thing but is not praised showed that it was better than things that are praised. He believed that God and “the good” are like this – all other things are judged by comparing them to God and the good.

• Praise is appropriate for virtue, because as a result of virtue, people tend to do noble deeds.
• Encomia (formal speeches of high praise) are given for specific accomplishments, whether of the body or of the soul.

Perhaps being very precise about these terms is more for people who specialize in studying speeches of praise. For us, it’s clear from what we’ve said that happiness is among the things that are prized and perfect (or final and complete).

It also seems to be prized because it is a first principle.

• It is for the sake of happiness that we all do everything else that we do.
• And we believe that the first principle and the ultimate cause of good things is something prized and divine.

13. Understanding Virtue to Understand Happiness

Since happiness is an activity of the soul that aligns with perfect virtue, we must now consider the nature of virtue. Perhaps by understanding virtue, we will better understand the nature of happiness.

The true student of politics (the science of how a city-state or society should be run) is also thought to have studied virtue above all things. This is because such a student wants to make his fellow citizens good people who are obedient to the laws.

• As examples of this, we have the lawmakers of ancient Crete and Sparta, and any others like them.

If this investigation into virtue belongs to political science, then pursuing it will clearly be in line with our original plan. But it’s also clear that the virtue we must study is human virtue. After all, the good we were looking for was human good, and the happiness we were seeking was human happiness.

By human virtue, we mean not the virtue of the body, but the virtue of the soul. And we also call happiness an activity of the soul. If this is true, then clearly the student of politics must know something about the facts concerning the soul.

• This is similar to how a doctor who is going to heal the eyes, or the body as a whole, must know about the eyes or the body.
• This knowledge is even more important for the student of politics, because politics is a more prized and better field than medicine. Even among doctors, the best educated ones spend a lot of effort learning about the human body.

So, the student of politics must study the soul. They must study it with these specific goals in mind (understanding virtue and happiness). And they should do so just to the extent that is sufficient for the questions we are currently discussing. Going into more precise detail than that is perhaps more work than our current purposes require.

The Parts of the Soul

Some things are said about the soul, adequately enough, even in discussions that happen outside our own school of thought, and we should use these ideas. For example, it is commonly said that:

• One part of the soul is irrational (does not use reason).
• Another part has a rational principle (uses reason).

Whether these two parts are separated like the parts of the body or like parts of anything that can be divided, or whether they are distinct by definition but naturally inseparable (like the convex and concave sides of the curve of a circle), does not affect our current discussion.

The Irrational Part of the Soul

Of the irrational part of the soul, one division seems to be very widespread and vegetative in its nature.

• By this, I mean the part that causes nutrition and growth.
• We must assign this kind of power of the soul to all infants and even to embryos. This same power is also in full-grown creatures. This is more reasonable than thinking they have some different power for nutrition and growth.

Now, the excellence or virtue of this vegetative part seems to be common to all species, not specifically human.

• This part or faculty seems to function most when we are asleep.
• Goodness and badness are least clear or obvious during sleep. (This is why people say that for half their lives, the happy are no better off than the miserable. This happens naturally enough, because sleep is a period of inactivity for the soul in the ways that it is called good or bad).
• Perhaps, to a small extent, some of the body’s movements (from this vegetative part) do actually penetrate to the conscious soul during sleep. In this respect, the dreams of good people might be better than those of ordinary people. However, that’s enough about this subject. Let’s leave the nutritive faculty alone, since by its nature, it has no share in specifically human excellence or virtue.

There seems to be another irrational element in the soul. However, this one, in a sense, does share in a rational principle.

• We praise the rational principle (reason) of the continent man (someone with self-control) and of the incontinent man (someone lacking self-control). We praise the part of their soul that has this principle because it urges them correctly and towards the best goals.
• But we also find in them another element that is naturally opposed to their rational principle. This other element fights against and resists that principle.
• It’s exactly like paralyzed limbs: when we intend to move them to the right, they turn to the left instead. The same happens with the soul: the impulses of incontinent people move in contrary directions to their reason.
• But there’s a difference: in the body, we can see the part that moves astray. In the soul, we do not see it directly.
• Nevertheless, we must suppose that in the soul too, there is something contrary to the rational principle, resisting and opposing it. (In what exact way it is distinct from the other elements does not concern us for now.)

Now, even this resistant, irrational element seems to have a share in a rational principle, as we said.

• At any rate, in the continent man (the self-controlled person), this irrational part obeys the rational principle.
• Presumably, in the temperate man (who is moderate and balanced) and the brave man, it is even more obedient. In such a person, this part speaks, on all matters, with the same voice as the rational principle.

Therefore, the irrational element of the soul also appears to be two-fold:

1. The vegetative element: This in no way shares in a rational principle.
2. The appetitive and generally the desiring element: This part, in a sense, does share in the rational principle, in so far as it listens to and obeys it.
   • This is the sense in which we speak of “taking account of” or “listening to” one’s father or one’s friends. It’s different from the sense in which we speak of “accounting for” a mathematical property, which is a purely intellectual use of reason.

That the irrational element is in some sense persuaded by a rational principle is also shown by the fact that we give people advice, and by all forms of reproof (criticism) and exhortation (urging someone to do something).

And if this desiring element (because it can obey reason) must also be said to have a rational principle, then the part of the soul “that has a rational principle” (as well as the part that does not) will be twofold:

1. One subdivision has reason in the strict sense and in itself (this is the purely thinking part).
2. The other subdivision has a tendency to obey reason, much like a child obeys a father.

Types of Virtue

Virtue, too, is distinguished into different kinds in accordance with this difference in the parts of the soul.

• We say that some virtues are intellectual (relating to thinking and understanding).
• Others are moral (relating to character and behavior).

Examples:

• Intellectual virtues: Philosophic wisdom, understanding, and practical wisdom (good judgment in action).
• Moral virtues: Liberality (generosity) and temperance (self-control).

When we are speaking about a man’s character, we don’t say that he is “wise” or “has understanding” to mean he is good-tempered. We say that he is “good-tempered” or “temperate.” Yet, we also praise the wise man with respect to his state of mind (his wisdom). And of these states of mind, those that deserve praise, we call virtues.

BOOK II

1. How We Develop Good Character (Moral Virtue)

We’ve said there are two kinds of virtue, or good human qualities: intellectual and moral.

• Intellectual virtue mostly comes from teaching. It needs experience and time to grow.
• Moral virtue, on the other hand, comes about from habit. In fact, the Greek word for moral virtue (ethike) is very similar to the Greek word for habit (ethos).

This tells us something important: none of the moral virtues are in us naturally. Why? Because nothing that exists by nature can be changed by habit to act against its nature.

• For instance, a stone naturally moves downwards. You can’t train it to move upwards, even if you throw it in the air ten thousand times.
• Fire can’t be trained to move downwards.
• Nothing that naturally behaves one way can be trained to behave another way.

So, virtues don’t come to us by nature, nor do they come by going against nature. Instead, we are naturally able to receive them, and then we perfect them through habit.

Learning by Doing

Think about things we get from nature, like our senses (sight, hearing, etc.).

• First, we have the potential (the ability to see or hear).
• Later, we actually use that ability (we see or hear). It wasn’t by seeing many times or hearing many times that we got these senses. It was the other way around: we had them before we used them; we didn’t get them by using them.

But virtues are different. We get virtues by first doing virtuous things. This is also true for skills in the arts.

• The things we have to learn before we can do them, we learn by doing them.
  • For example, people become builders by actually building things.
  • People become musicians by playing music.
• In the same way:
  • We become just (fair) by doing just actions.
  • We become temperate (self-controlled) by doing temperate actions.
  • We become brave by doing brave actions.

The Role of Laws and Habits

This idea is confirmed by what happens in societies.

• Lawmakers try to make citizens good by forming good habits in them.
• This is the goal of every good lawmaker. Those who don’t achieve this fail in their purpose.
• This is the key difference between a good system of government and a bad one.

Furthermore, every virtue (and every skill) is both created and destroyed by the same kinds of causes and actions.

• Playing music badly makes a bad musician; playing well makes a good one.
• The same is true for builders and all other skilled workers. People become good or bad builders by building well or badly. If this weren’t true, there would be no need for teachers. Everyone would just be born either good or bad at their craft.

This is also true for virtues:

• By the actions we take in our dealings with other people, we become either just or unjust.
• By the actions we take when facing danger, and by getting used to feeling fear or confidence in those situations, we become either brave or cowardly.
• The same applies to our desires and feelings of anger. Some people become self-controlled and even-tempered, while others become indulgent and quick to anger, all by behaving one way or another in relevant situations.

In a single sentence: Our character traits (states of character) develop from the activities we repeatedly do. This is why the activities we engage in must be of a certain kind. Our character will reflect the differences in these activities. So, it makes a huge difference – in fact, all the difference – whether we form good habits or bad habits from a very young age.

2. How to Act: Finding the Middle Way

Our current investigation is not like others that aim only for theoretical knowledge. We are not asking “What is virtue?” just to know the answer. We are asking so that we can become good people. If our study didn’t help us become good, it would be useless.

So, we must examine the nature of actions – specifically, how we ought to perform them. As we’ve said, our actions determine the kind of character traits we develop.

The “Right Rule” and Practical Matters

It’s a common principle that we must act according to the right rule or right reason. We can assume this for now and discuss it later. We’ll explore what the right rule is and how it relates to other virtues.

But we must agree on this beforehand: any discussion about how to conduct ourselves must be given in outline and not with perfect precision. We said at the beginning that the level of detail we demand should match the subject matter.

• Matters of conduct and questions about what is good for us don’t have the same kind of fixed certainty as, say, mathematics. They are more like matters of health, which can vary.
• If the general discussion is already somewhat imprecise, then talking about specific, individual cases will be even more lacking in exactness. Particular situations don’t fall under any exact skill or set of rules.
• In each case, the people involved must consider what is appropriate for that specific occasion. This is similar to what doctors or ship navigators have to do.

Avoiding Too Much or Too Little

Even though our current discussion has this somewhat imprecise nature, we must try to offer what help we can.

First, let’s consider this: it is the nature of things like health, strength, and virtue to be destroyed by too little (defect) and too much (excess). (To understand things we can’t see, like virtue, we can use examples of things we can see, like physical strength and health.)

• Both too much exercise and too little exercise destroy strength.
• Similarly, food or drink that is much more or much less than what’s needed destroys health.
• The amount that is in proportion is what produces, increases, and preserves health and strength.

This is also true for temperance (self-control), courage, and the other virtues:

• The person who runs away from everything, fears everything, and never stands their ground becomes a coward (this is a defect, too little courage).
• The person who fears nothing at all and rushes into every danger becomes rash (this is an excess, too much boldness without thought).
• Similarly, the person who indulges in every pleasure and avoids none becomes self-indulgent (an excess).
• The person who shuns every pleasure, like someone uncultured or crude, becomes somewhat insensitive (a defect).

So, temperance and courage are destroyed by too much or too little. They are preserved by finding the mean, or the middle way.

Practice Makes Perfect (and Maintains Virtue)

Not only are the sources and causes of their creation and growth the same as the causes of their destruction, but the actual practice or expression of these virtues will also be in the same areas. This is also true for things we can see more clearly, like strength:

• Strength is produced by eating enough food and doing enough physical work.
• And it is the strong person who will be most able to do these things (eat well and work hard).

The same applies to virtues:

• By abstaining from pleasures, we become temperate (self-controlled). Once we have become temperate, we are most able to abstain from those pleasures.
• Similarly with courage: by getting used to looking down on frightening things and standing our ground against them, we become brave. Once we have become brave, we are most able to stand our ground against them.

3. Pleasure and Pain: The Signs of Good Character

We must use the pleasure or pain that follows our actions as a sign of our state of character.

• The person who avoids bodily pleasures and actually enjoys doing so is temperate (self-controlled).
• The person who is annoyed by having to avoid them is self-indulgent.
• The person who stands firm against frightening things and enjoys this, or at least is not pained by it, is brave.
• The person who is pained by standing firm is a coward.

This is because moral excellence (virtue) is all about pleasures and pains.

• It is for the sake of pleasure that we do bad things.
• It is because of pain that we avoid doing noble things.

Therefore, as Plato said, we ought to have been brought up in a particular way from our earliest youth: to feel delight in and be pained by the things we should feel delight in or be pained by. This is the foundation of a good education.

More Reasons Virtue Involves Pleasure and Pain

Here are more reasons why virtue is connected to pleasures and pains:

• Virtues are concerned with actions and passions (emotions). Every passion and every action is accompanied by pleasure and pain. So, virtue must also be concerned with pleasures and pains.
• The use of punishment also shows this. Punishments often involve imposing pain or removing pleasure. Punishment is a kind of cure, and cures often work by applying opposites (e.g., something to counteract a harmful state).
• As we said a little while ago, every state of our soul (our character) is naturally related to and concerned with the kinds of things that tend to make it worse or better. People become bad because of pleasures and pains – specifically, by pursuing or avoiding:
  • The pleasures and pains they ought not to pursue or avoid.
  • Or pursuing/avoiding them when they ought not.
  • Or in a way they ought not.
  • Or by going wrong in other similar ways we could list.
• This is why some people even define virtues as certain states of being unaffected by passion (impassivity) or states of rest. But this isn’t quite right. They speak too simply, without adding important details like “feeling them as one ought,” and “when one ought or ought not,” and other similar qualifications.
• So, we assume that this kind of excellence (virtue) aims to do what is best with regard to pleasures and pains, while vice (bad character) does the opposite.

What We Choose and Avoid

These facts also show us that virtue and vice are concerned with pleasures and pains: There are three kinds of things we choose, and three kinds of things we avoid:

• Objects of choice:
  1. The noble (what is admirable and fine).
  2. The advantageous (what is useful and beneficial).
  3. The pleasant.
• Objects of avoidance (their opposites):
  1. The base (what is shameful and ugly).
  2. The injurious (what is harmful).
  3. The painful.

Regarding all of these, the good person tends to choose correctly, and the bad person tends to choose incorrectly. This is especially true concerning pleasure.

• Pleasure is common to all animals.
• It also accompanies all things we choose; even things that are noble and advantageous also appear to be pleasant.

The Challenge of Pleasure

Pleasure has grown up with all of us since we were infants. That’s why it’s difficult to rub off this feeling, deeply ingrained as it is in our lives. We even measure our actions, some of us more and others less, by the standard of pleasure and pain. For this reason, then, our whole investigation must be about these feelings. To feel delight and pain in the right way or the wrong way has a significant effect on our actions.

It is harder to fight against pleasure than against anger, as the philosopher Heraclitus said. But both skill (art) and virtue are always concerned with what is harder. Even good things are better when they are harder to achieve. Therefore, for this reason also, the whole concern of both virtue and political science is with pleasures and pains.

• The person who uses pleasures and pains well will be good.
• The person who uses them badly will be bad.

So, let’s take it as established that:

• Virtue is concerned with pleasures and pains.
• Virtue is increased by the same kinds of acts from which it arises. If those acts are done differently, virtue is destroyed.
• The acts from which virtue arose are the very acts in which it expresses itself.

4. Does Doing Good Actions Mean You’re Already Good?

A question might come up here: What do we mean by saying that we must become just by doing just acts, and temperate by doing temperate acts? If people are already doing just and temperate acts, doesn’t that mean they are already just and temperate? This would be like saying that if people do things according to the rules of grammar or music, they are already grammarians or musicians.

Is this true even for skills like grammar or music? Not quite. It’s possible to do something that follows the rules of grammar either by chance or because someone else suggested it. A person will only be a true grammarian when they have both:

1. Done something grammatical.
2. Done it grammatically – meaning, done it according to the grammatical knowledge they have within themselves.

The Difference Between Skills and Virtues

Also, the case of skills (the arts) and the case of virtues are not exactly the same.

• The products of skills have their goodness in themselves. So, it’s enough that the product (like a well-made table) has a certain quality.
• However, if acts that are in line with virtues have a certain quality (e.g., an act is fair), it does not automatically mean they are done justly or temperately. The person doing the act must also be in a certain condition:
  1. First, they must have knowledge (know what they are doing).
  2. Second, they must choose the acts, and choose them for their own sakes (not for some ulterior motive).
  3. Third, their action must come from a firm and unchangeable character.

These conditions (choosing for its own sake, and firm character) are not usually counted as necessary for having a skill, except for the basic knowledge. But for having virtues, knowledge actually has little or no weight compared to the other conditions. These other conditions count not just for a little, but for everything. And these very conditions (choosing for their own sake, firm character) are what result from often doing just and temperate acts.

How Virtuous People Act

So, actions are called just and temperate when they are the kind of actions that a just or temperate person would do. But the person who simply does these actions is not yet just and temperate. A person is just and temperate when they also do them in the way that just and temperate people do them (with the right inner state and motivation).

It is well said, then, that:

• It is by doing just acts that a just person is formed.
• It is by doing temperate acts that a temperate person is formed. Without doing these actions, no one would even have a chance of becoming good.

Theory vs. Practice

But most people don’t actually do these things. Instead, they take refuge in theory. They think they are being philosophers and will become good in this way. They behave somewhat like patients who listen carefully to their doctors but then do none of the things they are ordered to do.

• Just as those patients will not get well physically by such a course of treatment…
• …these people will not get well in their soul by such a course of philosophy.

5. What Kind of Thing is Virtue?

Next, we must consider what virtue is. Things found in the soul are of three kinds:

1. Passions: These are feelings like appetite, anger, fear, confidence, envy, joy, love, hatred, longing, jealousy, pity – generally, any feeling that is accompanied by pleasure or pain.
2. Faculties: These are the capacities that enable us to feel these passions. For example, the faculty of becoming angry, or of feeling pain, or of feeling pity.
3. States of character: These are the ways we are disposed to act or feel in relation to our passions. For example, with anger:
   • We are in a bad state if we feel it too violently or too weakly.
   • We are in a good state if we feel it moderately. The same applies to other passions.

Virtue must be one of these three things.

Virtue is Not a Passion

Neither virtues nor vices (bad character traits) are passions. Here’s why:

• We are not called good or bad based on our passions. We are called good or bad based on our virtues and vices.
• We are neither praised nor blamed for our passions.
  • The person who simply feels fear or anger is not praised.
  • Nor is the person who simply feels anger blamed.
  • But the person who feels anger in a certain way (e.g., too much, too little, or at the wrong time) might be blamed.
• However, for our virtues and vices, we are praised or blamed.

Also:

• We feel anger and fear without choosing to.
• But virtues are modes of choice, or they involve choice.
• Furthermore, in respect of passions, we are said to be “moved” by them. But in respect of virtues and vices, we are said not to be “moved,” but to be “disposed” or “inclined” in a particular way.

Virtue is Not a Faculty

For these reasons, virtues are not faculties either.

• We are not called good or bad, nor praised or blamed, for simply having the capacity to feel passions.
• Again, we have faculties by nature. But we are not made good or bad by nature (we’ve discussed this before).

Virtue is a State of Character

So, if virtues are neither passions nor faculties, the only thing remaining is that they must be states of character.

Thus, we have stated what virtue is in terms of its general category: it is a state of character.

6. What Kind of State of Character is Virtue? The Mean.

However, we must not only describe virtue as a state of character, but also say what sort of state it is.

We can observe that every virtue or excellence does two things:

1. It brings the thing of which it is an excellence into good condition.
2. It makes the work or function of that thing be done well.

For example:

• The excellence of the eye makes both the eye itself good and its work (seeing) good. It is by the excellence of the eye that we see well.
• Similarly, the excellence of a horse makes the horse both good in itself (a good specimen) and good at its functions: running, carrying its rider, and facing an enemy attack.

If this is true in every case, then the virtue of a human being will also be the state of character that:

1. Makes a person good.
2. Makes that person do their own work (or function) well.

We have already talked about how this happens, but it will become even clearer by considering the specific nature of virtue.

Finding the Intermediate (The Mean)

In everything that is continuous (like a line) and divisible (can be split into parts), it is possible to take:

• More
• Less
• Or an equal amount.

This “equal amount” can be understood in two ways:

1. In terms of the thing itself (objective).
2. Relatively to us (subjective, or personal). And the equal is an intermediate point between too much (excess) and too little (defect).

• By the intermediate in the object, I mean the point that is exactly halfway between the two extremes. This point is one and the same for all people.
  • For example, if 10 is “many” and 2 is “few,” then 6 is the intermediate in terms of the object. It exceeds 2 by 4, and 10 exceeds it by 4. This is an intermediate according to mathematical proportion.
• But the intermediate relatively to us is not to be taken this way. It is what is neither too much nor too little for a specific individual. This is not one single amount, nor is it the same for everyone.
  • For instance, if ten pounds of food is too much for a particular person to eat and two pounds is too little, it doesn’t automatically mean the trainer will order six pounds.
  • Six pounds might also be too much for the person who is supposed to eat it, or it might be too little. It would be too little for a champion athlete like Milo, but too much for a beginner in athletic training.
  • The same idea applies to activities like running and wrestling.

Thus, a master of any art or skill avoids excess and defect. Instead, they seek the intermediate and choose this – the intermediate that is not in the object itself but is relative to us.

If this is how every art or skill does its work well – by looking to the intermediate and judging its works by this standard – then virtue must also have this quality of aiming at the intermediate. (This is why we often say of good works of art that it’s not possible to take anything away or add anything to them. We mean that excess and defect destroy the goodness of artworks, while the mean preserves it. Good artists, as we say, look to this in their work.)

Furthermore, if virtue is more exact and better than any art (just as nature is also more exact and better than art), then virtue must aim at the intermediate. I mean moral virtue here, because moral virtue is concerned with passions (feelings) and actions. And in these passions and actions, there can be:

• Excess (too much).
• Defect (too little).
• And the intermediate (the right amount).

For instance, feelings like fear, confidence, appetite (desire), anger, pity, and generally pleasure and pain, can all be felt:

• Both too much,
• And too little. And in both cases, it is not good or “well felt.”

But to feel them:

• At the right times,
• With reference to the right objects (or situations),
• Towards the right people,
• With the right motive (reason),
• And in the right way, is what is both intermediate and best. And this is characteristic of virtue. Similarly with regard to actions also there is excess, defect, and the intermediate.

Now, virtue deals with feelings (passions) and actions. In these, doing too much (excess) is a form of failure, and doing too little (defect) is also a form of failure. But finding the intermediate or middle way is praised and is a form of success. Both being praised and being successful are characteristics of virtue. Therefore, virtue is a kind of mean (a middle way), because, as we’ve seen, it aims at what is intermediate.

Think of it this way:

• It’s possible to fail in many ways. (The ancient Pythagoreans suggested that evil belongs to the class of the unlimited or boundless, while good belongs to the class of the limited or defined).
• But it’s possible to succeed in only one way. (This is why one is easy and the other is difficult – it’s easy to miss the target, but difficult to hit it). For these reasons too, then, excess and defect are characteristics of vice (bad character), and the mean is characteristic of virtue.

As a poet said:

“For men are good in but one way, but bad in many.”

So, virtue is:

1. A state of character (a settled way of being).
2. Concerned with choice.
3. Lying in a mean – specifically, the mean that is relative to us (not a mathematical average, but what’s right for each individual in their situation).
4. This mean is determined by a rational principle (by reason).
5. And it’s determined by the principle by which a person of practical wisdom (someone with good judgment and experience in life) would determine it.

Virtue is a mean that lies between two vices (bad character traits):

• One vice involves doing too much (excess).
• The other vice involves doing too little (defect).

It’s also a mean because the vices either fall short of, or go beyond, what is right in both feelings and actions. Virtue, on the other hand, both finds and chooses what is intermediate. So, in terms of its basic nature and the definition that explains what it truly is, virtue is a mean. However, when we think about what is best and right, virtue is an extreme – meaning it’s the peak of excellence, not a mediocre compromise.

Not Everything Has a Mean

But not every action, nor every feeling, allows for a mean. Some things have names that already include the idea of badness. For example:

• Feelings: Spite (malice), shamelessness, envy.
• Actions: Adultery, theft, murder.

All of these things, and others like them, are bad in themselves just by their names. It’s not their excesses or deficiencies that are bad; the things themselves are bad.

• It’s not possible, then, ever to be right with regard to them. One must always be wrong.
• Goodness or badness with regard to such things doesn’t depend on committing adultery with the right woman, at the right time, and in the right way. Simply to do any of them is to go wrong.

It would be equally absurd, then, to expect that in unjust, cowardly, and self-indulgent actions there should be a mean, an excess, and a deficiency. If that were true, there would be a mean of doing too much and doing too little, an excess of excess, and a deficiency of deficiency! But just as there is no excess and deficiency of temperance and courage (because what is intermediate in these virtues is, in a sense, an extreme of goodness), the same is true for the inherently bad actions we mentioned. There is no mean, nor any excess or deficiency for them. However they are done, they are wrong. For, in general, there is neither a mean of excess and deficiency, nor an excess and deficiency of a mean.

7. Examples of Virtues as Middle Ways

We must not only make this general statement about virtue being a mean. We also need to apply it to individual, real-life situations. When we talk about conduct:

• General statements apply more widely.
• But statements about particular cases are more genuine or true to life, because conduct always has to do with individual situations. Our statements must match the facts in these cases.

We can take these examples from a sort of “table” or list of virtues and vices:

• Regarding feelings of Fear and Confidence:

  • The mean (virtue): Courage.
  • People who exceed:
    • Someone who exceeds in fearlessness (has too little fear) doesn’t have a common name (many of these states don’t).
    • Someone who exceeds in confidence (is overly confident) is Rash.
  • People who fall short:
    • Someone who exceeds in fear and falls short in confidence is a Coward.

• Regarding Pleasures and Pains (mainly pleasures, less so pains):

  • The mean (virtue): Temperance (self-control).
  • The excess: Self-indulgence (overdoing pleasures).
  • People deficient with regard to pleasures (who don’t enjoy them enough) are not often found. So, these people also don’t have a common name. Let’s call them “Insensible.”

• Regarding Giving and Taking Money (in smaller amounts):

  • The mean (virtue): Liberality (generosity in the right way).
  • The excess and defect (vices): Prodigality (wastefulness) and Meanness (stinginess).
  • In these actions, people go to extremes in opposite ways:
    • The prodigal person spends too much and often takes in too little (or from wrong sources to fund their spending).
    • The mean (stingy) person takes in too much (hoarding or getting money from anywhere) and spends/gives too little. (This is just a quick outline for now; we’ll define these states more precisely later.)

• Regarding Money (in larger amounts, like for public projects or significant gifts):

  • The mean (virtue): Magnificence (spending large sums appropriately and impressively). (The magnificent person is different from the liberal person; magnificence deals with large sums, liberality with small ones).
  • The excess (vice): Tastelessness and Vulgarity (spending too much in a showy, unrefined way).
  • The deficiency (vice): Niggardliness (being stingy with large sums). (These differ from the states related to liberality, and how they differ will be explained later.)

• Regarding Honor and Dishonor:

  • The mean (virtue): Proper Pride (also called “greatness of soul”; knowing your worth and acting accordingly regarding significant honors).
  • The excess (vice): What’s known as a sort of “Empty Vanity” (thinking you deserve more honor than you do).
  • The deficiency (vice): Undue Humility (thinking you deserve less honor than you do).
  • Just as we said liberality is related to magnificence but deals with small sums, there is a state similarly related to proper pride. This state is concerned with small honors, while proper pride is concerned with great honors.
  • It’s possible to desire honor as one should, or more than one should, or less than one should.
    • The person who exceeds in their desires for honor is called Ambitious.
    • The person who falls short is called Unambitious.
    • The intermediate person often has no specific name. Their dispositions (tendencies) are also nameless, except that the tendency of the ambitious person is called ambition.
    • This is why people at the extremes often try to claim the middle position for themselves. We ourselves sometimes call the intermediate person “ambitious” and sometimes “unambitious.” Sometimes we praise the ambitious person, and sometimes the unambitious one. (We’ll explain why we do this later. For now, let’s continue listing the other states in the same way.)

• Regarding Anger:

  • There is also an excess, a deficiency, and a mean.
  • Although these states barely have names, since we call the intermediate person Good-tempered, let’s call the mean (virtue) Good Temper.
  • Of the people at the extremes:
    • Let the one who exceeds (gets too angry) be called Irascible (quick-tempered), and his vice Irascibility.
    • Let the man who falls short (doesn’t get angry enough) be called an “Inirascible” sort of person (unemotional or spiritless), and the deficiency Inirascibility.

• Regarding Social Interactions (Words and Actions): There are also three other means. They are somewhat alike but different from each other.

  • They are all concerned with how we interact with others in words and actions.
  • They differ because:
    • One is concerned with truth in this area.
    • The other two are concerned with pleasantness.
      • One kind of pleasantness is shown in giving amusement (humor).
      • The other in all the circumstances of daily life.
  • We must speak of these too, so we can better see that in all things the mean is praiseworthy, and the extremes are neither praiseworthy nor right, but deserving of blame.
  • Most of these states also don’t have common names. But we must try, as in other cases, to invent names ourselves so that we can be clear and easy to follow.

  1. Regarding Truth in Social Interaction:

     • The intermediate person is a Truthful sort of person, and the mean (virtue) may be called Truthfulness.
     • The pretense that exaggerates is Boastfulness, and the person is a Boaster.
     • The pretense that understates is Mock Modesty, and the person is Mock-modest.

  2. Regarding Pleasantness in Giving Amusement (Humor):

     • The intermediate person is Ready-witted (clever and tactful in humor), and the disposition (virtue) is Ready Wit.
     • The excess is Buffoonery, and the person is a Buffoon (tries too hard, is tasteless or vulgar).
     • The man who falls short is a sort of Boor (dull, lacking a sense of humor), and his state is Boorishness.

  3. Regarding the Remaining Kind of Pleasantness (in Life Generally):

     • The man who is pleasant in the right way is Friendly, and the mean (virtue) is Friendliness.
     • The man who exceeds (is overly pleasant):
       • Is an Obsequious person if he has no particular goal in mind (just wants to please everyone).
       • Is a Flatterer if he is aiming at his own advantage.
     • The man who falls short and is unpleasant in all circumstances is a Quarrelsome and Surly sort of person.

• Means in Feelings (Passions) Themselves:

  • Shame: This is not exactly a virtue, yet praise is given to the modest man. Even in these feelings, one person is said to be intermediate, and another to exceed or fall short.
    • The Bashful man is one who exceeds – he is ashamed of everything.
    • He who falls short, or is not ashamed of anything at all, is Shameless.
    • The intermediate person is Modest.
  • Righteous Indignation: This is a mean between envy and spite. These states are concerned with the pain and pleasure we feel about the fortunes of our neighbors.
    • The person characterized by Righteous Indignation is pained at good fortune that is undeserved.
    • The Envious man, going beyond him, is pained at all good fortune of others (deserved or not).
    • The Spiteful man falls so far short of being pained that he even rejoices at others’ misfortune.

(There will be an opportunity to describe these states, and also justice, elsewhere. Justice doesn’t have one simple meaning, so after describing the other states, we will distinguish its two kinds and say how each of them is a mean. Similarly, we will also discuss the rational virtues later.)

8. How These Virtues and Vices Oppose Each Other

So, there are three kinds of dispositions (character states):

1. Two of them are vices (bad character traits), involving excess and deficiency respectively.
2. One is a virtue (a good character trait), which is the mean.

All of these are, in a sense, opposed to all the others:

• The extreme states (excess and defect) are contrary both to the intermediate state (the virtue) and to each other.
• The intermediate state is contrary to the extremes.

Think of it like numbers: the number 5 is larger compared to 3 (less), and smaller compared to 7 (greater). Similarly, the middle states (virtues) are excessive compared to the deficiencies, and deficient compared to the excesses, both in feelings and in actions.

• For example, the brave man appears:
  • Rash (too bold) when compared to the coward.
  • Cowardly when compared to the rash man.
• Similarly, the temperate man (self-controlled) appears:
  • Self-indulgent (too pleasure-seeking) when compared to the insensible man (who lacks pleasure).
  • Insensible when compared to the self-indulgent man.
• And the liberal man (generous) appears:
  • Prodigal (wasteful) when compared to the mean/stingy man.
  • Mean/stingy when compared to the prodigal man.

This is why people at the extremes tend to “push” the intermediate man towards the other extreme in their descriptions:

• The coward calls the brave man “rash.”
• The rash man calls the brave man “cowardly.” And this happens in other cases too.

Extremes are Most Opposite to Each Other

Since these states are opposed to one another in these ways, the greatest opposition is between the two extremes themselves, rather than between an extreme and the intermediate state.

• The extremes are further from each other than they are from the intermediate.
• Just as the number 10 is further from 2, and 2 from 10, than either is from 6 (their middle point).

Also, some extremes show a certain likeness to the intermediate state.

• For example, rashness has some similarity to courage.
• Prodigality (wastefulness) has some similarity to liberality (generosity). But the extremes show the greatest unlikeness to each other. Contraries are defined as the things that are furthest from each other. So, things that are further apart are more contrary.

Which Extreme is “More” Opposite to the Virtue?

Sometimes the deficiency is more opposed to the mean (the virtue); in other cases, the excess is more opposed.

• For example, it is not rashness (which is an excess of confidence), but cowardice (which is a deficiency of confidence and excess of fear), that is more opposed to courage.
• And it is not insensibility (a deficiency regarding pleasure), but self-indulgence (an excess regarding pleasure), that is more opposed to temperance.

This happens for two main reasons:

1. One reason comes from the nature of the thing itself:

   • Because one extreme is naturally nearer and more similar to the intermediate virtue, we don’t oppose this extreme to the virtue as much. Instead, we oppose its contrary (the other extreme, which is further away) to the virtue.
   • For example, since rashness is thought to be more like courage and closer to it, and cowardice seems more unlike courage, we consider cowardice to be more opposed to courage. Things that are further from the intermediate are thought to be more contrary to it.

2. Another reason comes from ourselves (our natural tendencies):

   • The things towards which we ourselves more naturally lean seem more contrary to the intermediate virtue.
   • For instance, most of us naturally tend towards pleasures. Because of this, we are more easily carried away towards self-indulgence than towards proper moderation.
   • So, we describe as “more contrary” to the mean those directions in which we more often go to great lengths.
   • Therefore, self-indulgence, which is an excess, is considered more contrary to temperance.

9. Being Good is Not Easy: Practical Advice

So, it has been stated clearly enough that:

• Moral virtue is a mean.
• In what sense it is a mean (it aims at the intermediate in feelings and actions).
• It is a mean between two vices: one involving doing too much (excess), the other doing too little (deficiency).

Because of all this, it is no easy task to be good. In everything, it’s not easy to find the middle. For example, finding the exact center of a circle is not for everyone, but only for someone who knows geometry. Similarly:

• Anyone can get angry – that is easy.
• Anyone can give or spend money – that is also easy. But to do this:
• To the right person,
• To the right extent (the right amount),
• At the right time,
• With the right motive (for the right reason),
• And in the right way… …that is not for everyone, nor is it easy. This is why goodness is both rare, praiseworthy, and noble.

Tips for Aiming at the Mean

Therefore, someone who aims at the intermediate (the virtue) must first:

1. Steer clear of the extreme that is more contrary to it. This is like the advice Calypso gave in the old story: “Hold the ship out beyond that surf and spray” (meaning, avoid the more obvious and dangerous extreme).

   • Of the two extremes, one is usually more wrong, and one less so.
   • Since hitting the mean perfectly is extremely hard, we must, as a “second best” option (as people say), choose the lesser of the two evils. This will be done best in the way we are describing.

2. Consider the things towards which we ourselves are easily carried away.

   • Different people tend towards different extremes.
   • We can recognize our own tendencies by noticing the pleasure and pain we feel in various situations.

3. Drag ourselves away towards the contrary extreme.

   • By pulling ourselves well away from our common error, we are more likely to land in the intermediate state.
   • This is like how people straighten sticks that are bent: they bend them in the opposite direction.

4. In everything, be most on guard against what is pleasant, or pleasure itself.

   • We do not judge pleasure impartially. We are biased towards it.
   • We should feel towards pleasure as the elders of Troy felt towards Helen. (They recognized her beauty but also the trouble she caused, and said it would be better if she left). If we can dismiss pleasure in this way, we are less likely to go wrong.

To sum it up: it is by doing these things that we shall best be able to hit the mean.

The Difficulty of Being Precise

But this is undoubtedly difficult, especially in individual cases. It’s not easy to determine by fixed rules:

• Exactly how one should be angry,
• And with whom,
• And on what kind of provocation (for what reason),
• And for how long.

We ourselves sometimes praise those who fall short in anger and call them good-tempered. But other times we praise those who get angry and call them manly or assertive.

• The person who deviates only a little from goodness is not blamed, whether they lean a bit towards doing too much or too little.
• Only the person who deviates more widely is blamed, because their error does not go unnoticed.

But it is not easy to determine by reasoning exactly up to what point and to what extent a person must deviate before they become blameworthy. This is like many other things that are perceived by our senses rather than calculated by rules. Such things depend on particular facts, and the decision rests with our perception or good judgment in the moment.

So much, then, is plain:

• The intermediate state is in all things to be praised.
• But we must sometimes incline towards the excess, and sometimes towards the deficiency.
• For by doing so (by aiming away from our natural bias), we shall most easily hit the mean and what is right.

BOOK III

1. Responsibility: Voluntary and Involuntary Actions

Virtue, or good character, is concerned with our feelings (passions) and our actions.

• When feelings and actions are voluntary (done by choice), they receive praise or blame.
• When they are involuntary (not done by choice), they may receive pardon, and sometimes even pity.

So, if we are studying the nature of virtue, it’s essential to distinguish between what is voluntary and what is involuntary. This is also useful for lawmakers when they are deciding on honors and punishments.

What Makes an Action Involuntary?

Actions are generally thought to be involuntary if they happen in one of two ways:

1. Under compulsion (being forced).
2. Due to ignorance.

An action is compulsory when the cause of the movement or action is outside the person, and the person who is acting or feeling the passion contributes nothing to it.

• For example, if you were carried somewhere by a strong wind, or by people who had you in their power.

“Mixed” Actions: A Gray Area

But what about things that are done out of fear of even worse things happening, or for some noble purpose?

• For instance, imagine a tyrant has your parents and children in his power. He orders you to do something shameful. If you do it, your family will be saved; if you don’t, they will be put to death. Is doing the shameful act in this situation voluntary or involuntary? This can be debated.

Something similar happens when sailors throw goods overboard during a storm.

• In an abstract sense, no one throws valuable goods away voluntarily.
• But to ensure the safety of himself and his crew, any sensible person does it.

Actions like these are called mixed actions, but they are more like voluntary actions. Here’s why:

• They are worthy of choice at the time they are done. The specific situation makes them the right thing to choose.
• The goal or purpose of an action depends on the specific occasion.
• So, the terms “voluntary” and “involuntary” must be applied by looking at the moment of action.

In these mixed situations, the person acts voluntarily.

• The part of them that moves their body parts (like their arms to throw things overboard) is within them.
• And when the source of movement is within the person themself, it’s in their power to do the action or not. Therefore, such actions are voluntary in the moment they are done. However, in an abstract sense (if you ignore the specific pressures), they might seem involuntary because no one would choose such an act for its own sake.

Praise, Blame, and Pardon for Mixed Actions

For such mixed actions, people are sometimes even praised. This happens when they endure something shameful or painful in return for achieving great and noble outcomes. In the opposite case, they are blamed. Enduring the greatest disgraces for no noble purpose, or for only a minor one, is the mark of an inferior person.

For some actions, praise is not given, but pardon is. This happens when someone does what they shouldn’t, but only under pressure that is too much for human nature to bear – pressure that no one could withstand.

However, there are perhaps some acts that we can never be forced to do. We should rather face death, even after the most fearful sufferings, than do them. For example, the reasons that supposedly “forced” Alcmaeon in Euripides’ play to kill his mother seem absurd (not truly compelling).

It’s sometimes difficult to determine what should be chosen at what cost, and what should be endured in return for what gain. It’s even more difficult to stick to our decisions once made.

• Usually, what we expect in these tough situations is painful.
• And what we feel forced to do is often shameful. This is why praise and blame are given based on whether people were truly compelled or not.

Defining Compulsory Acts More Clearly

So, what kind of acts should be called truly compulsory?

• We can say, without further qualification, that actions are compulsory when the cause is in external circumstances and the agent (the person acting) contributes nothing.

But what about those actions that are involuntary in themselves, but in a particular situation, and in return for certain gains, become worthy of choice? If the moving principle (the decision to act) is in the agent, then:

• These actions are involuntary in themselves (no one would want them otherwise).
• But they are voluntary now, in this situation, and for these gains. They are more like voluntary acts because actions are always about particular details, and these particular acts are voluntary. It’s not easy to state exactly what things should be chosen in return for what, because there are many differences in individual cases.

Can Pleasant or Noble Things “Compel” Us?

What if someone were to say that pleasant things and noble goals have a compelling power, forcing us from the outside? If that were true, then all actions would be compulsory for that person, because it is for these kinds of goals (pleasure and nobility) that all people do everything they do. This idea is rejected.

Consider this:

• People who act under true compulsion and unwillingly usually act with pain.
• But people who do acts because they are pleasant and noble do them with pleasure.

It’s absurd to:

• Make external circumstances responsible for our actions, and not ourselves (as if we are easily caught by such attractions).
• And it’s absurd to make ourselves responsible for our noble acts, but blame pleasant objects for our shameful acts.

So, a compulsory act seems to be one where the source of movement is outside the person, and the person being compelled contributes nothing.

Actions Done Due to Ignorance

Everything that is done by reason of ignorance is not voluntary. (This is a specific category). However, only an action that produces pain and repentance (regret) in the person who did it is truly involuntary due to ignorance.

• If a person does something because of ignorance but feels no annoyance or regret at their action, they have not acted voluntarily (since they didn’t know what they were doing). But they haven’t acted involuntarily either (since they are not pained by it).
• Such a person, who acts from ignorance and doesn’t repent, may be called a not-voluntary agent. Since they are different from someone who repents, it’s better they have their own distinct name.
• The person who acts by reason of ignorance and does repent is considered an involuntary agent.

Two Kinds of “Acting in Ignorance”

Acting by reason of ignorance also seems different from acting in ignorance.

• For example, a person who is drunk or in a rage is thought to act not as a result of ignorance itself, but as a result of being drunk or enraged. Yet, they are acting in a state of ignorance (not knowingly or clearly).

Ignorance and Wrongdoing

Every wicked person is ignorant of what they ought to do and what they ought to avoid. It is because of this kind of error that people become unjust and generally bad. But the term “involuntary” is usually not used if a person is merely ignorant of what is to their own advantage.

• A mistaken purpose (choosing the wrong goals in life) doesn’t cause involuntary action; it leads to wickedness.
• Ignorance of universal principles (general moral rules) is something people are blamed for.
• Involuntary action is caused by ignorance of particulars – that is, ignorance of the specific circumstances of the action and the objects with which it is concerned. Pity and pardon depend on these kinds of ignorance, because a person who is ignorant of any of these particular details acts involuntarily.

What Kind of Ignorance Makes an Act Involuntary?

Perhaps it’s useful, therefore, to determine the nature and number of these particular circumstances. A person might be ignorant of:

• Who they are (though this is rare unless mad).
• What they are doing.
• What or whom they are acting upon.
• Sometimes also what instrument they are using (e.g., a tool).
• To what end (e.g., they might think their act will lead to someone’s safety, but it doesn’t).
• How they are doing it (e.g., whether gently or violently).

No one could be ignorant of all of these details unless they were mad. And clearly, a person couldn’t be ignorant of the agent (the person acting), for how could they not know themself? But a person might be ignorant of what they are doing. For instance:

• People might say, “It just slipped out of my mouth while I was speaking.”
• Or, “I didn’t know it was a secret,” as the playwright Aeschylus said about the sacred mysteries.
• Or a person might say he “let it (a weapon) go off when he merely wanted to show how it worked,” as happened with someone demonstrating a catapult.

Other examples of ignorance of particular circumstances:

• One might think one’s son was an enemy, as Merope did in a play.
• One might think that a pointed spear had a protective button on it.
• One might think that a particular stone was pumice-stone (light and harmless) when it was actually heavy.
• One might give a person a drink to save them, but it actually kills them.
• One might want to merely touch a person, as people do in sparring or wrestling, but actually wound them.

So, the ignorance may relate to any of these things – the circumstances of the action. The person who was ignorant of any of these is thought to have acted involuntarily, especially if they were ignorant of the most important points. These important points are usually considered to be the circumstances of the action and its intended end or outcome. Furthermore, for an act to be called involuntary because of this sort of ignorance, it must be painful to the person afterward and involve repentance (regret).

Defining Voluntary Action

Since an involuntary action is done either under compulsion or by reason of ignorance (of particulars, with subsequent pain and repentance), then a voluntary action would seem to be one where:

1. The moving principle (the source of the action) is in the agent himself.
2. The agent is aware of the particular circumstances of the action.

Are Acts from Anger or Appetite Involuntary?

It’s probably not right to call acts done out of anger or appetite “involuntary.” Here’s why that argument is flawed:

• First, if acts from anger or appetite were involuntary, then no other animals would act voluntarily, and neither would children (since they often act from appetite and emotion).
• Second, is it meant that we do none of the acts due to appetite or anger voluntarily? Or is it that we do the noble acts that come from appetite or anger voluntarily, but the shameful acts involuntarily? That seems absurd, especially when one and the same thing (appetite or anger) is the cause.
• Surely it would be odd to describe as “involuntary” the things one ought to desire. We ought to be angry at certain things (like injustice) and we ought to have an appetite for certain things (like health and learning).
• Also, what is truly involuntary is thought to be painful. But what is done in accordance with appetite is generally thought to be pleasant.
• Again, what’s the real difference, in terms of being involuntary, between errors committed after careful calculation and those committed in a fit of anger? Both kinds of errors are to be avoided. But the irrational passions (like anger and appetite) are thought to be no less human than reason is. Therefore, actions that come from anger or appetite are also the person’s actions. It would be odd, then, to treat them as involuntary.

2. Understanding Choice

Now that we have distinguished between voluntary and involuntary actions, we must next discuss choice. Choice is thought to be:

• Very closely connected with virtue.
• A better indicator of a person’s character than their actions alone.

Choice vs. “The Voluntary”

Choice, then, seems to be voluntary, but it is not the same thing as “the voluntary” in general. “The voluntary” is a broader category.

• Both children and non-human animals share in voluntary action (they can move and act willingly to some extent). But they do not share in choice.
• We describe acts done on the spur of the moment as voluntary, but not as chosen.

What Choice Is Not

Those who say that choice is appetite, or anger, or a wish, or some kind of opinion do not seem to be right.

• Choice is not appetite or anger:
  • Choice is not common to irrational creatures, but appetite and anger are.
  • The person who lacks self-control (the incontinent person) acts with appetite, but not with choice.
  • The person who has self-control (the continent person), on the contrary, acts with choice, but not with (or against) appetite.
  • Appetite can be contrary to choice (e.g., you choose to diet, but your appetite wants cake). But appetite is not contrary to appetite in the same way.
  • Appetite relates to what is pleasant and painful. Choice relates neither to the painful nor to the pleasant in itself (though its consequences might be).
• Choice is still less anger: Acts due to anger are thought to be the furthest from being objects of choice.
• Choice is not a wish, though it seems close to it:
  • Choice cannot relate to impossible things. If anyone said they chose to achieve something impossible, they would be thought silly. But we can wish even for impossible things (e.g., for immortality).
  • A wish can relate to things that could in no way be brought about by one’s own efforts (e.g., wishing that a particular athlete or actor should win a competition). But no one chooses such things. We only choose things that we think could be brought about by our own efforts.
  • Again, a wish relates more to the end goal. Choice relates more to the means to achieve that goal. For instance, we wish to be healthy (the end), but we choose the specific actions that will make us healthy (the means). We wish to be happy and say we do, but we cannot properly say we choose to be happy (as if it’s a direct, immediate selection). In general, choice seems to relate to things that are in our own power.
• Choice is not opinion for these reasons too:
  • Opinion is thought to relate to all kinds of things – eternal things, impossible things, no less than things in our own power.
  • Opinion is distinguished by its being true or false. Choice is distinguished more by its being good or bad.
  • Perhaps no one even says choice is identical with opinion in general.
  • But it’s not identical even with any specific kind of opinion. By choosing what is good or bad, we become people of a certain character. We do not become people of a certain character simply by holding certain opinions.
  • We choose to get or avoid something good or bad. But we have opinions about what a thing is, or whom it is good for, or how it is good for them. We can hardly be said to “opine to get or avoid” something.
  • Choice is praised for being related to the right object or being the right choice, rather than just for being correctly formed. Opinion is praised for being true.
  • We choose what we best know to be good. But we often have opinions about things we do not quite know for sure.
  • It’s not always the same people who are thought to make the best choices and to have the best opinions. Some people are thought to have fairly good opinions, but because of some vice (bad character), they choose what they should not.
  • Whether opinion comes before choice or accompanies it doesn’t change this. We are not considering that relationship right now, but whether choice is some kind of opinion.

What Is Choice, Then?

So, what, or what kind of thing, is choice, since it is none of the things we have just mentioned?

• It certainly seems to be voluntary.
• But not everything that is voluntary seems to be an object of choice.

Is it, then, what has been decided upon as a result of previous deliberation? At any rate, choice involves a rational principle (reason) and thought. Even the name “choice” (prohairesis in Greek) seems to suggest that it is what is “chosen before” other things, or taken in preference.

3. What We Deliberate About

Do we deliberate about everything? Is everything a possible subject of deliberation, or is deliberation impossible about some things?

• We should probably say that a subject of deliberation is not what a fool or a madman would deliberate about, but what a sensible person would deliberate about.

Now, about eternal things, no one deliberates. For example:

• The material universe as a whole.
• The mathematical truth that the diagonal and the side of a square are incommensurable (cannot be expressed as a simple ratio).

No more do we deliberate about things that involve movement but always happen in the same way, whether this is due to necessity, nature, or some other cause. For example:

• The solstices (the longest and shortest days of the year).
• The risings of the stars.

Nor do we deliberate about things that happen now in one way, now in another, unpredictably. For example:

• Droughts and rains.

Nor do we deliberate about chance events. For example:

• The finding of a treasure.

We do not deliberate even about all human affairs if they are outside our control. For instance:

• No person from Sparta deliberates about the best system of government for the Scythians (an ancient people distant from Sparta). This is because none of these things can be brought about by our own efforts.

We deliberate about things that are in our power and can be done. These are, in fact, what is left after excluding the categories above.

• The causes of things are thought to be nature, necessity, and chance. But also considered as causes are reason and everything that depends on human agency.
• Now, every group of people deliberates about the things that can be done by their own efforts.

In the case of exact and self-contained sciences, there is no deliberation. For example:

• About the letters of the alphabet (we have no doubt how they should be written).

But the things that are brought about by our own efforts, but not always in the same way, are the things about which we do deliberate. For example:

• Questions of medical treatment (what’s best for this patient?).
• Questions of money-making (how best to invest or run a business?).

And we deliberate more in some fields than others:

• More in the art of navigation than in gymnastics, because navigation has been less precisely worked out.
• And similarly about other things, in the same proportion.
• We also deliberate more in the case of arts (practical skills) than in the case of sciences (theoretical knowledge), because we have more doubt and uncertainty about the arts.

Deliberation is concerned with:

• Things that happen in a certain way for the most part, but in which the specific outcome is unclear.
• And with things in which the outcome is indeterminate (not fixed beforehand).

We call in others to help us in deliberation on important questions, when we don’t trust ourselves as being able to decide alone.

Deliberation is About Means, Not Ends

We deliberate not about ends (goals), but about means (how to achieve those goals).

• A doctor does not deliberate whether he shall heal. That’s his assumed end.
• An orator (public speaker) does not deliberate whether he shall persuade.
• A statesman does not deliberate whether he shall produce law and order.
• No one else deliberates about their ultimate end in their specific role.

They assume the end and then consider how and by what means it is to be attained.

• If it seems that the end can be produced by several means, they consider by which means it can be produced most easily and best.
• If it is achieved by one means only, they consider how it will be achieved by this one means, and by what further means this step will be achieved. They continue this process until they arrive at the first cause – the first thing they need to do – which in the order of discovery is the last thing they identify.

The person who deliberates seems to investigate and analyze in the way described, as though they were analyzing a geometrical construction. (Not all investigation appears to be deliberation – for instance, mathematical investigations are not – but all deliberation is a form of investigation). And what is last in the order of analysis seems to be first in the order of action (what you do first).

• If we come upon an impossibility (e.g., we need money for a project, and this money cannot be obtained), we give up the search or deliberation.
• But if a thing appears possible, we try to do it. By “possible” things, I mean things that might be brought about by our own efforts. These, in a sense, include things that can be brought about by the efforts of our friends, since the initial moving principle (the start of the action) is in ourselves.

The subject of investigation (deliberation) is sometimes the instruments needed, sometimes the use of them. Similarly in other cases: sometimes it’s the means, sometimes it’s the mode of using that means, or the means of bringing that about.

It seems, then, as has been said, that a human being is a moving principle of actions.

• Now, deliberation is about the things to be done by the agent himself.
• And actions are for the sake of things other than themselves (i.e., for ends).

Therefore:

• The end cannot be a subject of deliberation, only the means.
• Nor, indeed, can particular facts be a subject of deliberation. For example, whether this is bread, or whether it has been baked as it should be. These are matters of perception (using our senses). If we were to be always deliberating about every single detail, we would have to go on to infinity.

Deliberation and Choice Are Closely Linked

The same thing is deliberated upon and is chosen, except that the object of choice is already determinate (decided upon). This is because the object of choice is that which has been decided upon as a result of deliberation. For everyone stops inquiring how they are to act when they have brought the moving principle (the starting point of action) back to themselves and to the ruling part of themselves (their reason and capacity for choice). For this is what chooses. This is also clear from the ancient systems of government, which Homer represented in his poems: the kings announced their choices (decisions) to the people.

The object of choice being one of the things in our own power which is desired after deliberation, choice will be deliberate desire of things in our own power. For when we have decided as a result of deliberation, we desire in accordance with our deliberation.

Okay, we’ve outlined what choice is. We said it’s about the things we do to reach our goals.

4. What We Wish For: The Good or What Seems Good?

We’ve already said that wish is for the end goal. But what exactly is that end goal?

• Some people think we wish for the good.
• Others think we wish for what appears to be good.

Let’s think about these two ideas.

If We Wish for “The Good” If we say that “the good” is always what we wish for, we run into a problem. What if someone makes a bad choice?

• If they wished for something that turned out to be bad, then according to this idea, they didn’t truly “wish” for it (because it wasn’t “good”).
• This doesn’t seem right.

If We Wish for “What Appears Good” If we say that “what appears good” is what we wish for, that also creates issues.

• This would mean there’s no single, natural thing that everyone wishes for. Instead, “good” is just whatever seems good to each individual.
• Different things appear good to different people. Sometimes, these ideas of good can even be opposites.

Finding a Better Answer Since both ideas have problems, let’s try another way:

• Absolutely and truly, the good is the object of wish. This means “the good” is the ultimate thing people aim for.
• But for each individual person, what they wish for is what appears good to them.
• So, what is truly an object of wish is what a good person wishes for. A bad person, on the other hand, might wish for anything at all.

Think about it like physical health:

• Things that are truly healthy are good for people in good physical condition.
• But for people who are sick, other things might seem helpful or desirable – things like bitter or sweet foods, or very hot or heavy items, and so on.

The good person judges every situation correctly. In each case, the truth appears to them.

• This is because every type of character (whether good or bad) has its own ideas about what is noble and pleasant.
• Perhaps the main difference between a good person and others is that the good person sees the truth in each type of situation. They are like a standard or a measuring stick for what is truly good.

Often, mistakes happen because of pleasure.

• Pleasure can appear to be a good thing even when it’s not.
• Because of this, we often choose pleasant things as if they are good, and we avoid painful things as if they are evil.

5. Virtue and Vice: They Are Up To Us

So, the end goal is what we wish for. The means (the ways to reach that goal) are what we think about and choose. Actions that concern these means must be based on our choice and are therefore voluntary – we do them willingly.

The practice of virtues is about these means. This means that virtue is also in our own power. And if virtue is in our power, then vice (bad character) is also in our power.

Here’s why:

• Where we have the power to act, we also have the power not to act. The reverse is also true.
• So, if acting is noble and it’s in our power to do it, then not acting (which would be shameful if action is called for) is also in our power.
• And if not acting is noble (e.g., refraining from a shameful deed) and it’s in our power, then acting (which would be shameful) is also in our power.

Now, if it’s in our power to do noble acts or shameful acts, and likewise in our power not to do them, and if this is what it means to be a good or bad person, then it is in our power to be virtuous or vicious.

Are People Wicked by Choice? There’s a saying: “No one is willingly wicked, nor unwillingly happy.” This seems partly true and partly false.

• It’s true that no one is happy against their will.
• But, wickedness is voluntary.

If we disagree with this, we’d have to argue against what we just said. We’d have to deny that a person is the source or originator of their actions, like a parent is the originator of their children. But if it’s clear that our actions come from principles within us, and we can’t trace them back to any other source, then the actions whose sources are in us must themselves be in our power and voluntary.

Evidence That Virtue and Vice Are Voluntary We see evidence for this idea in a couple of ways:

1. Individuals in their private lives: People generally act as if they and others are responsible for their actions.
2. Lawmakers:
   • They punish and seek payback from those who do wicked things (unless the person was forced, or was ignorant of something they weren’t responsible for knowing).
   • They honor those who do noble acts.
   • They do this to encourage good behavior and discourage bad behavior.
   • But no one tries to encourage people to do things that are not in our power or voluntary. For example, it’s pointless to try to persuade someone not to feel hot, or be in pain, or feel hungry, because we will experience these feelings anyway.

Punishing Ignorance Indeed, we even punish a person for their ignorance if we think they are responsible for it.

• For example, penalties for crimes committed while drunk might be doubled. The reason is that the person had the power not to get drunk, and getting drunk was the cause of their ignorance (e.g., not knowing what they were doing).
• We also punish people who are ignorant of laws they should know, especially if those laws are not hard to learn.
• The same goes for anything else people are ignorant of through carelessness. We assume it’s in their power not to be ignorant if they have the power to take care.

Can Someone Be Blamed for Not Taking Care? Someone might argue: “But maybe a person is just the kind of person who doesn’t take care.” Even so, people are responsible for becoming that kind of person through their consistently careless lifestyles.

• People make themselves unjust by repeatedly cheating.
• People make themselves self-indulgent (e.g., lacking self-control with desires) by repeatedly spending their time in drinking parties and similar activities.
• It is the activities we practice regarding particular things that create our character. This is clear from people training for any competition or action; they practice that specific activity all the time.
• To not know that our character is formed by repeatedly doing certain actions is the mark of a completely clueless person.

Also, it’s irrational to suppose that a person who acts unjustly doesn’t want to be unjust (at the moment of choosing the action, or in forming the habit), or that a person who acts without self-control doesn’t want to be self-indulgent.

• If a person, without being ignorant, does the things that will make them unjust, they will become unjust voluntarily.
• However, it doesn’t mean that if an unjust person suddenly wishes to be just, they will immediately become just.
• Think of a sick person. They don’t become well just by wishing for it. Suppose someone becomes ill voluntarily – for example, by living an unhealthy life and ignoring their doctors’ advice. In that situation, it was possible for them not to be ill (before they made those choices). But now that they have thrown away their health, it’s no longer immediately possible, just like when you’ve thrown a stone, it’s too late to get it back. Yet, it was in your power to throw the stone because the starting point of the action was in you.
• It’s the same for the unjust person and the self-indulgent person. At the beginning, it was possible for them not to become that kind of person. So, they are unjust and self-indulgent voluntarily. But now that they have become that way, it’s not immediately (or easily) possible for them not to be that way.

Vices of the Body Can Also Be Voluntary It’s not just vices of the soul (character flaws) that are voluntary. Vices of the body can also be voluntary for some people, and we blame them for it.

• No one blames people who are born unattractive.
• But we do blame those whose unattractiveness is due to lack of exercise and care.
• It’s similar with weakness or disability. No one would criticize a person who is blind from birth, or due to a disease, or from an accident. Instead, we would pity them.
• However, everyone would blame a person who became blind because of drunkenness or some other form of self-indulgence. So, for vices of the body, those that are in our own power are blamed, while those not in our power are not. If this is true for physical flaws, then in other cases too, the vices that are blamed must be in our own power.

Character and How Things Appear to Us Now, someone might argue: “All people desire what appears good to them, but they don’t have control over how things appear. The end goal appears to each person in a way that matches their character.”

Our reply is this:

• If each person is somehow responsible for their state of mind (their character), then they will also be somehow responsible for how things appear to them.
• But if they are not responsible for their state of mind, then no one is responsible for their own wrongdoing. Everyone does evil acts because they are ignorant of the true end goal, thinking that by these actions they will get what is best for them.
• In this second scenario, aiming at the end goal is not something we choose for ourselves. Instead, a person would have to be born with a kind of “eye” that allows them to judge rightly and choose what is truly good. A person who is naturally gifted with this “eye” would be truly well-endowed by nature. This “eye” would be the greatest and noblest thing, something we cannot get or learn from someone else, but must have exactly as it was given to us at birth. To be well and nobly endowed with this would be perfect and true natural excellence.

If this “born with an eye” theory is true, then how could virtue be any more voluntary than vice?

• For both the good person and the bad person, the end goal would appear to them and be fixed by nature (or in some other way beyond their control).
• And people would do whatever they do by relating everything else to this naturally determined end goal.

So, we have two possibilities regarding the end goal:

1. Either the way the end appears to each person is not solely determined by nature, but something about it also depends on the person themselves.
2. Or, the end is determined by nature, but because the good person voluntarily chooses the means to achieve that end, virtue is voluntary.

In either case, vice will also be no less voluntary. Why? Because for the bad person, even if their end (what seems good to them) is not their choice, their actions (the means they choose) still involve something that depends on them.

So, if, as we assert, virtues are voluntary (because we are somehow partly responsible for our character, and it is by being certain kinds of people that we view the end goal in a certain way), then vices also will be voluntary, for the same reasons.

Summary of Virtues in General So far, concerning virtues in general, we’ve established in outline:

• They are means (or intermediate states between extremes).
• They are states of character.
• They tend, by their very nature, to lead to doing the kinds of actions by which they are developed.
• They are in our power and voluntary.
• They operate as the right rule or principle prescribes.

Actions vs. States of Character: How They Are Voluntary However, actions and states of character are not voluntary in exactly the same way:

• Actions: We are masters of our actions from the beginning right to the end, as long as we know the particular facts of the situation.
• States of character: We control the beginning of developing our states of character. However, the gradual progress of a character state forming is not always obvious, much like how an illness develops gradually.
• But, because it was in our power to act in a certain way or not to act in that way (which led to the character state), the states of character themselves are therefore considered voluntary.

Now, let’s take up the different virtues one by one. We’ll discuss what they are, what kinds of things they deal with, and how they deal with them. At the same time, it will become clear how many virtues there are.

And first, let us speak of courage.

6. Courage: Facing Fear and Danger

We’ve already mentioned that courage is a mean (a balanced middle point) concerning feelings of fear and confidence.

What We Fear Plainly, the things we fear are terrible things. Generally speaking, these are evils. This is why people even define fear as the “expectation of evil.”

Now, we fear many kinds of evils, for example:

• Disgrace or dishonor
• Poverty
• Disease
• Having no friends
• Death

But the brave person is not thought to be concerned with all these kinds of evils.

• To fear some things is actually right and noble, and it’s shameful not to fear them. For example, disgrace.
  • Someone who fears disgrace is a good and modest person.
  • Someone who does not fear disgrace is shameless.
  • Sometimes, a shameless person might be called “brave” by people, but this is a misuse of the word. They might seem fearless like a brave person, but true bravery isn’t about being shameless.
• We perhaps ought not to fear poverty or disease, or generally things that don’t come from our own bad behavior (vice) and are not our own fault.
• But even the person who is fearless about these things is not automatically brave in the true sense. Yet, we might also call them brave because of a similarity in fearlessness.
  • For instance, some people who are cowards in the dangers of war might be very generous and confident when it comes to losing money.
• A person is not a coward if they fear insult to their wife and children, or if they fear envy, or similar things.
• Nor is a person brave if they are confident when they are about to be whipped.

What Kind of Terrible Things Concern the Brave Person? So, what kind of terrible things is the brave person concerned with? Surely, with the greatest and most serious ones. No one is more likely than the brave person to stand their ground against what is truly awe-inspiring or terrifying.

Death is the most terrible of all things.

• It is the end of everything.
• Nothing is thought to be any longer good or bad for the person who is dead.

However, the brave person would not seem to be concerned even with death in all circumstances. For example, they aren’t especially called brave for facing death at sea in a storm or death from a disease in the same way they are for facing death in battle.

In what circumstances, then, is bravery regarding death most apparent? Surely, in the noblest circumstances.

• Such deaths are those that happen in battle. These occur in the greatest and noblest kind of danger.
• These kinds of deaths are correspondingly honored in city-states and by rulers.

Properly, then, the person who will be called brave is someone who is fearless in the face of a noble death, and fearless in all emergencies that involve death, where such death can be noble. The emergencies of war are in the highest degree of this kind.

Yet, at sea or in disease, the brave person can also be fearless, but not in the same way as, say, experienced sailors.

• The brave person in such a situation (like a shipwreck if they are not a sailor) might have given up hope of being saved and dislikes the idea of dying in that particular way.
• The sailors, on the other hand, might be hopeful because of their experience and skill.

At the same time, we show courage in situations where there is an opportunity to show prowess (skill and strength) or where death is noble. In many forms of death, like some at sea or from disease, neither of these conditions (opportunity for prowess or a noble end) is fulfilled.

7. How the Brave Person Acts

What is considered terrible is not the same for all people.

• But we do say there are things so terrible they are beyond human strength to endure. These things, then, are terrible to everyone—or at least to every sensible person.
• The terrible things that are not beyond human strength differ in how big or serious they are. The same is true for things that inspire confidence.

The brave person is as dauntless (unafraid) as a human being can be.

• Therefore, while they will fear even the things that are not beyond human strength (because they are sensible), they will face them as they ought to and as the rule or principle directs, for the sake of honor. This is because honor is the end goal of virtue.

But it’s possible to fear these things more than one should, or less than one should. It’s also possible to fear things that are not really terrible as if they were.

Mistakes in this area can happen in several ways:

• Fearing what one should not fear.
• Fearing in a way that one should not (e.g., too much or too little).
• Fearing when one should not.
• And so on. The same kinds of mistakes can be made regarding things that inspire confidence.

The person who is truly brave:

• Faces and fears the right things.
• From the right motive.
• In the right way.
• At the right time.
• And feels confidence under the corresponding correct conditions. This is because the brave person feels and acts according to what the situation deserves and in whatever way the right rule or principle directs.

Now, the end goal of every activity is to be consistent with the state of character that corresponds to that activity. This is true for the brave person just as it is for others. But courage is a noble thing. Therefore, the end goal of courage is also noble. For each thing is defined by its end goal. So, it is for a noble end that the brave person endures and acts as courage directs.

Extremes Related to Courage:

• Excess in Fearlessness (No Fear at All):
  • The person who goes to excess in being fearless doesn’t really have a specific name. (We’ve said before that many states of character don’t have names.)
  • Such a person would be a kind of madman or an insensitive person if they feared nothing at all—neither earthquakes nor huge waves, as they say the Celts do not.
• Excess in Confidence about Terrible Things (Rashness):
  • The person who exceeds in confidence when facing what really is terrible is called rash.
  • The rash person is also often thought to be boastful and only a pretender to courage.
  • At any rate, the rash man wishes to appear brave in terrible situations, just as the brave man is brave. So, he imitates the brave man in situations where he thinks he can get away with it.
  • Because of this, most rash people are actually a mixture of rashness and cowardice. They display confidence in some situations (where they can manage it), but they do not hold their ground when faced with things that are truly terrible.
• Excess in Fear (Cowardice):
  • The person who exceeds in fear is a coward.
  • A coward fears what they ought not to fear, and fears in a way they ought not to, and so on for all similar characteristics.
  • A coward is also lacking in confidence.
  • But a coward is more noticeable for their excessive fear in painful or frightening situations.
  • The coward, then, is a despairing kind of person, because they fear everything.

The brave person, on the other hand, has the opposite disposition. Confidence is the mark of a hopeful disposition.

So, the coward, the rash person, and the brave person are all concerned with the same objects (things that inspire fear or confidence). But they are differently disposed or oriented towards them:

• The first two (coward and rash person) either exceed or fall short of the ideal.
• The third (the brave person) holds the middle position, which is the right position.

Also:

• Rash people tend to be precipitate (they rush into things). They wish for dangers before they arrive, but then they draw back when they are actually in them.
• Brave people, in contrast, are keen and ready in the moment of action, but they are calm and quiet beforehand.

Courage: Choosing and Enduring for a Noble Reason As we have said, then, courage is a mean (a balanced middle) with respect to things that inspire confidence or fear, in the circumstances that have been described. And courage chooses or endures things because it is noble to do so, or because it is shameful (base) not to do so.

But to die simply to escape from poverty, or from the pain of love, or from anything painful, is not the mark of a brave person. Rather, it is the mark of a coward.

• It is a kind of softness or weakness to run away from what is troublesome.
• Such a person endures death not because it is a noble act, but merely to escape from an evil (pain or suffering).

8. Other Things People Call “Courage”

Courage, then, is something like what we’ve described. But the name “courage” is also applied to five other kinds of behavior or states that are not true courage in this primary sense.

(1) The Courage of Citizen-Soldiers First comes the courage of the citizen-soldier. This type is the most like true courage.

• Citizen-soldiers seem to face dangers because of:
  • The penalties imposed by the laws and the reproaches (criticism, shame) they would otherwise face if they were cowardly.
  • The honors they win by acting bravely.
• Therefore, those communities or peoples seem to be the bravest where cowards are held in dishonor and brave men are held in honor.
• This is the kind of courage that the poet Homer depicts, for example, in characters like Diomede and Hector.
  • (The original text includes quotes here showing characters motivated by fear of shame or desire for glory.)
  • One character might say, “Polydamas will be the first to blame me.”
  • Another might boast, “Hector will say that his enemy was afraid and fled.”
• This kind of courage is most like the true courage we described earlier because it is motivated by virtue (or something very close to it). It comes from:
  • A sense of shame (wanting to avoid doing something shameful).
  • A desire for a noble object (specifically, honor).
  • The avoidance of disgrace, which is considered ignoble (not noble).

One might also include in this same category those soldiers who are compelled by their rulers to fight. However, these are inferior to citizen-soldiers acting from honor because:

• They do what they do not from shame, but from fear (of their rulers).
• They are trying to avoid not what is disgraceful, but what is painful (punishment from their commanders).
• Their masters compel them. For example, Hector is quoted as saying: “If I see anyone cowardly and trying to stay out of the fight, they won’t escape the dogs (i.e., severe punishment or a dishonorable death).”
• Officers who assign soldiers their posts and then beat them if they retreat are doing the same thing. So are those who line up their troops with trenches or other obstacles behind them, leaving no room for escape. All of these are forms of compulsion.

But a person ought to be brave not because they are forced to be, but because it is a noble thing to be brave.

(2) Experience as “Courage” Having experience with particular kinds of dangers or situations is also sometimes thought to be courage. This is indeed the reason why Socrates thought that courage was a form of knowledge.

Other people, like professional soldiers, show this quality based on their experience in different dangers, especially the dangers of war.

• In war, there seem to be many empty alarms—situations that look dangerous but aren’t, or where the danger is less than it appears. Professional soldiers have seen these many times.
• So, they appear brave because others, who lack this experience, don’t understand the true nature of these situations.
• Also, their experience makes them very skilled in attacking and defending themselves. They know how to use their weapons effectively and have the best kind of gear for both offense and defense.
• Therefore, they fight like trained, armed men against unarmed people, or like professional athletes against amateurs. In such contests, it’s not always the bravest people who fight best, but usually those who are strongest and in the best physical condition.

However, professional soldiers can turn into cowards when:

• The danger becomes too overwhelming.
• They are badly outnumbered or don’t have enough equipment.
• In such cases, they are often the first to run away.
• Citizen-soldiers, on the other hand (like those fighting for their city out of duty), might die at their posts rather than flee. An example of this apparently happened at the temple of Hermes.
  • For these citizen-soldiers, running away is considered disgraceful, and they see death as preferable to surviving in shame.
  • The professional soldiers, from the very beginning, faced the danger thinking they were stronger or better equipped. When they realize the situation is not in their favor, they run away, fearing death more than they fear disgrace.
  • But the truly brave person is not like that.

(3) “Courage” from Passion or Strong Emotion Sometimes, passion (like intense anger or spirit) is also counted as courage.

• People who act from passion, like wild animals rushing at those who have wounded them, are often thought to be brave.
• This is partly because truly brave individuals can also be passionate. Passion, more than anything, makes one eager to rush into danger.
• Homer’s epic poems have lines like “put strength into his passion,” “aroused their spirit and passion,” “hard he breathed panting,” and “his blood boiled.” All these phrases seem to show the stirring and attack-drive of passion.

Now, there’s a key difference:

• Truly brave people act for the sake of honor, and passion might help them in their actions.
• Wild animals, however, act because of pain (they attack because they’ve been wounded) or because they are afraid. If they are safe in a forest, they don’t just come looking for a fight.
• So, animals are not truly brave. They rush into danger driven by pain and passion, without thinking ahead about any of the actual perils. If this was bravery, then even donkeys would be brave when they are very hungry, because even being hit won’t drive them away from their food.
• Similarly, lust can make adulterers do many daring things, but this isn’t courage.
• So, creatures (or people) are not brave if they are driven towards danger merely by pain or passion.

The “courage” that comes from passion seems to be the most natural kind of impulsive bravery. It could become true courage if choice (a reasoned decision) and the right motive (like acting for a noble reason) were added to it.

Both humans and animals feel pain when they are angry, and they feel pleased when they get revenge.

• However, those who fight for these reasons (anger, revenge) are pugnacious (they like to fight, are aggressive) but they are not brave in the true sense.
• They don’t act for the sake of honor, nor do they act as reason directs. They act from the strength of their feelings.
• They do, however, have something that looks a bit like courage.

(4) “Courage” in Optimistic People People who are very sanguine (naturally optimistic and confident) are not truly brave either.

• They are confident in dangerous situations only because they have won many times and against many opponents in the past.
• They do look a lot like brave people because both types are confident.
• But brave people are confident for the reasons we discussed earlier (they understand the risks, act for honor, and follow reason). Sanguine people are confident because they simply think they are the strongest and that nothing bad can happen to them.
• (Drunken people also behave this way; they become overly optimistic and confident).
• However, when their adventures don’t turn out well, these sanguine people usually run away.
• But it was the mark of a truly brave person to face things that are terrible, and seem terrible, for a human being, because it is noble to do so and disgraceful not to.

This is why it is also thought to be a sign of greater courage to be fearless and undisturbed in sudden alarms rather than in dangers that were foreseen.

• Fearlessness in sudden danger must have come more from a person’s established state of character, because there was less time for preparation.
• Actions that are foreseen can be chosen based on calculation and reasoned planning, but sudden actions must be based on one’s inner character.

(5) “Courage” in Ignorant People People who are ignorant of the danger also appear brave.

• They are not very different from those with a sanguine temperament, but they are inferior because they don’t have any self-reliance (that feeling of “I can handle this”), whereas sanguine people do (from past victories).
• This is why sanguine people might hold their ground for a while.
• But those who have been deceived about the facts (the ignorant ones) will run away if they find out or even suspect that the situation is different from what they initially supposed. This happened to the Argives when they unexpectedly encountered the Spartans and had mistaken them for Sicyonians (who they presumably considered less of a threat).

So, we have now described the character of truly brave people and also the characters of those who are often thought to be brave but aren’t, in the truest sense.

9. Courage, Pain, and Noble Goals

Although courage deals with feelings of both confidence and fear, it is not concerned with both equally. It is more concerned with the things that inspire fear.

• A person who is undisturbed in the face of fearful things and behaves as they should towards them is more truly brave than a person who only behaves well towards things that inspire confidence.
• It is for facing what is painful, then, as we’ve said, that people are called brave.
• This is why courage also involves pain, and it is justly praised. It is harder to face what is painful than it is to stay away from what is pleasant.

Yet, it might seem that the end goal which courage aims for is pleasant (like victory, peace, or honor). But this pleasant end is often hidden by all the difficult and painful circumstances that come with it.

• This also happens in athletic contests. For example, the end goal for boxers is pleasant—the winner’s crown and the honors. But the blows they take are very distressing to their bodies and painful. Their whole effort is also exhausting and painful.
• And because there are so many painful blows and so much exertion, the end goal, which is just one small thing (the crown), can appear to have nothing pleasant about it when you’re going through the process.

So, if the situation with courage is similar:

• Death and wounds will be painful to the brave person, and they will face them against their natural inclination to avoid pain.
• But the brave person will face them anyway, because it is noble to do so, or because it is shameful (base) not to do so.

And consider this:

• The more a person possesses complete virtue, and the happier they are in life, the more pained they will be at the thought of death.
• This is because life is most worth living for such a good and happy person. They are knowingly losing the greatest goods a person can have, and this is naturally painful.
• But this person is no less brave. Perhaps they are even more brave, because they choose to perform noble deeds in war at such a great personal cost (the potential loss of a very good life).

It is not the case, then, with all the virtues that practicing them is always pleasant, except in so far as the practice reaches its ultimate end goal.

It’s quite possible that the very best soldiers are not always people of this perfectly virtuous and happy sort. Instead, the best soldiers might sometimes be those who are less brave (in this deep philosophical sense) but who have no other great goods in their lives to lose.

• These individuals are often ready to face danger.
• They are willing to “sell their lives” for relatively small gains or rewards.

So much, then, for our discussion of courage. It is not too difficult to grasp its basic nature, at least in outline, from what we have said.

10. Temperance: Dealing with Pleasures

After courage, let us speak of temperance. Courage and temperance seem to be the virtues of the irrational (non-reasoning) parts of our soul.

We have already said that temperance is a mean (a balanced middle state) with regard to pleasures.

• (It is less concerned with pains, and not in the same way that courage is concerned with pains).
• Self-indulgence (the vice of excessive pleasure-seeking) also shows up in this same area of pleasures.

Now, therefore, let us determine what kind of pleasures temperance and self-indulgence are concerned with.

We can start by distinguishing between:

1. Bodily pleasures
2. Pleasures of the soul, such as the love of honor or the love of learning.
   • When someone loves honor or learning, they delight in that thing itself. Their body is not directly affected; rather, it’s their mind that experiences the pleasure.
   • People who are concerned with these kinds of “soul pleasures” are called neither temperate nor self-indulgent.
   • The same applies to those concerned with other pleasures that are not bodily. For example, people who love hearing and telling stories and who spend their days on whatever trivial thing comes up are called gossips, but not self-indulgent. Nor do we call people self-indulgent if they are pained at the loss of money or friends.

Temperance must be concerned with bodily pleasures. But it’s not even concerned with all bodily pleasures.

• Consider those who delight in objects of vision, like colors, shapes, and paintings. They are called neither temperate nor self-indulgent based on these pleasures. Yet, it would seem possible to delight in these things either as one should (the right amount), or too much (excess), or too little (deficiency).
• The same is true for objects of hearing. No one calls those who delight extravagantly in music or acting self-indulgent, nor are those who enjoy them appropriately called temperate based on this alone.
• Nor do we apply these names (temperate or self-indulgent) to those who delight in smell, unless it’s in an indirect way.
  • We do not call people self-indulgent if they delight in the odor of apples, or roses, or incense.
  • Rather, we might call self-indulgent those who delight in the odor of perfumes or of rich, dainty dishes. Why? Because self-indulgent people delight in these smells because these smells remind them of the actual objects of their appetite (the perfume they want to use, or the food they want to eat).
  • You can see even other people, when they are hungry, delighting in the smell of food. But to delight in this kind of thing (smells that are directly connected to satisfying a bodily appetite) is a mark of the self-indulgent person, because these things are direct objects of appetite for them.

Interestingly, animals other than humans don’t seem to experience pleasure from these senses (smell, sight, hearing) in relation to food, except incidentally (as a side-effect of getting to the food).

• For example, dogs don’t delight in the scent of hares themselves, but in the eating of them. The scent just told them the hares were nearby.
• Nor does a lion delight in the lowing sound of an ox, but in eating it. The lion perceived by the lowing that the ox was near, and therefore appears to delight in the lowing (as a sign of food).
• Similarly, a lion doesn’t delight just because he sees “a stag or a wild goat,” but because he is about to get a meal from it.

Temperance and self-indulgence, however, are concerned with the kind of pleasures that the other animals do share in. These pleasures therefore appear somewhat slavish (like those of a slave, not a free person) and brutish (like those of an animal). These pleasures are primarily those of touch and taste.

But even of taste, animals and self-indulgent people appear to make little or no refined use.

• The true business of taste is the discriminating of flavors. This is what wine-tasters do, or people who season dishes carefully.
• But self-indulgent people hardly take pleasure in making these fine discriminations. Instead, they take pleasure in the actual enjoyment or sensation, which in all cases (food, drink, and sexual intercourse) comes through the sense of touch.
• This is why a certain gourmand (a person who is excessively fond of eating fine food) famously prayed that his throat might become longer than a crane’s. He implied that it was the physical sensation of contact and swallowing that he took pleasure in.

Thus, the sense with which self-indulgence is most closely connected is touch, which is the most widely shared of all the senses among animals. Self-indulgence would seem to be justly a matter of reproach (blame or disapproval) because it attaches to us not in our capacity as human beings, but in our capacity as animals. To delight in such things, then, and to love them above all others, is brutish.

For even among the pleasures of touch, the most liberal (meaning refined, or fitting for a free and cultivated person) have been set apart from basic self-indulgence. For example, the pleasures produced in the gymnasium by rubbing and by the warmth that results. The contact characteristic of the self-indulgent person does not affect the whole body in a healthy way, but only certain parts related to basic appetites.

11. Appetites: Natural, Acquired, and How We Go Wrong

Of the appetites we have, some seem to be common to all people, while others are peculiar to individuals and are acquired (learned or developed).

• For example, the appetite for food is natural. Everyone who is without food craves food or drink, and sometimes both.
• The appetite for love (or sex) is also natural, as Homer says, if a person is young and vigorous.
• But not everyone craves this or that specific kind of nourishment or love, nor do they all crave the same things. Hence, such specific cravings appear to be very much “our own” or individual.
• Yet, even these individual cravings have something natural about them. Different things are pleasant to different kinds of people, and some things are more pleasant to everyone than just random objects.

Now, in the natural appetites, few people go wrong, and when they do, it’s usually only in one direction: that of excess.

• To eat or drink whatever offers itself until one is completely stuffed is to exceed the natural amount. Natural appetite is simply for the replenishment of what your body is lacking.
• Hence, these people are sometimes called belly-gods (or gluttons), implying that they fill their belly beyond what is right or natural.
• It is people of an entirely slavish character (lacking in self-mastery) who become like this.

But with regard to the pleasures peculiar to individuals, many people go wrong, and in many ways.

• When we say people are “fond of so-and-so” (meaning they have a particular fondness for something), it’s often because they delight either:
  • In the wrong things (things they shouldn’t enjoy).
  • More than most people do (to an excessive degree).
  • Or in the wrong way.
• The self-indulgent person exceeds in all three ways:
  • They delight in some things that they ought not to delight in (because those things are hateful or harmful).
  • And if it’s something one ought to delight in (in moderation), they delight in it more than one ought and more than most people do.

Plainly, then, excess with regard to pleasures is self-indulgence, and it is culpable (deserving blame).

With regard to pains:

• One is not called temperate for facing pains or self-indulgent for not facing them (as in the case of courage).
• Instead, the self-indulgent person is so-called because they are pained more than they ought to be at not getting pleasant things. (Even their pain is caused by their frustrated desire for pleasure).
• And the temperate person is so-called because they are not pained by the absence of what is pleasant and by their choice to abstain from it.

The self-indulgent man, then:

• Craves for all pleasant things, or at least those that are most pleasant.
• Is led by his appetite to choose these pleasures at the cost of everything else.
• Hence, he is pained both when he fails to get them and when he is merely craving for them (for appetite itself involves a kind of pain or agitation).
• But it seems absurd to be pained for the sake of pleasure.

People who fall short with regard to pleasures and delight in them less than they should are hardly ever found.

• Such insensibility (lack of response to pleasure) is not human.
• Even the other animals distinguish between different kinds of food and enjoy some while not enjoying others.
• And if there is anyone who finds nothing pleasant, and finds nothing more attractive than anything else, they must be something quite different from a human being. This sort of person hasn’t even received a name because they hardly ever occur.

The temperate man occupies a middle position with regard to these objects of pleasure.

• He neither enjoys the things that the self-indulgent man enjoys most—in fact, he rather dislikes them.
• Nor, in general, does he enjoy things that he should not.
• Nor does he enjoy anything of this sort to excess.
• He does not feel pain or craving when these pleasures are absent, or if he does, it’s only to a moderate degree, and not more than he should, nor when he should not, and so on.
• But the things that, being pleasant, also contribute to health or to a good physical condition, he will desire moderately and as he should.
• He will also desire other pleasant things if they are not hindrances to these good ends (health and good condition), or if they are not contrary to what is noble, or if they are not beyond his financial means.
• For a person who neglects these conditions (health, nobility, affordability) loves such pleasures more than they are actually worth.
• But the temperate man is not that sort of person. He is the sort of person that the right rule or principle prescribes.

12. Self-Indulgence Compared to Cowardice; Controlling Appetites

Self-indulgence is more like a voluntary state than cowardice is. Here’s why:

• Self-indulgence is motivated by pleasure, which is something we naturally choose.
• Cowardice is motivated by pain, which is something we naturally avoid.
• Pain tends to upset and even destroy the nature of the person who feels it, while pleasure does nothing of that sort.
• Therefore, self-indulgence is more voluntary.
• Hence, it is also more a matter of reproach (more deserving of blame). It’s easier to become accustomed to the objects of pleasure, since there are many things of this sort in life, and the process of getting used to them is generally free from danger. With terrible objects (those related to courage), the opposite is true; getting used to them is difficult and dangerous.

But cowardice (as a general state of character) would seem to be voluntary in a different way from its particular manifestations (individual acts of cowardice).

• Cowardice as a state is itself painless.
• But in specific dangerous situations, we are upset by pain, so much so that we might even throw down our weapons and disgrace ourselves in other ways. Because of this intense pressure, our cowardly acts are even thought to be done under compulsion (forced by fear and pain).

For the self-indulgent man, on the other hand:

• The particular acts of indulgence are voluntary (for he does them with craving and desire).
• But the whole state of being self-indulgent is perhaps less voluntary, because no one actively craves to be a self-indulgent person as an identity, even if they crave individual pleasures.

The name self-indulgence is also applied to childish faults, because they have a certain resemblance to the adult vice we have been considering.

• Which one is named after which (does adult self-indulgence get its name from childish behavior, or vice-versa?) doesn’t really make a difference for our current purpose. Plainly, however, the later thing to develop (the adult vice) is named after the earlier one (childish tendencies).
• The transfer of the name seems like a good one. That which desires what is base (shameful, improper) and which develops quickly (like appetite) ought to be kept in a chastened condition (disciplined, corrected, restrained).
• These characteristics—desiring what is base and developing quickly—belong above all to appetite and to the child.
• Children, in fact, live at the beck and call of their appetites. It is in them that the desire for what is pleasant is strongest.

If, then, this appetite is not going to be obedient and subject to the ruling principle (reason), it will go to great lengths and cause problems.

• In an irrational being (or in the irrational part of a human), the desire for pleasure is insatiable (it can never be fully satisfied), even if it tries every possible source of gratification.
• The exercise of appetite actually increases its natural force. If appetites are strong and violent, they can even expel or overpower the ability to calculate and reason.
• Hence, appetites should be moderate and few.
• They should in no way oppose the rational principle. This state—where appetite is controlled by reason—is what we call an obedient and chastened state.

Just as the child should live according to the direction of his tutor, so the appetitive element in a person should live according to the rational principle.

• Therefore, the appetitive element in a temperate man should harmonize with the rational principle.
• The noble (what is fine, right, and honorable) is the target at which both reason and well-ordered appetite aim.
• The temperate man craves for the things he ought to, as he ought to, and when he ought to.
• And this is exactly what the rational principle directs.

Here we conclude our account of temperance.

BOOK IV

1. Generosity: Finding the Balance with Wealth

Next, let’s talk about generosity (the quality the author calls liberality). This virtue seems to be the healthy middle ground when it comes to wealth.

We praise a generous person not for military skills, or for being temperate, or for fairness in legal decisions. Instead, we praise them for how they handle giving and taking wealth, especially for their giving.

• By wealth, we mean anything whose value can be measured by money.
• The extremes related to wealth are wastefulness (the author calls this prodigality) and stinginess (the author calls this meanness).
• We usually call people stingy if they care more about wealth than they should.
• The word “wasteful” is sometimes used in a broader sense. We might call people wasteful if they lack self-control and spend a lot of money on excessive self-indulgence. These people are often seen as having the worst characters because they combine several vices.
• However, this isn’t the precise meaning of “wasteful.” A wasteful person, in the strict sense, is someone with one specific fault: they ruin their own resources. They are being destroyed by their own actions, and wasting one’s resources is like a kind of self-destruction, as life depends on having what you need.

This is the meaning of wastefulness we’ll use.

Using Wealth Well Things that have a use can be used well or badly.

• Riches are useful things.
• Everything is used best by the person who has the virtue related to that specific thing.
• Therefore, riches will be used best by the person who has the virtue related to wealth. This person is the generous individual.

Spending and giving seem to be the main ways we use wealth. Taking and keeping are more about possessing wealth. So, it’s more a sign of a generous person to give to the right people than it is to take from the right sources and avoid taking from wrong sources (though these are also important).

Here’s why giving is key for generosity:

• It’s more characteristic of virtue to do good for others than to have good done to you.
• It’s more characteristic to do what is noble than to simply avoid doing what is shameful.
• It’s easy to see that giving involves doing good and acting nobly. Taking involves having good done to you or, at best, not acting shamefully.
• People feel gratitude towards someone who gives, not usually towards someone who simply doesn’t take what isn’t theirs. Praise also goes more to the giver.
• It’s also easier not to take something than it is to give. People are generally more hesitant to give away too much of their own things than they are to take what belongs to someone else.
• People who give are called generous. Those who don’t take things improperly are not praised for generosity but rather for being just or fair. Those who do take improperly are hardly praised at all.
• Generous people are among the most loved of all virtuous individuals because they are useful to others, and this usefulness comes from their giving.

How and Why a Generous Person Gives Virtuous actions are noble, and they are done for the sake of being noble. Therefore, the generous person, like other virtuous people, will give:

• For the sake of what is noble.
• In the right way:
  • To the right people.
  • The right amounts.
  • At the right time.
  • With all the other details that make giving appropriate.
• And they will do this with pleasure, or at least without pain. A virtuous action should feel pleasant or, at the very least, not painful.

However, someone who gives to the wrong people, or not for a noble reason but for some other motive, would not be called generous. They’d be called something else. Also, a person who gives but feels pain in doing so is not truly generous. This would mean they prefer their wealth over the noble act of giving, which is not a characteristic of a generous person.

The generous person also will not take money from wrong sources. Such taking is not characteristic of someone who does not place excessive value on wealth. They also won’t be quick to ask for things for themselves. It’s not typical of a person who enjoys providing benefits to others to readily accept them. But they will take from the right sources, for example, from their own property or earnings. They do this not because taking is noble in itself, but because it’s necessary so they have something to give. A generous person will not neglect their own property because they want to use it to help others. And they will avoid giving to just anybody and everybody. This way, they ensure they have resources to give to the right people, at the right time, and when it is a noble thing to do.

It’s also highly characteristic of a very generous person to sometimes give to excess, to the point where they leave too little for themselves. This is because it’s in the nature of a generous person not to focus primarily on their own needs.

Generosity is Relative to What You Have The term “generosity” is used in relation to a person’s substance (their wealth and resources).

• Generosity isn’t just about the total amount of gifts given. It’s about the giver’s state of character, and this character is judged relative to what the giver possesses.
• Therefore, it’s possible for a person who gives less to actually be more generous, if they have less to give from.

People who inherited their wealth, rather than earning it themselves, are sometimes thought to be more generous. There are a couple of reasons for this:

1. They haven’t personally experienced poverty or lack.
2. Everyone tends to be fonder of their own creations or achievements. Just like parents love their children and poets love their poems, those who made their own wealth might be more attached to it and less willing to give it away.

It’s not easy for a generous person to become rich.

• They are not skilled at taking or keeping wealth, but rather at giving it away.
• They don’t value wealth for its own sake, but see it as a means for giving.
• This is why people sometimes complain about fortune (luck), saying that those who most deserve riches get them least.
• But it’s not really unreasonable that things turn out this way. A person cannot have wealth, any more than anything else, if they don’t make an effort to acquire and keep it, and the generous person doesn’t prioritize this.

Still, the generous person will not give to the wrong people or at the wrong time, and so on. If they did, they would no longer be acting according to generosity. If they spent their resources on the wrong things, they would have nothing left to spend on the right things. For, as we’ve said, the generous person is one who spends according to their resources and on the right objects. Anyone who goes beyond this in an inappropriate way is wasteful. This is why we don’t usually call powerful rulers (like despots or tyrants) wasteful, even if they spend enormous sums. It’s thought that their possessions are so vast that it’s not easy for them to give and spend beyond what they have.

So, since generosity is the balanced middle state regarding the giving and taking of wealth, the generous person will:

• Both give and spend the right amounts on the right objects, whether in small matters or large ones, and do so with pleasure.
• Also take the right amounts and from the right sources.
• Because the virtue is a mean regarding both giving and taking, they will do both as they ought. Proper taking goes along with proper giving. Taking that isn’t proper is contrary to generosity.
• The giving and taking that are consistent with generosity are found together in the same person, while the contrary kinds (e.g., improper giving and improper taking) clearly are not.

If a generous person happens to spend money in a way that is contrary to what is right and noble, they will feel pained, but moderately and as they should. It’s a mark of virtue to be pleased by the right things and pained by the right things, and in the right way.

Furthermore, the generous person is easy to deal with in money matters.

• They can sometimes be “taken advantage of” because they don’t place a high value on money itself.
• They are more annoyed if they haven’t spent something they should have, than pained if they have spent something they shouldn’t have.
• They generally don’t agree with the sayings of Simonides (a poet who apparently wrote about the importance of money).

The Wasteful Person’s Mistakes The wasteful person also makes mistakes in these areas. They are neither pleased nor pained at the right things or in the right way. This will become clearer as we go on.

We’ve said that wastefulness (prodigality) and stinginess (meanness) are excesses and deficiencies. They occur in two areas:

1. Giving (which includes spending)
2. Taking

• Wastefulness goes to excess in giving and not taking.
• Stinginess falls short in giving, and goes to excess in taking (except for some very specific types of stingy people who only focus on not giving).

Understanding Wastefulness (Prodigality) The pure characteristics of wastefulness (giving to everyone while taking from no one) are not often found together for long.

• It’s not easy to keep giving to everyone if you take from no one. Private individuals who do this soon use up all their resources. These are the people most accurately called prodigals or purely wasteful.
• A person like this, however, would seem to be much better than a stingy person.
  • They are easily “cured” of their wastefulness, either by getting older or by experiencing poverty. This can help them move towards the balanced middle state.
  • This is because they already have some characteristics of a generous person: they give and they don’t try to take improperly. They just don’t do these things in the right way or well.
  • Therefore, if they were guided by habit or some other influence to act correctly, they would become generous. They would then give to the right people and not take from wrong sources.
• This is why this type of purely wasteful person is thought to not have a bad character. It’s not the mark of a wicked or ignoble person to simply give too much and not take; it’s only the mark of a foolish one.
• The person who is wasteful in this “pure giving” way is considered much better than the stingy person, both for the reasons above and because they benefit many people, while the stingy person benefits no one, not even themselves.

Most Wasteful People: A More Common and Flawed Type However, most people who are called wasteful, as mentioned earlier, also take from wrong sources. In this respect, they are actually stingy or mean.

• They become likely to take improperly because they want to spend a lot but can’t do so easily, as their own money soon runs out.
• Thus, they are forced to find money from some other source.
• At the same time, because they often care nothing for honor or what is noble, they take recklessly and from any source they can. They have a strong desire to give (or spend), and they don’t care how they get the money or where it comes from.

Therefore, their giving is not truly generous:

• It is not noble.
• It does not aim at what is noble.
• It is not done in the right way.
• Sometimes they make people rich who should be poor (e.g., unworthy recipients).
• They will give nothing to people of respectable character.
• They will give much to flatterers or to those who provide them with some other kind of pleasure.

Hence, most of these wasteful people are also self-indulgent.

• They spend money carelessly.
• They waste money on their own indulgences.
• They lean towards pursuing pleasures because they do not live with a view to what is noble.

Curing Wastefulness vs. Stinginess So, the wasteful person turns into the flawed type we just described if they are left untaught or unguided. But if they receive care and guidance, they can reach the balanced and right state of generosity.

Stinginess (Meanness), however, is both incurable and more deeply ingrained in people than wastefulness.

• Old age and every kind of disability or misfortune are thought to make people more stingy.
• It seems to be more natural for most people to be fond of getting money than of giving it away. Stinginess also spreads widely and appears in many forms, as there seem to be many kinds of it.

Stinginess consists of two main things:

1. Deficiency in giving (not giving enough).
2. Excess in taking (taking too much or improperly).

It’s not always found in its complete form in all stingy people; sometimes it’s divided:

• Some people go to excess in taking.
• Others mainly fall short in giving.

Those who are called by names like “miserly,” “close-fisted,” or “stingy” all fall short in giving. However, they do not necessarily desire the possessions of others or wish to get them.

• In some, this is due to a sort of honesty and a desire to avoid doing anything shameful. Some people seem (or at least claim) to hoard their money for this reason—so that they might not someday be forced to do something disgraceful due to lack of funds. The “penny-pincher” (the original text uses a term like “cheeseparer,” meaning someone who pares off the tiniest bits) and similar types belong to this class. They are called this because of their extreme unwillingness to give anything.
• Others, again, keep their hands off other people’s property out of fear. They believe that if one takes the property of others, it’s not easy to avoid having one’s own property taken by them in return. So, they are content neither to take nor to give.

Then there are others who go to excess in taking, by taking anything and from any source. Examples include:

• Those who engage in sordid trades (dishonorable ways of making money), like pimps and similar people.
• Those who lend small sums of money at very high interest rates (loan sharks).
• All of these people take more than they should, and from wrong sources.
• What is common to them is clearly a sordid love of gain (a shameful desire for profit). They all put up with having a bad reputation for the sake of gain, and often only for a little gain.

We do not call those who make great gains from wrong sources “stingy” or “mean,” but rather wicked, impious (disrespectful of sacred things), and unjust. Examples are tyrants who sack cities and spoil temples. But the cheating gambler, the petty thief (like a pickpocket, original “footpad”), and the highway robber do belong to the class of the stingy or mean, since they have a sordid love of gain.

• Both the thief and the gambler practice their craft and endure the disgrace of it for the sake of profit.
• The robber faces the greatest dangers for the sake of what they can steal.
• The cheating gambler makes a profit from his friends, to whom he ought to be giving.
• Both, then, since they are willing to make a profit from wrong sources, are sordid lovers of gain. Therefore, all such ways of taking money are considered mean or stingy in this broader sense.

It is natural that stinginess is described as the opposite of generosity.

• Not only is it a greater evil than wastefulness (especially the purely giving type).
• But people also make mistakes more often in the direction of stinginess than in the direction of the “pure giving” type of wastefulness we described.

So much, then, for generosity and the vices opposed to it.

2. Magnificence: Spending Large Sums Well

It seems appropriate to discuss magnificence next. This also appears to be a virtue concerned with wealth. However, unlike generosity, it doesn’t cover all actions involving wealth. It only applies to those actions that involve expenditure (spending money). And in these actions, it surpasses generosity in scale—it deals with spending large amounts.

• As the name itself suggests, magnificence is about fitting expenditure involving largeness of scale.
• But “largeness of scale” is relative. For example, the cost of equipping a warship (a “trireme” in ancient times) is not the same as the cost of leading a major religious or state delegation (a “sacred embassy”).
• What matters is what is fitting in relation to:
  • The person spending the money (the agent).
  • The circumstances.
  • The object or purpose of the spending.
• The person who spends appropriately according to the situation in small or medium-sized matters is not called magnificent. (For example, the person who can say, “I often gave gifts to the traveler.”) Only the person who does so in great matters is called magnificent.
• The magnificent person is also generous, but a generous person is not necessarily magnificent (since generosity applies to all levels of wealth, while magnificence only to large-scale spending).

The deficiency (falling short) of this state of character is called niggardliness (being cheap or stingy on a grand scale). The excess is called vulgarity, lack of taste, and similar terms. These vices don’t involve exceeding in the amount spent on the right objects, but rather involve showy expenditure in the wrong circumstances or in the wrong manner. We will speak more of these vices later.

The Character of the Magnificent Person The magnificent person is like an artist. They can see what is fitting and spend large sums of money tastefully.

• As we said at the beginning of our discussions on virtue, a state of character is determined by its activities and by its objects (what it deals with).
• The expenses of the magnificent person are large and fitting.
• Therefore, their results (what they achieve with their spending) are also large and fitting. This means there will be a great expenditure that is also fitting to the result it produces.
• So, the result should be worthy of the expense, and the expense should be worthy of the result, or perhaps even slightly exceed it to create a truly impressive effect.

The magnificent person will spend such sums for the sake of honor (or what is noble), because this is common to all virtues. Furthermore, they will do so gladly and lavishly.

• Being overly precise with calculations (“nice calculation”) is a mark of niggardliness.
• They will consider how the result can be made most beautiful and most becoming, rather than just how much it will cost or how it can be produced most cheaply.

It is necessary, then, that the magnificent person also be generous.

• The generous person will also spend what they ought and as they ought.
• It is in these matters of right spending that the greatness implied in the name of the magnificent person—their “bigness,” so to speak—is shown, since generosity also deals with these matters.
• And, for an equal amount of expense, the magnificent person will produce a more magnificent work or result.

The Excellence of Possessions vs. Works A possession and a work (something created or sponsored) do not have the same kind of excellence.

• The most valuable possession is the one that is worth the most money (e.g., gold).
• But the most valuable work (like a piece of art, a public building, or a grand event) is one that is great and beautiful. The contemplation of such a work inspires admiration, and so does magnificence itself.
• A work has an excellence—namely, magnificence—which involves magnitude (greatness in scale, impact, or beauty).

Occasions for Magnificent Spending Magnificence is an attribute of expenditures of the kind which we call honorable. These include things like:

• Those connected with the gods:
  • Votive offerings (gifts dedicated to a deity).
  • Buildings (like temples).
  • Sacrifices.
• Similarly, anything related to religious worship.
• All those things that are proper objects of public-spirited ambition. For example, when people feel they ought to:
  • Equip a chorus for a theatrical performance in a brilliant way.
  • Sponsor a warship for the city’s defense.
  • Entertain the entire city with a spectacular event.

But in all cases, as has been said, we must also consider the agent (the person doing the spending). We ask:

• Who are they?
• What resources (means) do they have? For the expenditure should be worthy of their means. It should suit not only the result produced but also the producer (the one spending).

Hence:

• A poor person cannot be magnificent, since they do not have the resources to spend large sums in a fitting way.
• If a poor person tries to spend magnificently, they are a fool. They are spending beyond what can be reasonably expected of them and beyond what is proper. Virtuous spending is right expenditure.
• Great expenditure is becoming (appropriate and fitting) for those who have suitable resources to begin with. These resources might have been acquired by their own efforts or inherited from ancestors or connections.
• It is also fitting for people of high birth or great reputation, and so on. All these things naturally bring with them a sense of greatness and prestige, making large, fitting expenditures appropriate.

Primarily, then, the magnificent person is of this sort, and magnificence is shown in expenditures of this kind, as has been said, because these are the greatest and most honorable types of spending.

Of private occasions for expenditure, the most suitable for magnificence are those that happen once for all, for example:

• A wedding or anything of a similar grand, infrequent nature.
• Anything that interests the whole city or the important people in it.
• Also, the receiving of foreign guests and the sending of them on their way (which would involve significant hospitality and gifts).
• Gifts and counter-gifts (especially on a grand scale).

The magnificent person spends not primarily on themselves but on public objects. Their gifts often bear some resemblance to votive offerings (gifts to the gods), suggesting a public or selfless spirit.

A magnificent person will also:

• Furnish their house suitably to their wealth (for even a house can be a sort of public ornament or reflection of status).
• Spend by preference on those works that are lasting (for these are considered the most beautiful and impactful).
• On every class of things, they will spend what is becoming (appropriate). The same things are not suitable for gods and for men, nor are the same expenditures appropriate in a temple and in a tomb.

Producing Magnificently: Scale and Appropriateness Since each expenditure may be great of its kind:

• What is most magnificent absolutely is a great expenditure on a great object.
• But what is magnificent in a particular situation is what is great in those specific circumstances.
• And greatness in the work (the result) is different from greatness in the expense (the cost).
  • For example, the most beautiful ball or bottle might be magnificent as a gift to a child, but the price of it is small and insignificant in terms of overall wealth. Such an item isn’t magnificent due to its cost. Therefore, it is characteristic of the magnificent man, whatever kind of result he is producing, to produce it magnificently.
• This means the result is not easily surpassed in quality or appropriateness for the scale.
• He makes it worthy of the expenditure.

Okay, that describes the magnificent person—someone who spends large amounts of money appropriately and for noble purposes.

Now let’s look at the extremes: The person who goes to excess and is vulgar spends beyond what is right, as we’ve mentioned.

• They spend a lot on small objects of expenditure and make a tasteless, showy display.
• For example, they might host a dinner for a small club on the grand scale of a wedding banquet.
• Or, when they are sponsoring the chorus for a comedy show, they might bring the performers on stage dressed in expensive purple robes, like they do in the city of Megara (a known, perhaps ostentatious, practice).
• They will do all these things not for the sake of honor or what is noble, but simply to show off their wealth. They do it because they think people will admire them for these displays.
• And often, where they ought to spend a lot of money (on truly great and fitting things), they spend little. But where they should spend little, they spend a lot.

The niggardly person (who is cheap on a grand scale), on the other hand, will fall short in everything.

• Even after spending the greatest sums of money on a project, they will spoil the beauty of the result just to save a tiny amount on some small detail (for a “trifle”).
• Whatever they are doing, they will hesitate and constantly consider how they can spend the absolute least amount of money.
• They will even complain about the money they do spend.
• They always think they are doing everything on a bigger scale than they really ought to.

These states of character—vulgarity and niggardliness—are therefore vices (flaws). Yet, they generally do not bring serious disgrace upon a person, because they are typically neither very harmful to one’s neighbor nor extremely offensive or unseemly in a moral sense.

3. Pride: Knowing and Claiming Your Great Worth

Pride, judging even from its name (in Greek, megalopsychia, meaning “greatness of soul”), seems to be concerned with great things. Our first question must be: what sort of great things is it concerned with? It doesn’t matter whether we consider the state of character itself or the person who has that character.

Now, the person is thought to be proud who:

1. Thinks himself worthy of great things.
2. And is actually worthy of them. For someone who thinks they are worthy of great things but goes beyond their actual merits is a fool, and no virtuous person is foolish or silly. The proud person, then, is the one we’ve just described.

Consider other types:

• The person who is worthy of little and thinks himself worthy of little is sensible or temperate, but not proud. Pride implies greatness, just as beauty implies a good-sized body. Little people can be neat and well-proportioned, but they cannot be called beautiful in the grand sense.
• On the other hand, the person who thinks himself worthy of great things but is unworthy of them is vain. (Though not everyone who thinks himself worthy of more than he really is worthy of is automatically vain in every respect.)
• The person who thinks himself worthy of less than he is really worthy of is unduly humble. This is true whether their real worth is great or moderate, or even if their worth is small but their claims about themselves are even smaller.
  • The person whose actual merits are great would seem the most unduly humble if they underestimate their worth. What would they have claimed if their merits had been less?

So, the proud person is an extreme in terms of the greatness of their claims (they claim great things for themselves). But they are a mean (a balanced middle) in terms of the rightness of their claims. They claim what is in accordance with their true merits, while the others (vain and unduly humble) either go to excess or fall short in their claims relative to their merit.

What Pride is About: Honor If, then, the proud person deserves and claims great things—and above all, the great things—they will be concerned with one thing in particular.

• “Desert” or “merit” is relative to external goods (things outside of us, like wealth, power, or honor).
• The greatest of these external goods, we should say, is that which we offer to the gods, and which people of high position most aim for, and which is the prize given for the noblest deeds.
• This greatest external good is honor. That is surely the greatest of them.
• Therefore, honors and dishonors are the objects with respect to which the proud person behaves as they should.
• And even without much argument, it’s clear that proud people appear to be concerned with honor. For it is honor that they chiefly claim, but they claim it in accordance with their true deserts (what they actually deserve).

Let’s compare the vices:

• The unduly humble man falls short both in comparison with his own merits and in comparison with the proud man’s rightful claims.
• The vain man goes to excess in his claims compared to his own merits, but he does not exceed the proud man’s rightful claims (because the proud man’s claims are for truly great things he deserves).

Pride and Goodness Now, the proud man, since he deserves the most, must be good in the highest degree.

• The better a person is, the more they always deserve.
• The best person deserves the most.
• Therefore, the truly proud man must be a good man.
• Greatness in every virtue would seem to be characteristic of a proud man.

It would be completely unbecoming for a proud man to:

• Flee from danger, swinging his arms by his sides (a sign of panic or undignified haste).
• Do wrong to another person. Why would he do disgraceful acts? To him, to whom nothing is truly “great” in a way that would tempt him to act basely for it, such actions would be pointless. If we consider him point by point, we shall see the utter absurdity of a proud man who is not good.

Furthermore, if he were a bad person, he would not be worthy of honor. Honor is the prize of virtue, and it is given to good people. Pride, then, seems to be a sort of crown of the virtues.

• It makes the other virtues greater.
• And it is not found without them. Therefore, it is hard to be truly proud, because it is impossible without nobility and goodness of character.

The Proud Man’s Attitude Towards Honor and Fortune It is chiefly with honors and dishonors, then, that the proud person is concerned.

• At honors that are great and given by good men, he will be moderately pleased. He thinks he is getting what is his own, or perhaps even less than his own. For there can be no honor that is truly worthy of perfect virtue. Yet, he will accept it anyway, since those giving it have nothing greater to offer him.
• But honor from casual people and on trivial grounds he will utterly despise. This is not the kind of honor he deserves.
• He will also despise dishonor, because in his case, it cannot be just (as he is truly virtuous).

So, in the first place, as has been said, the proud man is concerned with honors. Yet, he will also behave with moderation towards wealth and power and all good or evil fortune, whatever may happen to him.

• He will be neither overjoyed by good fortune nor overly pained by evil fortune.
• For not even towards honor itself does he behave as if it were a very great thing (though it’s the greatest external good). Power and wealth are desirable for the sake of honor (at least, those who have them wish to get honor by means of them). For the proud man, to whom even honor is a relatively small thing (compared to virtue itself), these other things (wealth, power) must be even less significant. Hence, proud men are often thought to be disdainful (looking down on things others value highly).

Fortune, Virtue, and Pride The goods of fortune (like good birth, power, or wealth) are also thought to contribute towards pride.

• Men who are well-born are thought worthy of honor, and so are those who enjoy power or wealth. This is because they are in a superior position, and everything that has a superiority in something good is held in greater honor.
• Hence, even such things can make men prouder, because they are honored by some people for having them.
• But in truth, the good man alone is to be honored.
• However, a person who has both advantages (goodness and goods of fortune) is thought to be even more worthy of honor.

But those who have such goods of fortune without virtue:

• Are neither justified in making great claims for themselves.
• Nor are they entitled to be called “proud” (in this virtuous sense). For true pride implies perfect virtue.

Disdainful and insolent (arrogant and disrespectful), however, even those who only have goods of fortune (without virtue) often become.

• Without virtue, it is not easy to bear the goods of fortune gracefully.
• Being unable to bear them well, and thinking themselves superior to others, they despise others and do whatever they please.
• They try to imitate the proud man without actually being like him, and they do this wherever they can. So, they do not act virtuously, but they do despise others.
• The truly proud man despises justly (since he thinks truly and sees what lacks true worth), but these many others despise others at random and without justification.

Behavior of the Proud Man

• He does not run into trifling dangers, nor is he fond of danger just for danger’s sake, because there are few things he honors enough to risk himself for trivially.
• But he will face great dangers. When he is in danger, he is unsparing of his life, knowing that there are conditions on which life is not worth having.
• He is the sort of man to confer benefits (do good deeds for others), but he is ashamed of receiving them. Conferring benefits is the mark of a superior, while receiving them is the mark of an inferior.
• He is apt to confer greater benefits in return if he does receive one. This way, the original benefactor will not only be repaid but will also end up owing him a debt, thus being the gainer in the exchange.
• They also seem to remember any service they have done for others, but not those they have received. (For the one who receives a service is inferior to the one who has done it, but the proud man wishes to be superior). They hear of the services they’ve done with pleasure, but of those they’ve received with displeasure.
  • This, it seems, is why Thetis (in Homer’s Iliad) did not mention to Zeus the services she had done for him when asking for a favor.
  • And why the Spartans, when speaking to the Athenians, did not list their own services to Athens, but rather the services they had received from Athens (though this example’s interpretation can vary).
• It is also a mark of the proud man to ask for nothing, or scarcely anything, but to give help readily.
• He is dignified towards people who enjoy high position and good fortune, but unassuming towards those of the middle class.
  • It is a difficult and lofty thing to feel superior to the former (the powerful), but easy to do so with the latter.
  • A lofty bearing (acting superior) towards the powerful is no mark of ill-breeding, but among humble people, it is as vulgar as a display of strength against the weak.
• Again, it is characteristic of the proud man not to aim at the things commonly held in honor by most people, or the things in which others excel.
• He tends to be sluggish and to hold back, except where great honor or a great work is at stake.
• He is a man of few deeds, but of great and notable ones.
• He must also be open in his hate and in his love. To conceal one’s feelings (that is, to care less for truth than for what people will think) is a coward’s part.
• He must speak and act openly. He is free of speech because he is contemptuous (of pretense and triviality), and he is given to telling the truth (except when he speaks in irony to the vulgar or common crowd).
• He must be unable to make his life revolve around another person, unless it be a friend. To do so is slavish. For this reason, all flatterers are servile (like slaves), and people lacking in self-respect are often flatterers.
• Nor is he given to admiration, for nothing is truly “great” to him (in the sense of being overwhelmingly impressive, as he judges by the standard of virtue).
• Nor is he mindful of wrongs done to him. It is not the part of a proud man to have a long memory, especially for wrongs, but rather to overlook them.
• Nor is he a gossip. He will speak neither about himself nor about another, since he doesn’t care to be praised himself, nor for others to be blamed.
• Nor again is he given to praising others much. And for the same reason, he is not an evil-speaker, even about his enemies, except out of haughtiness (a sense of his own superiority expressing itself directly).
• With regard to necessary or small matters, he is least of all given to lamentation or the asking of favors. It is the part of someone who takes such matters very seriously to behave that way regarding them, and he does not.
• He is one who will possess beautiful and profitless things rather than profitable and useful ones. This is because having fine but not strictly useful things is more proper to a character that is self-sufficient.

Physical Demeanor of the Proud Man Furthermore, a slow step is thought proper to the proud man, a deep voice, and a level (steady) utterance.

• The man who takes few things seriously is not likely to be hurried.
• The man who thinks nothing is truly “great” (in a way that would overwhelm him) is not likely to be excited.
• A shrill voice and a rapid way of walking are often the results of hurry and excitement.

Such, then, is the proud man.

• The man who falls short of him is unduly humble.
• The man who goes beyond him (in claims, not merit) is vain.

Now, even these (the unduly humble and the vain) are not thought to be bad people in the sense of being malicious or intending harm, but only mistaken in their self-assessment.

• The unduly humble man, being worthy of good things, robs himself of what he deserves. He seems to have something bad about him from the fact that he does not think himself worthy of good things. He also seems not to know himself; otherwise, he would have desired the things he was worthy of, since these were good.
  • Yet, such people are not thought to be fools, but rather excessively retiring or shy.
  • Such a reputation, however, seems actually to make them worse. Each class of people naturally aims at what corresponds to its worth. These unduly humble people stand back even from noble actions and undertakings, thinking themselves unworthy, and they shy away from external goods (like honor or opportunities) as well.
• Vain people, on the other hand, are fools and ignorant of themselves, and that’s obvious.
  • Not being worthy of them, they attempt honorable undertakings, and then they are found out (their lack of merit is exposed).
  • They adorn themselves with fancy clothing and outward show and such things.
  • They wish their strokes of good fortune to be made public.
  • They speak about them as if they expect to be honored for them.

But undue humility is more opposed to pride than vanity is. This is because undue humility is both more common and worse (it prevents good people from achieving what they could).

Pride, then, as has been said, is concerned with honor on the grand scale.

4. A Virtue for Everyday Honors

There seems to be another virtue in the area of honor, as was mentioned in our first remarks on the subject. This virtue would appear to be related to pride in the same way that generosity (liberality) is related to magnificence.

• Neither of these lesser virtues (generosity, and this unnamed virtue for everyday honor) has anything to do with the grand scale.
• But both of them dispose us to act as is right with regard to middling and unimportant objects.

Just as in the getting and giving of wealth there is a mean (generosity) and an excess (wastefulness) and defect (stinginess), so too honor may be desired more than is right, or less than is right, or from the right sources and in the right way.

We blame:

• The ambitious man for aiming at honor more than is right and from wrong sources.
• The unambitious man for not being willing to be honored even for noble reasons.

But sometimes we praise:

• The ambitious man as being manly and a lover of what is noble.
• The unambitious man as being moderate and self-controlled (as we said in our first discussion of these topics).

Evidently, since “fond of such and such an object” can have more than one meaning, we do not always assign the term “ambition” or “love of honor” to the same thing.

• When we praise the quality, we think of the man who loves honor more than most people normally do (but still appropriately).
• When we blame it, we think of him who loves it more than is right.

The mean state (the balanced middle) regarding everyday honor doesn’t have a specific name. Because of this, the extremes (ambition and unambitiousness) seem to fight for its place, as though that middle spot were empty. But where there is excess and defect, there is also an intermediate state.

• Men desire honor both more than they should and less than they should.
• Therefore, it is also possible to desire it as one should.
• At any rate, this is the state of character that is praised, being an unnamed mean in respect of honor.
  • Relative to ambition, it seems to be unambitiousness.
  • Relative to unambitiousness, it seems to be ambition.
  • While relatively to both extremes individually, it seems in a sense to be a bit of both. This appears to be true of the other virtues as well. But in this case (honor), the extremes seem to be direct opposites because the mean state has not received a name.

5. Good Temper: The Right Way to Handle Anger

Good temper is a mean (a balanced middle state) with respect to the feeling of anger.

• The middle state itself is largely unnamed, and the extremes are almost without names as well.
• We place good temper in the middle position, though it tends to lean slightly towards the deficiency (not getting angry enough), which is also without a specific common name.
• The excess might be called a sort of “irascibility” (a tendency to become easily angered). For the passion involved is anger, while its causes are many and diverse.

The person who is angry:

• At the right things,
• And with the right people,
• And, further, as they ought to be (in the right way/degree),
• When they ought to be,
• And for as long as they ought to be, …is praised. This will be the good-tempered man, then, since good temper is praised.

For the good-tempered man tends to be:

• Unperturbed (not easily agitated).
• Not to be led by raw passion.
• To be angry in the manner, at the things, and for the length of time that the rule (reason) dictates.
• But he is thought to err rather in the direction of deficiency (being less angry than the situation might call for). The good-tempered man is not revengeful, but rather tends to make allowances for others.

The deficiency in anger, whether it is a sort of “inirascibility” (an inability to get angry) or whatever it is, is blamed.

• Those who are not angry at the things they should be angry at are thought to be fools.
• So are those who are not angry in the right way, at the right time, or with the right persons.
• Such a person is thought not to feel things properly or to be pained by them.
• And, since they do not get angry, they are thought unlikely to defend themselves.
• To endure being insulted and to put up with insults to one’s friends is considered slavish (like a slave, lacking spirit).

The excess of anger can show up in all the points that have been named (for one can be angry with the wrong persons, at the wrong things, more than is right, too quickly, or too long).

• Yet, all these forms of excess are not usually found in the same person. Indeed, they couldn’t all exist together perfectly; for evil, if complete, destroys even itself and becomes unbearable.

Now, different types of people show excessive anger:

• Hot-tempered people get angry quickly, and with the wrong persons, and at the wrong things, and more than is right. But their anger ceases quickly—which is the best point about them. This happens because they do not restrain their anger but retaliate openly due to their quickness of temper, and then their anger is gone.
• By reason of excess, choleric people (from an old idea about “choler” or bile making people angry) are quick-tempered and ready to be angry with everything and on every occasion. This is how they get their name.
• Sulky people are hard to appease, and they retain their anger for a long time because they repress their passion inwardly.
  • But their anger ceases when they retaliate or get revenge. Revenge relieves them of their anger, producing pleasure in them instead of pain.
  • If this doesn’t happen, they continue to carry their burden of anger. Because their anger is not obvious, no one even reasons with them to help them resolve it. To “digest” one’s anger internally takes time.
  • Such people are most troublesome to themselves and to their dearest friends.
• We call people bad-tempered (generally) if they are angry at the wrong things, more than is right, and for longer than is right, and cannot be appeased until they inflict some kind of vengeance or punishment.

To good temper, we oppose the excess (bad temper) rather than the defect (not getting angry enough). There are two reasons for this:

1. It is more common (since seeking revenge is a very human tendency).
2. Bad-tempered people are worse to live with.

What we said in our earlier treatment of virtues (about the difficulty of hitting the mean) is also clear from what we are now saying about anger.

• It is not easy to define exactly how, with whom, at what, and how long one should be angry, and at what precise point right action ceases and wrong action begins.
• The person who strays only a little from the right path, either towards too much anger or too little, is not blamed.
  • Sometimes we praise those who show the deficiency (too little anger) and call them good-tempered.
  • And sometimes we call angry people “manly,” seeing them as capable of ruling or taking charge.
• How far, therefore, and in what way a man must stray before he becomes blameworthy, it is not easy to state in words. The decision depends on the particular facts of each case and on perception (our ability to judge the situation correctly).

But this much at least is plain:

• The middle state is praiseworthy—that state by virtue of which we are angry with the right people, at the right things, in the right way, and so on.
• The excesses and defects are blameworthy.
  • They are slightly blameworthy if they are present in a low degree.
  • More blameworthy if in a higher degree.
  • And very much blameworthy if in a high degree. Evidently, then, we must try to cling to the middle state. Enough of the states of character relative to anger.

6. Friendliness and Social Interaction

In gatherings of people, in social life, and in the exchange of words and deeds, some men are thought to be obsequious, meaning…

…meaning they are overly eager to please, always agree, and avoid causing any discomfort.

• People who are obsequious (or “eager to please” to an extreme) will praise everything and never oppose anyone. They think it’s their duty “to give no pain to the people they meet.”
• On the other hand, those who, on the contrary, oppose everything and don’t care at all about giving pain are called churlish (rude and ill-tempered) and contentious (likely to argue).

It’s clear enough that these extreme states are blameworthy (deserve criticism). The middle state is laudable (worthy of praise)—that state where a person will put up with the right things and also object to the right things, and do both in the right way.

• However, no specific name has been assigned to this middle state, though it most closely resembles friendship. The person who fits this middle state is very much like what we would call a good friend, if affection were added.
• But this state in question differs from friendship because it doesn’t involve passion or deep affection for one’s associates. Such a person takes everything in the right way not because they love or hate someone, but because they are a person of a certain good character.
• They will behave this way alike towards people they know and those they don’t know, towards close friends and those who are not so close. However, in each case, they will behave as is fitting for the specific relationship. It’s not proper to show the same level of care for close friends as for strangers, nor are the reasons for causing them slight discomfort the same.

Now, we have said generally that this person will associate with people in the right way. More specifically, they will aim at not giving pain or at contributing pleasure by reference to what is honorable and beneficial (expedient).

• This person seems to be concerned with the pleasures and pains that arise in social life.
• Wherever it is not honorable, or is harmful, for them to contribute pleasure, they will refuse to do so. They will choose instead to give pain (for example, by disagreeing or pointing out a difficult truth).
• Also, if their agreement with another person’s action would bring great disgrace or injury to that other person, while their opposition would only bring a little pain, they will not agree but will decline to support the harmful action.

They will associate differently with people in high positions and with ordinary people, with closer acquaintances and more distant ones. They will adapt their behavior for all other kinds of differences, giving to each class of person what is fitting.

• While for its own sake, this person chooses to contribute pleasure and avoids giving pain, they will be guided by the consequences if these are more significant—that is, if issues of honor or greater benefit are at stake.
• For the sake of a great future pleasure (either for others or for the common good), they will be willing to inflict small pains now.

The person who achieves this mean, then, is as we have described, but they have not received a specific name. Of those who focus on contributing pleasure:

• The person who aims at being pleasant with no ulterior motive (no hidden agenda, just to be agreeable) is obsequious or an excessive people-pleaser.
• The person who does so in order that they may get some advantage in terms of money or what money can buy is a flatterer.
• The person who quarrels with everything is, as has been said, churlish and contentious.

And the extremes (being overly eager to please without reason, and being argumentative about everything) seem to be direct opposites because the balanced middle state doesn’t have a common name.

7. Truthfulness: The Balance in Self-Presentation

The mean (balanced state) that is opposed to boastfulness is found in almost the same area of social interaction, and this mean also lacks a specific name. It will be a good plan to describe these states as well.

• We shall know the facts about character better if we go through them in detail.
• We shall also be more convinced that the virtues are balanced means if we see this to be true in all cases.

We have already described those who, in social life, make the giving of pleasure or pain their main object when associating with others. Now let us describe those who pursue truth or falsehood equally in their words and deeds, and in the claims they make about themselves.

• The boastful man is thought to be likely to claim things that bring glory or admiration when he doesn’t actually have them, or to claim more of them than he really has.
• The mock-modest man (someone who pretends to be less than they are, often called false modesty or understatement), on the other hand, tends to disclaim qualities or achievements he actually has, or to belittle them.
• The man who observes the mean is one who calls a thing by its own name. He is truthful both in his life and in his words, acknowledging what he has—neither more nor less.

Now, each of these approaches (boasting, false modesty, truthfulness) can be adopted either with or without an ulterior motive. But generally, each person speaks, acts, and lives in accordance with their character, unless they are acting for some specific hidden purpose.

• Falsehood, in itself, is low and blameworthy.
• Truth, in itself, is noble and worthy of praise.
• Thus, the truthful man is another case of a person who, being in the mean, is worthy of praise. Both forms of untruthful men (the boaster and the mock-modest) are blameworthy, and particularly the boastful man.

Let us discuss them both, but first of all, the truthful man.

• We are not speaking here of the person who keeps faith in their agreements or contracts—that is, in things that relate to justice or injustice. That would belong to a different virtue.
• We are speaking of the person who, in matters where nothing of that sort (justice or fairness in agreements) is at stake, is true both in word and in life simply because their character is such.
• Such a person would seem to be, as a matter of fact, equitable or fair-minded.
• For the person who loves truth, and is truthful where nothing important is at stake, will be even more truthful where something is at stake.
• They will avoid falsehood as something base (shameful), seeing that they avoided it even when there was no specific gain, just for its own sake. Such a person is worthy of praise.
• This truthful person tends rather to understate the truth a little. This seems in better taste because exaggerations are often tiresome or off-putting.

Now, regarding the extremes: The Boaster

• Someone who claims more than they have with no ulterior motive is a rather contemptible sort of person (otherwise, they would not have delighted in falsehood itself). However, they seem more futile (pointless, ineffective) than truly bad.
• But if they boast for an ulterior motive:
  • Someone who does it for the sake of reputation or honor is (for a boaster) not very much to be blamed.
  • But someone who does it for money, or for things that lead to money, has an uglier character.
• It’s not the capacity to boast that makes the boaster, but the purpose or intention. It is by virtue of their state of character and by being a certain kind of person that they are a boaster.
• This is like how one person is a liar because they simply enjoy the lie itself, while another is a liar because they desire reputation or profit.
• Now, those who boast for the sake of reputation claim qualities that will bring them praise or congratulations.
• But those whose object is gain claim qualities that are valuable to one’s neighbors and where one’s lack of such qualities is not easily detected. Examples include claiming to have the powers of a seer (someone who can predict the future), a wise sage, or a physician. For this reason, it is such things as these that most people claim and boast about, because in them the qualities mentioned (value to others and difficulty of detection) are found.

Mock-Modest People (Understatement)

• Mock-modest people, who understate things, often seem more attractive in character.
• This is because they are thought to speak not for personal gain but to avoid parade or showing off.
• Here too, it is often qualities that bring reputation that they disclaim. Socrates, for example, used to do this (professing ignorance).
• Those who disclaim trifling and obvious qualities (pretending not to have minor, evident skills or possessions) are called humbugs (deceivers) and are more contemptible.
• Sometimes this kind of extreme understatement can even seem like a form of boastfulness, like the very plain and severe dress of the Spartans (which could be seen as a way of showing off their discipline). Both excessive claims and excessive deficiency in claims can be forms of boastfulness.
• But those who use understatement with moderation and understate things about matters that are not very obvious or forced on our notice seem attractive.

And it is the boaster that seems to be most directly opposed to the truthful man, for the boaster is generally considered the worse character.

8. Wit and Good Humor: Finding the Balance in Amusement

Since life includes rest and relaxation as well as activity, and this includes leisure and amusement, there seems here also to be a kind of social interaction which can be tasteful.

• There is such a thing as saying—and also listening to—what one should and as one should.
• The kind of people one is speaking to or listening to will also make a difference.

Evidently, here also there is both an excess and a deficiency as compared with the mean.

• Those who carry humor to excess are thought to be vulgar buffoons. They strive after humor at all costs, aiming more at raising a laugh than at saying what is becoming (appropriate and fitting) and at avoiding giving pain to the person who is the object of their fun.
• Those who can neither make a joke themselves nor put up with those who do are thought to be boorish and unpolished (lacking social grace).
• But those who joke in a tasteful way are called ready-witted. This implies a sort of readiness to turn things this way and that with their words. Such witty remarks (sallies) are thought to be movements of the character, and just as bodies are distinguished by their movements, so too are characters.

The ridiculous side of things is not far to seek, however. Most people delight more than they should in amusement and in jesting. And so even buffoons are sometimes called ready-witted because they are found attractive. But that they differ from the truly ready-witted man, and to no small extent, is clear from what has been said.

Tact and Good Taste in Humor To the middle state (the balanced mean) also belongs tact. It is the mark of a tactful man to say and listen to such things as are fit for a good and well-bred person.

• There are some things that it is fitting for such a person to say and to hear by way of jest.
• The well-bred person’s jesting differs from that of a vulgar person. The joking of an educated person differs from that of an uneducated one.
• One may see this even from comparing old and new comedies (types of plays). To the authors of the older comedies, indecency of language was considered amusing. To the authors of the newer comedies, innuendo (indirect or suggestive remarks) is more so. And these differ in no small degree in respect of propriety (what is considered proper).

Now, how should we define the person who jokes well?

• By their saying what is not unbecoming to a well-bred person?
• Or by their not giving pain, or even giving delight, to the hearer?
• Or is this latter definition, at any rate, itself too indefinite, since different things are hateful or pleasant to different people?

The kind of jokes a tactful person will listen to will be the same kind they are willing to make. For the kind of jokes they can put up with are also the kind they seem to make. There are, then, jokes a tactful person will not make.

• For a jest is a sort of abuse or insult.
• There are some things that lawgivers forbid us to abuse. And perhaps they should have forbidden us even to make a jest of such things. The refined and well-bred person, therefore, will be as we have described, being, as it were, a law to himself.

Such, then, is the person who observes the mean, whether they are called tactful or ready-witted.

• The buffoon (the excess), on the other hand, is the slave of his sense of humor. He spares neither himself nor others if he can raise a laugh. He says things that a person of refinement would never say, and some of which they would not even listen to.
• The boor (the deficiency), again, is useless for such social interaction. He contributes nothing and finds fault with everything.

But relaxation and amusement are thought to be a necessary element in life.

Summary of Social Virtues The means in social life that have been described, then, are three in number. They are all concerned with an interchange of words and deeds of some kind. They differ, however, in that:

1. One (truthfulness) is concerned with truth.
2. The other two (friendliness/social pleasantness and wit) are concerned with pleasantness.
   • Of those concerned with pleasure, one (wit) is displayed in jests and amusement.
   • The other (friendliness) is displayed in the general social interactions of life.

9. Shame: A Feeling, Not a Virtue

Shame should not be described as a virtue. It is more like a feeling than a permanent state of character. It is defined, at any rate, as a kind of fear of dishonor or disgrace. It produces an effect similar to that produced by the fear of danger:

• People who feel disgraced blush.
• Those who fear death turn pale. Both, therefore, seem to be in a sense bodily conditions, which is thought to be more characteristic of a feeling rather than a stable state of character.

The feeling of shame is not becoming to every age, but only to youth.

• We think young people should be prone to the feeling of shame because they live much by their feelings and therefore commit many errors. Shame can act as a restraint on them.
• We praise young people who are prone to this feeling.
• But no one would praise an older person for being prone to the sense of disgrace, since we think an older person should not do anything that need cause this sense of shame in the first place.

For the sense of disgrace is not even characteristic of a good man, since it is a consequence of bad actions.

• Such actions simply should not be done.
• And if some actions are disgraceful in very truth, while others are considered disgraceful only according to common opinion, this makes no difference. Neither class of actions should be done, so no disgrace should be felt as a consequence. It is a mark of a bad man even to be the sort of person who would do any disgraceful action.

To be so constituted as to feel disgraced if one does such an action, and for this reason to think oneself good, is absurd.

• Shame is felt for voluntary actions.
• The good man will never voluntarily do bad actions.

But shame may be said to be conditionally a good thing: if a good person happens to do such bad actions, they will feel disgraced. But virtues are not subject to such “if” qualifications; they are good in themselves. And if shamelessness—not to be ashamed of doing base (shameful) actions—is bad, that does not automatically make it good to be ashamed of doing such actions. (The ideal is not to do them at all.)

Continence (self-restraint, especially when tempted) is also not strictly a virtue, but a mixed sort of state. This will be shown later.

Now, however, let us discuss justice.

BOOK V

1. Understanding Justice and Injustice

Now, let’s turn our attention to justice and injustice. In this discussion, we need to consider:

1. What kind of actions they are concerned with.
2. What sort of “middle ground” or mean justice is.
3. Between what extremes the just act lies. Our investigation will follow the same approach we’ve used in previous discussions.

What We Mean by Justice and Injustice We see that everyone generally means by justice that kind of character state which makes people inclined to do what is just. It also makes them act justly and wish for what is just. Similarly, by injustice, they mean that state of character which makes people act unjustly and wish for what is unjust. Let’s use this as our starting point.

It’s important to note that states of character are different from scientific knowledge or abilities (faculties).

• A single science or ability (like medical knowledge) can relate to opposite things (like health and disease).
• But a state of character that is one of two opposites (like the state of health) does not produce opposite results. For example, being healthy doesn’t make us do unhealthy things; it only leads to healthy actions. We say a person walks “healthily” when they walk as a healthy person would.

How We Recognize Virtues and Vices Often, we can understand one state of character by looking at its opposite. For example, we can understand what bad physical condition is if we know what good condition is. We also often recognize these states by looking at the people or things that show them:

• If we know what good physical condition looks like, then bad condition also becomes clear.
• Good condition is known from the things that are in good condition, and we understand those things by understanding good condition.
• For instance, if good condition means having firm flesh, then bad condition must mean having flabby flesh. And things that are “wholesome” would be those that cause firmness in flesh.

It usually follows that if one of two opposite terms has multiple meanings (is ambiguous), the other term will also have multiple meanings. For example, if “just” has several meanings, then “unjust” will likely have several meanings too.

The Different Meanings of “Justice” and “Injustice” “Justice” and “injustice” do seem to have multiple meanings. But because their different meanings are quite close to each other, the ambiguity often goes unnoticed. It’s not as obvious as when meanings are very far apart.

• For example, if a word had two completely unrelated meanings (like an ancient Greek word kleis meaning both an animal’s collarbone and a key for locking a door), the difference in form and function would make the ambiguity very clear. With “justice,” the different senses are more subtle.

Let’s start by looking at the various meanings of “an unjust man.”

• The lawless man is thought to be unjust.
• The grasping man (someone who always wants more than their fair share) and the unfair man are also thought to be unjust. From this, it becomes clear that:
• The law-abiding man will be considered just.
• The fair man will be considered just. So, we can say that the just is what is lawful and what is fair. And the unjust is what is unlawful and what is unfair.

The Unjust Man as Grasping Since the unjust man is grasping, he must be concerned with “goods.”

• He’s not concerned with all goods, but specifically with those goods related to prosperity and adversity (good fortune and misfortune). These things, considered on their own (“absolutely”), are always good. However, for a particular individual, they are not always good (e.g., too much wealth could be bad for a particular person if it leads them astray).
• Now, people pray for and pursue these things that are “good absolutely.” But they shouldn’t just do that. They should pray that the things that are good absolutely may also be good for them, and they should choose the things that are actually good for them.
• The unjust man doesn’t always choose the greater share of what is good. Sometimes, in the case of things that are “bad absolutely,” he chooses the lesser share (the lesser evil). But because even a lesser evil is often thought to be good in a relative sense (better than a greater evil), and because graspingness is always aimed at getting some kind of “good,” he is therefore thought to be grasping.
• And he is unfair. This quality of being unfair includes both being lawless and being grasping.

Justice as Lawfulness (General Justice) Since we saw that the lawless man is unjust and the law-abiding man is just, it’s clear that all lawful acts are, in a sense, just acts.

• The actions laid down by the art of lawmaking are lawful, and we say that each of these is just.
• Laws, in what they require on all subjects, aim at the common advantage. This could be the advantage of all citizens, or of the best citizens, or of those who hold power, or something similar.
• So, in one sense, we call those acts just that tend to produce and preserve happiness and its components for the political society.
• The law also tells us to do the acts of a brave man (e.g., not to desert our post in battle, not to run away, not to throw away our weapons). It tells us to do the acts of a temperate man (e.g., not to commit adultery, not to act on every lustful urge). It tells us to do the acts of a good-tempered man (e.g., not to strike another person, not to speak evil of others).
• Similarly, the law commands some acts and forbids others with regard to the other virtues and forms of wickedness. A rightly-framed law does this correctly; a law that was conceived hastily or poorly does this less well.

This form of justice, then (which is essentially being law-abiding), is complete virtue. However, it’s not complete virtue absolutely, but complete virtue in relation to our neighbor.

• This is why justice is often thought to be the greatest of virtues. People say, “neither the evening star nor the morning star is so wonderful.” There’s also a proverb: “in justice every virtue is summed up.”
• And it is complete virtue in its fullest sense because it is the actual exercise of complete virtue towards others.
• It is complete because the person who possesses it can use their virtue not only in matters affecting themselves but also in their dealings with their neighbors. Many people can show virtue in their own private affairs but fail to do so in their relationships with others.
• This is why the saying of Bias (a wise ancient Greek) is thought to be true: “Rule will show the man.” A ruler, by necessity, is in relation to other people and is a member of a society, so their true character is revealed in how they rule.
• For this same reason, justice, alone among the virtues, is often thought to be “another’s good.” This is because it is directly related to our neighbor; it does what is advantageous or good for another person, whether that person is a ruler or a fellow member of society.
• Now, the worst man is the one who exercises his wickedness both towards himself and towards his friends.
• And the best man is not the one who exercises his virtue only towards himself, but the one who exercises it towards another person, for this is a difficult task.

So, justice in this general sense (lawfulness, complete virtue towards others) is not just a part of virtue, but virtue entire. Similarly, the contrary injustice (general lawlessness) is not just a part of vice, but vice entire. The difference between virtue (in an unqualified sense) and justice (in this general sense) is clear from what we’ve said:

• They are the same state of character.
• But their essence or definition is not the same. What, as a relation to one’s neighbor, is called justice, is, as a certain kind of character state without further qualification, called virtue.

2. Particular Justice: Fairness in Dealings

However, what we are mainly investigating now is the justice which is a part of virtue, because we maintain that there is such a specific kind of justice. Similarly, we are concerned with injustice in a particular sense.

The fact that there is such a “particular justice” is shown by this:

• A person who acts out other forms of wickedness (like cowardice, bad temper, or stinginess) certainly acts wrongly, but not necessarily in a grasping way. For example, the man who throws away his shield acts from cowardice, not from a desire to grasp more than his share. The one who speaks harshly acts from bad temper. The one who fails to help a friend with money acts from stinginess.
• But when a person acts graspingly, they often don’t show any of these other specific vices—or at least, not all of them together. Yet, they certainly show wickedness of some kind (because we blame them) and they show injustice.
• Therefore, there is another kind of injustice which is a part of injustice in the wide sense (general lawlessness). There’s a use of the word “unjust” that corresponds to a part of what is unjust in the broad sense of “contrary to the law.”

Here’s another example:

• If one man commits adultery for the sake of gain and makes money by it, while another man commits adultery because he is driven by appetite, even though he loses money and is punished for it:
  • The second man would be considered self-indulgent rather than grasping.
  • But the first man is considered unjust (because he did it for gain), not self-indulgent.
  • Clearly, then, he is unjust because of his making a profit from his wrongful act.

Again, all other unjust acts are usually attributed to some particular kind of wickedness:

• Adultery is attributed to self-indulgence.
• Deserting a comrade in battle is attributed to cowardice.
• Physical violence is attributed to anger.
• But if a man makes an unfair gain, his action is not attributed to any of those other forms of wickedness, but specifically to injustice.

Therefore, it’s clear that apart from injustice in the wide sense (general lawlessness), there is another, “particular” injustice. This particular injustice shares the name and nature of the first because its definition falls within the same general category (genus).

• The significance of both general and particular injustice consists in a relation to one’s neighbor.
• But particular injustice is concerned with things like honor, money, or safety—or that which includes all these, if we had a single name for it—and its motive is the pleasure that comes from unfair gain.
• General justice/injustice, on the other hand, is concerned with all the objects with which a good person (and therefore law) is concerned.

So, it is clear that there is more than one kind of justice, and that there is one specific kind which is distinct from virtue entire. We must now try to grasp its general class (genus) and its specific distinguishing features (differentia).

The Unlawful vs. The Unfair We previously divided the unjust into:

1. The unlawful.
2. The unfair. And the just into:
3. The lawful.
4. The fair.

The sense of injustice corresponding to “the unlawful” is the general kind we’ve already discussed. But since “unfair” and “unlawful” are not the same thing (they are different as a part is from its whole), the “unjust” and “injustice” in the sense of “the unfair” are not the same as the broader kind of injustice, but different, as a part is from a whole.

• The idea is that all that is unfair is also unlawful, but not all that is unlawful is necessarily unfair in this specific sense of grasping for more than one’s share. (For example, breaking a minor traffic law might be unlawful, but not necessarily “unfair” in the sense of particular justice being discussed here).
• Injustice in this sense (unfairness) is a part of injustice in the wide sense (lawlessness). Similarly, justice as fairness is a part of justice as lawfulness. Therefore, we must now speak specifically about particular justice (fairness) and particular injustice (unfairness).

The justice which corresponds to the whole of virtue (general justice), and the corresponding injustice (general injustice)—one being the exercise of virtue as a whole towards one’s neighbor, and the other that of vice as a whole towards one’s neighbor—we can leave aside for now. It’s also clear how the meanings of “just” and “unjust” which correspond to these general states are to be distinguished:

• Practically, the majority of the acts commanded by the law are those which are prescribed from the point of view of virtue taken as a whole. The law tells us to practice every virtue and forbids us to practice any vice.
• The things that tend to produce virtue taken as a whole are those acts, prescribed by the law, which have been laid down with a view to education for the common good.
• But concerning the education of the individual as such—that which makes a person unqualifiedly a good man—we must determine later whether this is the job of the political art or of some other art. For perhaps it is not the same thing to be a good man and to be a good citizen of any particular state.

Two Kinds of Particular Justice (Justice as Fairness) Of particular justice, and that which is just in the corresponding sense, there are two main kinds:

(A) Distributive Justice:

• This kind is shown in distributions of honor, or money, or the other things that can be divided among those who have a share in the political system or community (e.g., citizens).
• In these distributions, it is possible for one person to have a share that is either unequal or equal to that of another.

(B) Rectificatory Justice (also called Corrective Justice):

• This kind plays a rectifying or correcting part in transactions between people.
• Of this rectificatory justice, there are two divisions, based on the type of transaction:
  1. Voluntary Transactions: These are transactions where the origin is voluntary. Examples include:
     • Sale
     • Purchase
     • Loan for consumption (like borrowing money)
     • Pledging (giving something as security for a loan)
     • Loan for use (like borrowing an item)
     • Depositing (like leaving something for safekeeping)
     • Letting (like renting out property)
  2. Involuntary Transactions: These occur against someone’s will.
     • Clandestine (Secret) Involuntary Transactions: Examples include:
       • Theft
       • Adultery (when done secretly and involving harm/unfairness to another)
       • Poisoning
       • Procuring (arranging for prostitution)
       • Enticement of slaves (luring away someone’s slave)
       • Assassination
       • False witness (lying in court)
     • Violent Involuntary Transactions: Examples include:
       • Assault
       • Imprisonment (unlawful)
       • Murder
       • Robbery with violence
       • Mutilation (causing serious physical harm)
       • Verbal abuse
       • Insult

3. Distributive Justice: Fair Shares

(A) Distributive Justice Explained We have shown that both the unjust man and the unjust act are unfair or unequal. Now, it is clear that there is also an intermediate point (a middle) between the two unequals involved in any case of unfairness. And this middle point is the equal.

• In any kind of action where there can be a “more” and a “less,” there is also what is “equal.”
• If, then, the unjust is unequal, the just is equal. Everyone supposes this to be true, even without detailed argument.
• And since the equal is a middle point, the just will be a middle point.

Now, equality implies at least two things (or parties, or shares). So, the just must be:

• Intermediate (a middle point)
• Equal
• Relative (i.e., it is just for certain persons in a specific situation)

And since the equal is intermediate, it must be between certain things (which are respectively greater and less).

• As equal, it involves two things (e.g., two shares).
• As just, it is for certain people. The just, therefore, involves at least four terms:

1. The persons for whom it is just (at least two people).
2. The things in which justice is shown, i.e., the objects being distributed (at least two shares or items).

And the same equality will exist between the persons as exists between the things concerned.

• The relationship between the things (the shares) should be the same as the relationship between the persons (in terms of their merit or desert).
• If the persons are not equal (in whatever anagous criterion is relevant to the distribution), they will not and should not have equal shares.
• This is the origin of quarrels and complaints—when either equals receive unequal shares, or unequals receive equal shares.

This is also clear from the fact that awards or distributions should be “according to merit.”

• All people agree that what is just in distribution must be according to merit in some sense.
• However, they do not all specify the same sort of merit:
  • Democrats identify merit with the status of a freeman.
  • Supporters of oligarchy identify it with wealth (or sometimes with noble birth).
  • Supporters of aristocracy identify it with excellence (virtue).

The just, then, is a kind of proportionate relationship. (Proportion is not a property only of abstract numbers but of numbers and quantities in general).

• Proportion is an equality of ratios. It involves at least four terms.
  • (That discrete proportion like A:B = C:D involves four terms is plain. But so does continuous proportion like A:B = B:C, because it uses one term, B, as two and mentions it twice. So, if B is considered twice, the proportional terms are four.)
• And the just (in distribution) also involves at least four terms. The ratio between one pair is the same as the ratio between the other pair. There is a similar distinction between the persons and between the things.
• So, if Person 1 (P1) has merit M1 and receives share S1, and Person 2 (P2) has merit M2 and receives share S2, then the just distribution maintains this ratio: M1 is to M2 as S1 is to S2. (Or P1’s merit relative to P2’s merit is the same as P1’s share relative to P2’s share).
• The distribution connects Person 1 with Share 1, and Person 2 with Share 2. If the terms are combined in this proportional way, the distribution is just.
• This species of the just is an intermediate, and the unjust is what violates this proportion. The proportional is intermediate, and the just is proportional.
• (Mathematicians call this kind of proportion geometrical proportion. In geometrical proportion, it follows that the whole is to the whole as either part is to the corresponding part.)
• This proportion (in justice) is not continuous, because we cannot get a single term that stands for both a person and a thing.

This, then, is what distributive justice is—it is the proportional. The unjust is what violates this proportion.

• Hence, in an unjust distribution, one share becomes too great, and the other too small, as indeed happens in practice.
• The person who acts unjustly (in distributing) gets too much of what is good.
• The person who is unjustly treated gets too little of what is good.
• In the case of evil things, the reverse is true (the one acting unjustly gets too little of the evil, the one treated unjustly gets too much). For the lesser evil is considered a good in comparison with the greater evil, since the lesser evil is more to be chosen than the greater. What is worthy of choice is good, and what is worthier of choice is a greater good.

This, then, is one species of the just: distributive justice.

4. Corrective Justice: Righting Wrongs

(B) Corrective Justice Explained The remaining kind of particular justice is rectificatory or corrective justice. This arises in connection with transactions, both voluntary and involuntary. This form of the just has a different specific character from distributive justice.

• The justice which distributes common possessions (distributive justice) is always in accordance with the kind of proportion mentioned above (geometrical proportion). For example, if a distribution is made from the common funds of a partnership, it will be according to the same ratio that the funds put into the business by the partners bear to one another. The injustice opposed to this kind of justice is that which violates this proportion.
• But the justice in transactions between one person and another (corrective justice) is a sort of equality, and the injustice a sort of inequality. However, it’s not according to geometrical proportion, but according to arithmetical proportion.

For corrective justice, it makes no difference whether a good man has defrauded a bad man or a bad man has defrauded a good one. Nor does it matter whether it is a good or a bad man that has committed adultery.

• The law looks only to the distinctive character of the injury.
• It treats the parties as equal, if one is in the wrong and the other is being wronged, and if one inflicted an injury and the other has received it.

Therefore, this kind of injustice (in transactions) being an inequality, the judge tries to equalize it.

• For instance, if one person has received a wound and another has inflicted it, or one has killed and the other has been killed, the suffering and the action have been unequally distributed.
• The judge tries to equalize this by means of a penalty, taking away from the “gain” of the person who committed the offense.
• The term “gain” is applied generally to such cases, even if it’s not always an appropriate term for certain situations (e.g., for the person who inflicts a wound, “gain” might not be monetary but some other advantage). The term “loss” is applied to the sufferer. At any rate, when the suffering has been estimated, one side is called loss and the other gain.
• Therefore, the equal is the intermediate point between the greater (gain) and the less (loss). But the gain and the loss are respectively greater and less in contrary ways: more of the good and less of the evil are considered gain, and the contrary is loss.
• The intermediate point between them is, as we saw, the equal, which we say is just.
• Therefore, corrective justice will be the intermediate point between loss and gain.

This is why, when people have disputes, they take refuge in the judge. To go to the judge is to go to justice.

• The nature of the judge is to be a sort of “living justice” (justice personified).
• People seek the judge as an intermediate figure. In some states, they call judges “mediators,” on the assumption that if they get what is intermediate (the fair middle ground), they will get what is just.
• The just, then, is an intermediate, since the judge is so.

Now, the judge restores equality.

• It is as though there were a line divided into unequal parts. The judge takes away that portion by which the greater segment exceeds the half, and adds it to the smaller segment.
• When the whole has been equally divided (meaning the “loss” has been compensated and the unfair “gain” removed), then people say they have “their own”—that is, when they have received what is equal.
• The equal is the intermediate point between the greater and the lesser line according to arithmetical proportion (simple numerical equality, not proportional to merit).

This is also why justice is called dikaion in Greek—because it relates to a division into two equal parts (dicha). It’s as if one were to call it sichaion (a made-up word sounding like “bisected thing”). The judge (dikastes) is seen as one who bisects or divides in two (dichastes). The author is pointing out a wordplay in Greek that connects the idea of justice with equal division.

Here’s how this equalization works:

• When something is subtracted from one of two equal amounts and added to the other, the second amount now exceeds the first by twice the amount that was transferred.
• If what was taken from the one had not been added to the other, the second (the one that received) would have been in excess by only that one amount.
• So, the one that received the addition now exceeds the middle (equal) point by one unit (the amount transferred), and the middle point exceeds by one unit that from which the amount was taken. This helps us understand both what we must subtract from the party that has too much, and what we must add to the party that has too little:
• We must add to the one with less the amount by which the true middle point exceeds what they have.
• We must subtract from the one with the most the amount by which they exceed the true middle point.

Imagine three equal lines: AA’, BB’, and CC’.

• Let’s say a segment AE is subtracted from line AA’, leaving EA’.
• And a segment CD (equal to AE) is added to line CC’, making it DCC’.
• Now, the whole line DCC’ is longer than the line EA’. It exceeds BB’ (the original middle or equal line) by the segment CD. The judge’s role is like taking that excess segment CD from DCC’ and giving it (or its equivalent) back to restore EA’ to the length of BB’, making both equal.

“Loss” and “Gain” These names, loss and gain, have come from voluntary exchange (like buying and selling).

• To have more than one’s own original amount after a transaction is called gaining.
• To have less than one’s original share is called losing.
• When people get neither more nor less but just what rightly belongs to themselves (their original amount or its fair equivalent), they say that they “have their own” and that they neither lose nor gain.

Therefore, the just (in corrective justice) is an intermediate point between a sort of gain and a sort of loss, specifically those which are involuntary (resulting from an unfair transaction that needs correction). It consists in having an equal amount before and after the transaction has been rectified.

5. Is Reciprocity Simply Justice?

Some people think that reciprocity (giving back in kind, like “an eye for an eye”) is, without any qualification, justice. The Pythagoreans (an ancient philosophical school) said this, for they defined justice simply as reciprocity.

However, “reciprocity” in this simple sense fits neither distributive justice nor rectificatory (corrective) justice perfectly. Yet, people sometimes want even the justice of Rhadamanthus (a mythical judge of the dead, known for strict justice) to mean this: “Should a man suffer what he did, right justice would be done.”

But in many cases, simple reciprocity and rectificatory justice are not in agreement. For example:

1. If an official (like a police officer or magistrate) acting in their duty has inflicted a wound, they should not simply be wounded in return.
2. And if someone has wounded an official, they ought not to be only wounded in return but should likely be punished further (due to the office they attacked).

Furthermore, there is a great difference between a voluntary act and an involuntary act, which simple reciprocity doesn’t always take into account.

Reciprocity in Economic Exchange But in associations for exchange (like trade and commerce), this sort of justice—reciprocity—does hold people together. However, it must be reciprocity in accordance with a proportion, not on the basis of a precisely equal return in kind.

• It is by proportionate requital (giving back fair value) that the city or society holds together.
• People seek to return either evil for evil—and if they cannot, they feel their position is like slavery—or good for good.
• If they cannot return good for good, there is no exchange, and it is by exchange that they hold together as a community.
• This is why societies give a prominent place to temples or symbols of the Graces (goddesses of charm, beauty, and goodwill)—to promote the giving back of services. For this is characteristic of grace: we should serve in return someone who has shown grace (kindness or a gift) to us, and we should another time take the initiative in showing grace.

Proportionate Return in Exchange Now, proportionate return in exchange is secured by a kind of cross-conjunction of values. Let A be a builder, B be a shoemaker, C be a house (the builder’s product), and D be a pair of shoes (the shoemaker’s product).

• The builder, then, must get from the shoemaker the shoemaker’s work (shoes).
• And the builder must himself give the shoemaker in return his own work (the house, or a fair part of its value).

If, first, there is a proportionate equality of the goods (meaning their values are correctly assessed relative to each other), and then the reciprocal action (exchange) takes place, the desired fair result will be achieved. If not, the bargain is not equal, and it doesn’t hold (it’s not a fair or stable exchange). For there is nothing to prevent the work of one producer being better (more valuable) than that of the other. Their products must therefore be equated in value. (And this is true of the other arts and professions as well. They would have been destroyed if what the recipient of a service or product “suffered” or received was not equivalent in value to what the provider “did” or gave, and of the same amount and kind of value.)

For it is not usually two doctors that associate for exchange, but a doctor and a farmer, or in general, people who are different and unequal in what they produce or can do. But these different products or services must be equated in value for fair exchange.

The Role of Money in Exchange This is why all things that are exchanged must be somehow comparable.

• It is for this purpose that money has been introduced. Money becomes, in a sense, an intermediate measure.
• For it measures all things, and therefore it measures the excess and the defect—for example, how many shoes are equal in value to a house or to a given amount of food.
• The number of shoes exchanged for a house (or for a given amount of food) must therefore correspond to the ratio of value between the builder’s work and the shoemaker’s work. (For example, if building a house takes much more skill, time, and resources than making a pair of shoes, many pairs of shoes will be needed to equal the value of one house).
• If this proportion is not maintained, there will be no fair exchange and no ongoing economic interaction.
• And this proportion will not be achieved unless the goods are somehow made equal in value.

All goods must therefore be measured by some one thing, as we said before.

• Now, this unit of measure is, in truth, demand, which holds all things together in the market. (For if people did not need one another’s goods at all, or did not need them with some degree of mutual intensity, there would be either no exchange or not the same kind of exchange).
• But money has become, by social convention (agreement), a sort of representative of demand.
• This is why it has the name “money” (nomisma in Greek)—because it exists not by nature but by law or custom (nomos). It is in our power to change it and make it useless (e.g., by changing the currency or its accepted value).

There will, then, be reciprocity when the terms have been equated so that, for example:

• As the farmer is to the shoemaker (in terms of the value of their skill/labor/product), so the amount of the shoemaker’s work (e.g., shoes) is to the amount of the farmer’s work (e.g., food) for which it exchanges. (This means the ratio of their products’ values should reflect the ratio of the value of their labor or contribution).

But we must not bring them into a formal diagram of proportion after they have already exchanged their goods (otherwise, one extreme in the proportion calculation will seem to have both excesses of value). Instead, this equating must happen conceptually while they still have their own goods, before the exchange. Thus, they are equals and associates precisely because this equality in value can be effected in their case, allowing for a fair exchange.

• Let A be a farmer, C be food (his product). Let B be a shoemaker, D be his product (shoes), which is equated in value to C (the food).
• If it had not been possible for reciprocity (fair exchange of value) to be achieved in this way, there would have been no association or transaction between the parties.

That demand holds things together as if they were a single unit is shown by the fact that when people do not need one another—that is, when neither needs the other, or one does not need the other—they do not exchange. We do exchange, however, when someone wants what we have ourselves (e.g., when people permit the export of grain in exchange for wine, because there’s a demand for wine that can be met by grain). This equation of value through demand and a medium of exchange must therefore be established.

And for future exchange—the idea that if we do not need a thing now, we shall be able to get it if ever we do need it—money is, as it were, our surety (our guarantee). For it must be possible for us to get what we want by bringing the money. Now, the same thing happens to money itself as to goods—its value is not always exactly the same; yet, it tends to be steadier in value than individual commodities. This is why all goods must have a price set on them (expressed in money). For then there will always be the possibility of exchange, and if so, the possibility of association between people. Money, then, acting as a measure, makes goods commensurate (able to be compared by a common standard) and equates them in value.

• For there would be no association if there were not exchange.
• There would be no exchange if there were not equality (of value).
• There would be no equality (of value) if there were not commensurability.

Now, in truth, it is impossible that things differing so much (like a house and a vitamin pill) should become truly commensurate in themselves. But with reference to demand, they may become so sufficiently for practical purposes. There must, then, be a unit of measure, and that unit must be fixed by agreement (for which reason it is called “money,” as it’s based on convention). For it is this conventional unit that makes all things commensurate, since all things are measured by money.

• Let A be a house, B be ten minae (an ancient unit of money), C be a bed.
• A is half of B if the house is worth five minae or equal to them.
• The bed, C, is a tenth of B (meaning it’s worth one mina).
• It is plain, then, how many beds are equal in value to a house—namely, five. That exchange took place in this way (by comparing values) even before there was money is plain; for it makes no difference whether it is five beds that exchange for a house, or the money value of five beds.

Recap: The Just and Unjust in Action We have now defined the unjust and the just. These having been marked off from each other, it is plain that:

• Just action is an intermediate state between acting unjustly (doing an injustice) and being unjustly treated (suffering an injustice). For acting unjustly is to have or cause too much (of good, or too little of bad), and being unjustly treated is to have or suffer too little (of good, or too much of bad).
• Justice is a kind of mean (a middle state), but not in exactly the same way as the other virtues (which are typically means between two opposite vices, like courage between cowardice and rashness). Justice is a mean because it relates to an intermediate amount or share, while injustice relates to the extremes (too much or too little).
• And justice is that state of character by virtue of which the just man is said to be a doer, by choice, of that which is just. He is one who will distribute—either between himself and another, or between two other people—not so as to give more of what is desirable to himself and less to his neighbor (and conversely with what is harmful), but so as to give what is equal in accordance with proportion. He acts similarly when distributing between two other persons.
• Injustice, on the other hand, is similarly related to the unjust. The unjust is an excess and defect, contrary to proportion, of what is useful or hurtful.
  • For this reason, injustice is excess and defect: it is productive of excess and defect.
  • In one’s own case: excess of what is in its own nature useful, and defect of what is hurtful.
  • In the case of others (when an unjust act affects others): it is as a whole like what it is in one’s own case (producing excess for one, defect for another), but proportion may be violated in either direction.
• In an unjust act:
  • To have too little is to be unjustly treated.
  • To have too much (at another’s expense) is to act unjustly.

Let this be taken as our account of the nature of justice and injustice, and similarly of the just and the unjust in general.

6. Acting Unjustly vs. Being an Unjust Person; Political Justice

Since acting unjustly does not necessarily imply being an unjust person (in terms of fixed character), we must ask what sort of unjust acts imply that the doer is unjust with respect to each type of injustice. For example, what makes someone truly a thief, an adulterer (by character), or a brigand? Surely the answer does not turn merely on the outward difference between these types of acts.

• For a man might even lie with a woman knowing who she was (e.g., someone else’s wife), but the origin or motive of his act might be passion, not deliberate choice (of being an unjust person or committing an injustice for its own sake or for unfair gain).
• He acts unjustly in that instance, then, but he is not necessarily an unjust person by character. For example, a man is not necessarily a “thief” (by character) just because he once stole something. Nor is he an “adulterer” (by character) just because he once committed adultery. And similarly in all other cases.

Now, we have previously stated how the reciprocal (giving like for like) is related to the just. But we must not forget that what we are ultimately looking for is not only what is just in an unqualified, abstract sense, but also political justice—justice as it applies within a political community.

• This political justice is found among people who share their life with a view to self-sufficiency. They must be free and either proportionately or arithmetically equal (depending on the context, as discussed in distributive and corrective justice).
• So, between those who do not fulfill this condition (e.g., in relationships of extreme inequality or lack of freedom), there is no political justice in the full sense, but only justice in a special sense or by analogy.
• For justice exists only between people whose mutual relations are governed by law.
• And law exists for people between whom there is injustice (meaning, where the possibility of unjust actions exists that need regulation). For legal justice is the discrimination of the just and the unjust.
• And between people where injustice can occur, unjust action can also occur. (Though not everyone who commits an unjust action is necessarily an unjust person in character).
• This unjust action often involves assigning too much to oneself of things that are good in themselves, and too little of things that are evil in themselves.
• This is why we do not allow a mere man to rule, but rather rational principle (i.e., the law). Because an individual man, if given unchecked power, might behave in his own interests and become a tyrant.
• The magistrate (or ruler/official), on the other hand, is the guardian of justice, and, if of justice, then of equality also.
• And since he is assumed to have no more than his fair share if he is just (for he does not assign to himself more of what is good in itself, unless such a share is proportional to his merits—so that he often labors for others), it is for this reason that people say, as we stated previously, that justice is “another’s good.”
• Therefore, a reward must be given to the magistrate for his service, and this reward is honor and privilege. But those rulers for whom such things are not enough often become tyrants.

Household Justice vs. Political Justice The justice of a master towards a slave and that of a father towards a child are not the same as the justice between citizens, though they are like it in some ways.

• There can be no injustice in the unqualified sense towards things that are one’s own. A man’s chattel (property, including, in ancient times, slaves) and his child (until it reaches a certain age and becomes independent) are, as it were, part of himself.
• And no one chooses to hurt himself (for which reason there can be no injustice, in the strict political sense, towards oneself).
• Therefore, the justice or injustice found between citizens is not manifested in these relations (master-slave, parent-child before independence). For citizen justice, as we saw, is according to law and exists between people naturally subject to law. These, as we saw, are people who have an equal share in ruling and being ruled.
• Hence, justice can be more truly manifested towards a wife than towards children and chattels, for justice towards a wife is a form of household justice. But even this is different from political justice.

7. Natural Justice and Legal Justice

Of political justice, part is natural and part is legal.

• Natural justice is that which everywhere has the same force and does not exist merely by people thinking this or that. Its validity is not dependent on human opinion or enactment. (For example, the wrongness of murder might be considered naturally just.)
• Legal justice (also called conventional justice) is that which is originally indifferent—meaning it could have been decided one way or another without any inherent rightness or wrongness. But once it has been laid down by law, it is no longer indifferent and must be followed.
  • Examples: That a prisoner’s ransom shall be a specific amount (e.g., one mina of silver). Or that a goat, and not two sheep, shall be sacrificed in a particular ritual.
  • And again, all the laws that are passed for particular cases (e.g., that a sacrifice shall be made in honor of a specific hero like Brasidas), and the provisions of decrees (specific legal orders).

Now, some people think that all justice is of this legal/conventional sort. They argue this because that which is by nature is unchangeable and has everywhere the same force (as fire burns both here and in Persia), while they see that things recognized as just by law do change from place to place or time to time.

• This, however, is not true in this unqualified way, but is true in a sense.
• Or rather, with the gods, it is perhaps not true at all (what is just for them by nature might be absolutely unchangeable).
• But with us humans, there is something that is just even by nature, yet all of it is changeable (or, at least, its application might need to adapt to circumstances). But still, some justice is by nature, and some is not by nature (i.e., it’s legal/conventional).

It is evident which sort of thing, among things capable of being otherwise, is by nature, and which is not but is legal and conventional, assuming that both are equally changeable in some respects (natural justice principles might be applied differently; legal justice can clearly be changed by new laws).

• And in all other things, the same distinction will apply. For example, by nature, the right hand is stronger for most people, yet it is possible that all people could train themselves to be ambidextrous (equally skilled with both hands).
• The things which are just by virtue of convention and expediency (usefulness for the community) are like measures. For example, wine and grain measures are not everywhere equal; they might be larger in wholesale markets and smaller in retail markets.
• Similarly, the things which are just not by nature but by human enactment are not everywhere the same, since constitutions (forms of government) also are not the same. However, there is theoretically only one constitution which is everywhere by nature the best.

Of things just and lawful, each is related as the universal to its particulars.

• The things that are done (individual actions) are many.
• But each rule or principle of justice or law is one, since it is universal (applies to many particular cases).

There is a difference between an act of injustice and what is unjust, and between an act of justice and what is just.

• A thing (a principle, a type of action) is unjust by nature or by enactment.
• This very thing, when it has actually been done, is an act of injustice. But before it is done, it is not yet an act of injustice, but is merely “unjust” (as a potential or a type).
• The same applies to an act of justice. (Though the general term for doing something just is often “just action,” and “act of justice” is sometimes more specifically applied to the correction of an act of injustice).

Each of these (the nature of what is just/unjust, and the acts of justice/injustice) must later be examined separately with regard to the nature and number of its species and the nature of the things with which it is concerned.

8. Voluntariness and Responsibility in Just and Unjust Acts

Acts being just and unjust as we have described them, a person acts unjustly or justly whenever they do such acts voluntarily.

• When they act involuntarily, they act neither unjustly nor justly, except in an incidental way. For they merely do things which happen to be just or unjust in their outcome, without intending them as such.

Whether an act is or is not one of injustice (or of justice) is determined by its voluntariness or involuntariness.

• When an act is voluntary and wrongful, it is blamed, and at the same time, it is then an act of injustice.
• So, there will be things that are unjust (in their nature) but are not yet acts of injustice if voluntariness is not present as well.

By voluntary, I mean (as has been said before) any of the things in a person’s own power which they do with knowledge. This means not being ignorant of:

• The person acted upon.
• The instrument used.
• The end that will be attained (e.g., whom they are striking, with what, and to what end). Each such act must also be done not incidentally (not by accident) nor under compulsion (not forced).
• For example, if Person A takes Person B’s hand and with it strikes Person C, Person B does not act voluntarily, for the act was not in B’s own power.
• The person struck may be the striker’s father, and the striker may know that it is a man or one of the persons present, but not know that it is specifically his father. A similar distinction regarding knowledge can be made in the case of the end goal, and with regard to the whole action.

Therefore, that which is done:

• In ignorance, or
• Though not done in ignorance, is not in the agent’s power, or
• Is done under compulsion, …is involuntary. (For many natural processes, even, we knowingly both perform and experience—like growing old or dying—none of which is either voluntary or involuntary in the moral sense being discussed here).

But in the case of unjust and just acts alike, the injustice or justice of the act may be only incidental.

• For instance, a person might return a deposit (something left for safekeeping) unwillingly and only out of fear. In that case, they must not be said either to do what is just or to act justly in a virtuous sense, except in an incidental way (the outcome happens to be just).
• Similarly, the person who, under compulsion and unwillingly, fails to return the deposit must be said to act unjustly, and to do what is unjust, only incidentally.

Of voluntary acts, we do some by choice and others not by choice.

• By choice are those which we do after deliberation (thinking them through).
• Not by choice are those which we do without previous deliberation.

Thus, there are three kinds of injury in transactions between people:

1. Those done in ignorance are mistakes. This happens when the person acted on, the act itself, the instrument used, or the end that will be attained is other than what the agent supposed it to be.
   • The agent thought either that they were not hitting anyone, or that they were not hitting with this particular missile/instrument, or not hitting this specific person, or not aiming for this particular end.
   • But a result followed other than that which they thought likely (e.g., they threw something not with intent to wound but only to prick, but a wound resulted).
   • Or the person hit, or the missile used, was other than what they supposed.
2. Now when the injury takes place contrary to reasonable expectation (something completely unforeseeable happens), it is a misadventure.

When the injury (2) is not contrary to reasonable expectation, but it does not imply actual vice or wickedness in the person, it is a mistake. A person makes a mistake when the fault or cause of the injury originates in them (e.g., carelessness), but they are the victim of an accident or misadventure when the origin of the harm lies outside of them.

When (3) a person acts with knowledge but not after deliberation (without thinking it through carefully), it is an act of injustice.

• Examples include acts due to anger or other passions that are necessary or natural to humans.
• When people do such harmful and mistaken acts, they act unjustly, and the acts are acts of injustice.
• However, this does not automatically imply that the doers are unjust or wicked by character, because the injury is not due to an established vice or deep-seated wickedness in their character.

But when (4) a person acts from choice (meaning, after deliberation and with a considered intention to do wrong), then they are an unjust person and a vicious (wicked) person.

This is why acts proceeding from anger are rightly judged not to be done with “malice aforethought” (premeditated intent to harm stemming from a bad character).

• In such cases, it is not usually the person who acts in anger who starts the trouble, but the person who enraged them.
• Again, in disputes arising from anger, the main issue is often not whether the thing happened or not, but about its justice or fairness. It is the appearance of being treated unjustly that typically occasions the rage.
• People involved in such a dispute usually don’t argue about whether the event occurred—unlike in commercial transactions where one of the two parties might be deliberately deceptive and vicious. (Unless, of course, they dispute the facts due to forgetfulness).
• Instead, agreeing about the facts, they dispute on which side justice lies. (Whereas a person who has deliberately injured another cannot help knowing that they have done so). So, in anger-driven conflicts, one person thinks they are being treated unjustly, and the other disagrees.

But if a person harms another by deliberate choice, they act unjustly. And these are the acts of injustice which imply that the doer is an unjust person by character, provided that the act violates proportion or equality. Similarly, a person is just (by character) when they act justly by deliberate choice. But they merely act justly (perform a just action) if they simply act voluntarily (even without deep deliberation), and the act itself is just.

Of involuntary acts that cause harm:

• Some are excusable.
• Others are not excusable.
• The mistakes which people make not only in ignorance but also from ignorance (i.e., a general lack of understanding they should have had) are excusable.
• But those wrongful acts which people do, not from this kind of general ignorance, but (though they do them in ignorance of some specific detail) owing to a passion which is neither natural nor such as humans are ordinarily liable to (i.e., an extreme or unnatural passion), are not excusable.

9. Key Questions: Willing Injustice and Self-Inflicted Injustice

Assuming we have sufficiently defined what it means to suffer injustice and to do injustice, we might ask: (1) Can someone willingly be treated unjustly? Euripides, the playwright, wrote some paradoxical words: “I slew my mother, that’s my tale in brief.” “Were you both willing, or unwilling both?” (This implies questioning whether both parties—killer and victim—could be willing participants in such a terrible act).

So, is it truly possible to be willingly treated unjustly?

• Or, is all suffering of injustice the contrary—always involuntary—just as all unjust action is voluntary?
• And is all suffering of injustice of the involuntary kind, or is it sometimes voluntary and sometimes involuntary?

A similar question arises with the case of being justly treated. All just action is voluntary. So, it is reasonable to think there might be a similar opposition in either case—that both being unjustly treated and being justly treated should be either alike voluntary or alike involuntary.

• But it would be thought paradoxical (strange or self-contradictory) even in the case of being justly treated, if it were always voluntary. For some people are unwillingly treated justly (for example, when a criminal is punished justly but against their will).

(2) Is everyone who has suffered what is unjust actually being unjustly treated?

• Or, on the other hand, is it with suffering as it is with acting? In acting and in being acted upon (passivity) alike, it is possible to partake of justice incidentally. Similarly, it is plain, one can partake of injustice incidentally.
• For example, to do what is unjust (the act itself) is not the same as to act unjustly (which implies a certain moral state of the agent).
• Nor is to suffer what is unjust (to be harmed by an act that is unjust in nature) the same as to be unjustly treated (which implies that the other person acted unjustly towards you in a moral sense).
• The same applies to acting justly and being justly treated. It is impossible to be unjustly treated if the other person does not act unjustly (with voluntary intent). It’s impossible to be justly treated unless the other person acts justly.

Now, if “to act unjustly” simply means “to harm someone voluntarily,” and “voluntarily” means “knowing the person acted on, the instrument, and the manner of one’s acting”:

• And if the incontinent man (one who lacks self-control) voluntarily harms himself (e.g., through self-destructive habits).
• Then, it would seem not only that he could voluntarily be unjustly treated (by himself), but also that it would be possible to treat oneself unjustly. (This is also one of the questions in doubt).

Alternatively, consider if a person, due to their own lack of self-control (incontinence), is voluntarily harmed by another person who is also acting voluntarily. In that case, it would seem possible to be voluntarily treated unjustly. Or is our definition of “acting unjustly” incorrect? Must we add to “harming another, with knowledge of the person acted on, of the instrument, and of the manner” the further condition: “contrary to the wish of the person acted on”?

• If we add this, then a man may be voluntarily harmed (he may agree to the harm) and voluntarily suffer what is unjust (the harm itself), but no one is voluntarily treated unjustly in a moral sense.
• For no one wishes to be unjustly treated, not even the incontinent man. He acts contrary to his deeper wish (for no one wishes for what he does not think to be good, but the incontinent man does things that he does not think he ought to do).
• Again, consider the story Homer tells of Glaucus, who gave Diomede “armor of gold for brazen, the price of a hundred beeves for nine.” Glaucus is not unjustly treated, even if he made a bad deal. Though to give the armor is in his power, to be unjustly treated is not in his power; there must be someone else to treat him unjustly. It is plain, then, that being unjustly treated is not voluntary.

Of the questions we intended to discuss, two still remain: (3) When an unfair distribution occurs, is it the person who assigned more than his share (the distributor) who acts unjustly, or is it the person who has the excessive share? (4) Is it possible to treat oneself unjustly? (Revisiting this).

These questions are connected.

• If the first alternative (the distributor acts unjustly, not the receiver) is possible, then if a man knowingly and voluntarily assigns more to another person than to himself, he treats himself unjustly. This is what modest people often seem to do, since the virtuous man tends to take less than his share.
• Or does this statement also need qualification?
  • (a) Perhaps when he takes less of one good (e.g., money), he gets more than his share of some other good, for example, of honor or of intrinsic nobility (the good feeling of doing the right thing).
  • (b) The question is solved by applying the distinction we applied to unjust action in general: he suffers nothing contrary to his own wish. So, he is not unjustly treated as far as this goes, but at most, he only suffers harm or loss in one area while gaining in another.

It is plain too that the distributor acts unjustly, but not always the person who has the excessive share.

• For it is not the person to whom “what is unjust” (the unfairly large share) belongs that acts unjustly, but the person to whom it belongs to do the unjust act voluntarily.
• This means the person in whom the origin of the action lies. And this lies in the distributor, not in the receiver.
• Again, since the word “do” has multiple meanings (is ambiguous), and there is a sense in which lifeless things, or a hand, or a servant who merely obeys an order, may be said to “slay,” he who simply gets an excessive share does not thereby act unjustly, though he “does” what is unjust in the sense of receiving it.

Further:

• If the distributor gave his judgment or made the distribution in ignorance, he does not act unjustly in respect of legal justice, and his judgment is not unjust in this sense. But in a sense, it is unjust (for legal justice and primordial or natural justice are different concepts).
• But if, with knowledge, he judged unjustly, he himself is aiming at an excessive share of something for himself—either of gratitude from the one he favored, or of revenge against the one he disadvantaged.
• In such a case, the man who has judged unjustly for these reasons has effectively “got too much” for himself, just as if he were to actually share in the plunder. The fact that what he gets (gratitude, revenge) is different from what he distributes (e.g., land or money) makes no difference to his unjust act; for even if he awards land with a view to later sharing in the unjust gains (plunder), he gets not land perhaps, but money or some other benefit.

People often think that acting unjustly is in their power, and therefore that being just is easy. But it is not.

• To lie with one’s neighbor’s wife, to wound another, to deliver a bribe—these actions are easy to perform and are in our power.
• But to do these things as a result of a certain state of character (i.e., to be an unjust person by nature) is neither easy nor immediately in our power.

Similarly, to know what is just and what is unjust requires, people think, no great wisdom. They think this because it is not hard to understand the matters dealt with by the laws (though these laws are not “the just” itself, except incidentally or by convention).

• But how actions must be done and how distributions must be carried out in order to be just—to know this is a greater achievement than knowing what is good for the health.
• Though even in medicine, while it is easy to know that honey, wine, hellebore (a medicinal plant), cautery (burning for medical purposes), and the use of the knife are remedies, to know how, to whom, and when these should be applied with a view to producing health, is no less an achievement than that of being a skilled physician.

Again, for this very reason (that the outward acts seem easy), people sometimes think that acting unjustly is characteristic of the just man no less than of the unjust man, because the just man would be not less but even more capable of doing each of these unjust acts (he has the capacity).

• For example, a just man could physically lie with a woman or wound a neighbor. The brave man could throw away his shield and run away in battle.
• But to play the coward or to act unjustly (as a character trait) consists not merely in doing these things (except incidentally), but in doing them as the result of a certain state of character.
• Just as to practice medicine and healing consists not merely in applying or not applying the knife, or in using or not using medicines, but in doing so in a certain skilled and appropriate way.

Just acts occur between people who participate in things that are good in themselves (like health, wealth, honor) and who can have too much or too little of them.

• For some beings (e.g., presumably the gods) cannot have too much of these goods (they exist in a state of perfection).
• And to others—those who are incurably bad—not even the smallest share in them is beneficial; all such goods are actually harmful to them (e.g., wealth might enable more wickedness).
• While to other people, these goods are beneficial up to a certain point.
• Therefore, justice is essentially something human, concerned with the proper distribution and use of these goods among humans.

10. Equity: Correcting the Law’s Limitations

Our next subject is equity and the equitable (in Greek, to epieikes), and their respective relations to justice and the just.

• On examination, they appear to be neither absolutely the same as justice, nor generically different from it.
• Sometimes we praise what is equitable and the equitable man. We even apply the name “equitable” by way of praise to instances of the other virtues, instead of just saying “good,” using “more equitable” (epieikesteron) to mean that a thing is better or fairer.
• At other times, when we reason it out, it seems strange if the equitable, being something different from the just, is still praiseworthy. For either the just or the equitable is not good, if they are different; or, if both are good, they must be the same.

These, then, are pretty much the considerations that give rise to the problem or question about the equitable.

• However, these considerations are all, in a sense, correct and not opposed to one another.
• For the equitable, though it is better than one kind of justice (namely, strict legal justice), yet is itself just. And it is not as being a different class of thing that it is better than the just.
• The same thing, then, is both just and equitable. And while both are good, the equitable is superior.

What creates the problem is that the equitable is just, but it is not the legally just but rather a correction of legal justice. The reason for this is that all law is universal. But about some things, it is not possible to make a universal statement which shall always be correct in every particular circumstance.

• In those cases, then, in which it is necessary to speak universally, but not possible to do so with perfect correctness for every situation, the law takes the usual case (the most common scenario), though it is not ignorant of the possibility of error or exceptions.
• And the law is nonetheless correct in doing so (for its general purpose). For the error is not in the law itself, nor in the legislator, but in the nature of the thing being regulated, since the matter of practical affairs is inherently variable and complex from the start.

When the law speaks universally, then, and a particular case arises which is not adequately covered by the universal statement, then it is right, where the legislator fails us (has an omission) and has erred by oversimplicity, to correct the omission.

• This means to say what the legislator himself would have said had he been present and aware of this specific case, and what he would have put into his law if he had known about such situations.
• Hence, the equitable is just, and it is better than one kind of justice—not better than absolute justice (if such a perfect thing could be fully articulated), but better than the error that arises from the rigid, absolute nature of a universal legal statement when applied to a unique case.
• And this is the nature of the equitable: a correction of law where it is defective owing to its universality.

In fact, this is the reason why all things are not determined by law: about some things, it is impossible to lay down a specific law, so that a decree (a specific judgment for a particular case) is needed.

• For when the thing to be regulated is indefinite or highly variable, the rule for it must also be indefinite or flexible. It’s like the leaden rule used in ancient times for making the Lesbian moulding (a type of architectural feature with curves). The leaden rule could be bent to adapt itself to the shape of the stone and was not rigid. So too, a decree (an equitable judgment) is adapted to the specific facts of the case.

It is plain, then, what the equitable is:

• It is just.
• It is better than one kind of justice (strict legal justice).

It is also evident from this who the equitable man is:

• He is the man who chooses and does such equitable acts.
• He is no stickler for his strict legal rights in a bad sense (not harshly insisting on every letter of the law to the detriment of fairness).
• He tends to take less than his share even though he has the law on his side, if equity calls for it.
• This state of character is equity, which is a sort of justice and not a different state of character from justice in general.

11. Can a Man Treat Himself Unjustly? (Conclusion)

Whether a man can treat himself unjustly or not is evident from what has already been said. For consider two points: (a) Justice as Lawfulness and Virtue:

• One class of just acts are those acts in accordance with any virtue which are prescribed by the law. For example, the law does not expressly permit suicide, and what it does not expressly permit, it often implicitly forbids.
• Again, when a man, in violation of the law, harms another (otherwise than in retaliation or self-defense) voluntarily, he acts unjustly. A voluntary agent is one who knows both the person he is affecting by his action and the instrument he is using.
• And he who, through anger, voluntarily stabs himself does this contrary to the right rule of life (which aims at self-preservation and well-being), and this the law does not allow. Therefore, he is acting unjustly.
• But towards whom is he acting unjustly? Surely towards the state, not towards himself. For he suffers the harm voluntarily, but, as we’ve argued, no one is voluntarily treated unjustly.
• This is also the reason why the state sometimes punishes suicide or attempted suicide (or, in ancient times, attached a certain loss of civil rights to the man who destroyed himself), on the ground that he is treating the state unjustly (e.g., by depriving it of a citizen).

(b) Justice as Fairness (Particular Justice):

• In that sense of “acting unjustly” in which the man who “acts unjustly” is unjust in a particular way (e.g., by grasping for more than his fair share) and not necessarily bad all round (not showing complete vice), it is not possible to treat oneself unjustly.
  • (This is different from the former sense related to lawfulness. The unjust man in one sense of the term is wicked in a particularized way, just as the coward is, not in the sense of being wicked all round. So his “unjust act” in this specific sense does not manifest wickedness in general.)
• Here’s why it’s not possible to treat oneself unjustly in this specific sense of fairness:
  1. That would imply the possibility of the same thing’s having been subtracted from and added to the same thing at the same time (e.g., one part of you gaining an unfair advantage over another part in a way that mirrors interpersonal injustice). But this is impossible in the way justice and injustice operate, as they always involve more than one person in direct transactions or distributions.
  2. Further, unjust action (in the sense of particular injustice) is voluntary and done by choice, and it takes the initiative (it’s not a reaction). For the man who, because he has suffered a wrong, does the same in return is not typically thought to act unjustly (though he might be acting vengefully or excessively). But if a man harms himself, he suffers and does the same things at the same time, blurring the line between agent and recipient in the way required for this type of injustice.
  3. Further, if a man could treat himself unjustly, he could be voluntarily treated unjustly (by himself), which we have already argued against.
  4. Besides, no one acts unjustly (in the particular sense) without committing particular acts of injustice like adultery, housebreaking, or theft. But no one can commit adultery with his own wife (that’s not adultery), or housebreaking on his own house, or theft of his own property. These acts definitionally require another person or another’s property.

In general, the question “can a man treat himself unjustly?” is solved also by the distinction we applied to the question “can a man be voluntarily treated unjustly?” (The answer is generally no to both in a strict, unqualified sense).

It is evident too that both are bad:

• Being unjustly treated (which means having less than the intermediate amount).
• Acting unjustly (which means having more than the intermediate amount). The intermediate amount here plays the part that “the healthy” does in the medical art, and that “good condition” does in the art of bodily training.

But still, acting unjustly is the worse of the two.

• For acting unjustly involves vice and is blameworthy. It involves vice which is either of the complete and unqualified kind, or almost so. (We must admit the latter alternative because not all voluntary unjust action implies that the person has a fully formed character of injustice).
• Being unjustly treated, on the other hand, does not involve vice and injustice in oneself.
• In itself, then, being unjustly treated is less bad than acting unjustly. But there is nothing to prevent its being, incidentally, a greater evil in terms of consequences. (For example, theory calls pleurisy a more serious medical condition than a stumble. Yet the stumble may become incidentally the more serious if the fall due to it leads to your being taken prisoner by the enemy or put to death.) But theory primarily concerns itself with the intrinsic badness of the states.

Metaphorical Justice Within Oneself Metaphorically, and by virtue of a certain resemblance, there is a kind of justice, not indeed between a man and himself (as a single, unified entity), but between certain parts of him.

• Yet, this is not every kind of justice, but specifically that which might exist between a master and servant, or that between a husband and wife (reflecting a sort of internal governance).
• For these are the ratios or relationships in which the part of the soul that possesses a rational principle (reason) stands to the irrational part (appetites and emotions).
• And it is with a view to these different parts within oneself that people also think a man can be unjust to himself—namely, because these parts are liable to suffer something contrary to their respective desires if one part overpowers another inappropriately. There is therefore thought to be a kind of mutual justice (or injustice) possible between them, as between a ruler and those who are ruled within one’s own soul.

Let this be taken as our account of justice and the other moral virtues.

BOOK VI

1. Finding the “Right Rule” for Virtue

We’ve said before that to be virtuous, a person should choose the intermediate path—not too much (excess) and not too little (defect). We also said that this intermediate path is determined by the “dictates of the right rule.” Now, let’s explore what these “dictates” or principles of the right rule actually are.

In all the states of character we have discussed, just like in all other matters, there’s a specific mark or target that a person who possesses the right rule looks to. They adjust their actions, making them more intense or more relaxed, according to this target. There is a standard that defines these middle states, which we say are intermediate between excess and defect because they align with the right rule.

However, just saying this, even though it’s true, isn’t very clear.

• In all pursuits that involve knowledge, it’s true that we shouldn’t push ourselves too much or too little, but should aim for an intermediate extent, as the right rule dictates.
• But if a person only had this general knowledge, they wouldn’t be any wiser about what to actually do.
• For example, we wouldn’t know what sort of medicines to apply to our body if someone just told us, “Take all those medicines which the medical art prescribes, and which a skilled doctor would use.” This doesn’t tell us which medicines or how to use them. Therefore, when it comes to the states of the soul (our character and intellect), it’s necessary not only to make this true statement about following the right rule, but also to determine what the right rule actually is and what standard defines it.

The Intellectual Virtues We previously divided the virtues of the soul, saying that some are virtues of character (moral virtues) and others are virtues of intellect. We have already discussed the moral virtues in detail. Now, let’s talk about the others—the intellectual virtues—starting with some remarks about the soul itself.

We said before that there are two main parts of the soul:

1. The part that grasps a rule or rational principle (the rational part).
2. The irrational part.

Let’s now make a similar distinction within the rational part of the soul. Let’s assume that there are two parts within the rational soul, each grasping a rational principle:

1. One part by which we contemplate (think about) the kind of things whose fundamental causes or principles do not change (are invariable). These are things that are necessarily true, like mathematical principles or eternal truths. Let’s call this the scientific part of the rational soul.
2. Another part by which we contemplate variable things—things that can be otherwise, such as things we make or actions we perform. Let’s call this the calculative part or deliberative part. (To deliberate and to calculate are essentially the same activity here, and no one deliberates about things that are unchangeable.)

These two parts of the rational soul must be different in kind because the objects they deal with are different in kind. The soul gains knowledge through a certain likeness and kinship with its objects. Our goal, then, is to learn what the best state—the virtue—is for each of these two parts of the rational soul.

2. How Intellect and Desire Lead to Action

The virtue of anything is related to its proper work or function. There are three things in the soul that control action and our grasp of truth:

1. Sensation
2. Reason (or intellect)
3. Desire

Of these, sensation does not originate moral action. This is clear from the fact that animals have sensation, but they do not have a share in moral action or choice in the human sense.

Think of an analogy:

• In the realm of thinking: affirmation (saying “yes” to a proposition) and negation (saying “no”).
• In the realm of desire: pursuit (going after something) and avoidance (staying away from something).

Now, since moral virtue is a state of character concerned with choice, and choice is deliberate desire, two things must happen for a choice to be good:

1. The reasoning must be true.
2. The desire must be right. And, the desire must pursue exactly what the reasoning asserts or affirms.

Two Kinds of Intellectual Truth

• The kind of intellect and truth involved in good choice is practical. Its good state is truth that is in agreement with right desire.
• For the intellect which is contemplative (focused on understanding and knowing, not on acting or making), its good state is simply truth, and its bad state is falsity. This is the main work of any purely intellectual activity.

The Process of Action The origin of action—its efficient cause (what makes it happen), not its final cause (its ultimate purpose)—is choice. The origin of choice, in turn, is desire and reasoning that is aimed at an end or goal.

• This is why choice cannot exist either without reason and intellect, or without a moral state (a certain character). Good action, and its opposite (bad action), cannot exist without a combination of intellect and character.

Intellect itself, however, moves nothing. Only the intellect which aims at an end and is practical (concerned with action) can initiate movement or action.

• This practical intellect also rules the productive intellect (the thinking involved in making things). Everyone who makes something does so for an end. The thing made (e.g., a shoe) is not an end in the absolute sense (it’s not the ultimate goal of life), but only an end in a particular relation (e.g., the end of shoemaking) and the end of a particular operation.
• Only “that which is done”—meaning good action (eupraxia)—is an end in itself. Good action is an ultimate end, and desire aims at this.

Hence, choice is either:

• Desiderative reason (reason that is infused with and guided by desire for a good end).
• Or ratiocinative desire (desire that is shaped and guided by reason). And such an origin of action is what defines a human being as an agent.

(It is important to note that nothing that is already past can be an object of choice. For example, no one chooses to have sacked the ancient city of Troy, because that event is over. We don’t deliberate about the past, but about what is future and capable of being otherwise. What is past cannot not have taken place. The poet Agathon was right in saying: “For this alone is lacking even to God, To make undone things that have once been done.”)

The work of both intellectual parts of the soul, then, is to attain truth. Therefore, the states of character (the virtues) that most strictly enable each of these parts to reach truth are the specific virtues of these two parts.

3. The Five Ways the Soul Grasps Truth

Let’s begin again from the basics and discuss these states once more. Let it be assumed that the states by virtue of which the soul possesses truth by way of affirmation (saying “yes”) or denial (saying “no”) are five in number:

1. Art (or craft, technical skill – Techne)
2. Scientific Knowledge (Episteme)
3. Practical Wisdom (Phronesis)
4. Philosophic Wisdom (Sophia)
5. Intuitive Reason (or intellect – Nous)

We do not include judgment and opinion in this list because in these, we may be mistaken, whereas these five are states that grasp truth.

1. Scientific Knowledge (Episteme) What scientific knowledge is, if we are to speak precisely and not just follow vague similarities, is clear from the following:

• We all suppose that what we truly know scientifically is not even capable of being otherwise; it deals with necessities.
• Of things that are capable of being otherwise (variable things), we do not have scientific knowledge about whether they exist or not once they have passed outside our direct observation.
• Therefore, the object of scientific knowledge is something that exists of necessity. This means it is eternal. Things that are of necessity in the unqualified sense are all eternal; and things that are eternal are ungenerated (they don’t come into being) and imperishable (they don’t pass away).

Furthermore:

• Every science is thought to be capable of being taught, and its object is capable of being learned.
• All teaching starts from what is already known, as we also maintain in the Analytics (another of Aristotle’s works). Teaching proceeds sometimes through induction (reasoning from particular examples to a general principle) and sometimes by syllogism (logical deduction from general principles).
• Now, induction is the starting-point which provides knowledge even of the universal principles. Syllogism, on the other hand, proceeds from universals.
• Therefore, there must be starting-points (first principles) from which syllogism proceeds, which are not themselves reached by syllogism. It is therefore by induction (or, as we’ll see, by intuitive reason) that these first principles are acquired.

Scientific knowledge, then, is a state of character that includes the capacity to demonstrate conclusions logically. It also has the other limiting characteristics which we specify in the Analytics.

• A person has scientific knowledge when they believe in a certain way (i.e., with certainty about necessary truths) and the starting-points (first principles) of their reasoning are known to them.
• If these starting-points are not better known to them and more certain than the conclusion derived from them, then their knowledge will be only incidental or superficial, not true scientific knowledge.

Let this, then, be taken as our account of scientific knowledge.

4. Art or Craft Skill (Techne)

Among variable things (things that can be otherwise), we include both things made (products) and things done (actions).

• Making (called poiesis) and acting (called praxis) are different kinds of activities. (For the nature of this distinction, we can even treat discussions outside our own school of thought as reliable).
• Therefore, the reasoned state of capacity to act (which we will call practical wisdom) is different from the reasoned state of capacity to make (which is art).
• Hence, they are not included one in the other; acting is not a kind of making, nor is making a kind of acting.

Now, since architecture is an art, and it is essentially a reasoned state of capacity to make something, and since there is neither any art that is not such a state nor any such state (that is a reasoned capacity to make) that is not an art, we can say: Art (Techne) is identical with a state of capacity to make, involving a true course of reasoning.

All art is concerned with coming into being (genesis)—that is, with contriving and considering how something may come into being which is capable of either being or not being. The origin (or starting point) of such a thing is in the maker and not in the thing made.

• Art is not concerned with things that exist or come into being by necessity.
• Art is also not concerned with things that exist or come into being in accordance with nature (since these things, like plants and animals, have their origin of development within themselves).

Since making and acting are different, art must be a matter of making, not of acting. And, in a sense, chance and art are concerned with the same objects. As the poet Agathon says, “art loves chance and chance loves art” (meaning that chance can play a role in artistic creation, and art can capitalize on chance occurrences).

Art, then, as has been said, is a state concerned with making, involving a true course of reasoning. Lack of art, on the contrary, is a state concerned with making, involving a false course of reasoning. Both art and its lack are concerned with the variable (things that can be otherwise).

5. Practical Wisdom (Phronesis)

Regarding practical wisdom, we shall get at the truth by considering who are the persons we credit with having it.

• It is thought to be the mark of a person of practical wisdom to be able to deliberate well about what is good and beneficial (expedient) for themselves.
• This isn’t about what’s good in some particular respect (e.g., about what sorts of things lead to health or to physical strength), but about what sorts of things lead to the good life in general. This is shown by the fact that we credit people with practical wisdom in some particular area when they have calculated well with a view to some good end, where that end is not the object of any specific art or craft. It follows that in the general sense also, the person who is capable of deliberating well about the good life as a whole has practical wisdom.

Now, no one deliberates about:

• Things that are invariable (unchangeable necessary truths).
• Things that it is impossible for them to do.

Therefore, since scientific knowledge involves demonstration, but there is no demonstration of things whose first principles are variable (for all such things might actually be otherwise), and since it is impossible to deliberate about things that are of necessity:

• Practical wisdom cannot be scientific knowledge (because that which can be done through practical wisdom is variable, capable of being otherwise).
• Practical wisdom cannot be art (because action and making are different kinds of things).

The remaining alternative, then, is that practical wisdom is a true and reasoned state of capacity to act with regard to the things that are good or bad for human beings.

• For while making (art) has an end or purpose other than itself (namely, the product that is made), action (praxis) cannot; for good action itself is its end.

It is for this reason that we think Pericles (an Athenian statesman) and people like him have practical wisdom. They can see what is good for themselves and what is good for people in general. We consider that those who are good at managing households or states can do this.

(This is also why we call temperance by its Greek name sophrosune; we imply that it preserves—sozousa—one’s practical wisdom—phronesis. What temperance preserves is a sound judgment of the kind we have described, about what is good to do. For it is not any and every judgment that pleasant and painful objects destroy and pervert—e.g., they don’t destroy the judgment that the triangle has or has not its angles equal to two right angles—but only judgments about what is to be done. For the originating causes (the “why”) of the things that are done consist in the end at which they are aimed. But the person who has been ruined by too much pleasure or pain immediately fails to see any such originating cause or true end—they fail to see that for the sake of this good end, or because of this reason, they ought to choose and do whatever they choose and do. For vice (bad character) is destructive of the originating cause of good action, which is a true understanding of the good.)

Practical wisdom, then, must be a reasoned and true state of capacity to act with regard to human goods.

But further, while there is such a thing as excellence in art (a good artist, a bad artist), there is no such thing as “excellence in practical wisdom” in the same way; practical wisdom is itself an excellence or virtue. And in art, a person who errs (makes a mistake) willingly is preferable to one who errs unwillingly (because the willing error might show they knew the correct way but chose to deviate for some reason, implying mastery). But in practical wisdom, as in the moral virtues, a person who errs willingly is the reverse (much worse than one who errs unwillingly due to ignorance).

Plainly, then, practical wisdom is a virtue and not an art. Since there are two parts of the soul that can follow a course of reasoning (the scientific and the calculative/deliberative), practical wisdom must be the virtue of one of these two. Specifically, it is the virtue of that part which forms opinions; for opinion is about the variable, and so is practical wisdom. But yet, it is not only a reasoned state; it’s more than just a capacity for reasoning. This is shown by the fact that a state of that sort (mere reasoning ability) might be forgotten, but practical wisdom cannot be forgotten in the same way (it’s a stable disposition of character that guides action).

6. Intuitive Reason (Nous): Grasping First Principles

Scientific knowledge is judgment about things that are universal and necessary. The conclusions of demonstration, and all scientific knowledge, follow from first principles (fundamental starting points). (For scientific knowledge involves understanding a rational ground or basis).

This being so, the first principle from which what is scientifically known follows cannot itself be an object of scientific knowledge (because scientific knowledge demonstrates things, and first principles are undemonstrated starting points). It also cannot be an object of art (since art deals with variable things that are made). Nor can it be an object of practical wisdom (since practical wisdom deals with variable things that are done). Nor are these first principles the objects of philosophic wisdom in the sense that a philosopher demonstrates them; rather, a philosopher might have demonstrations about some things that follow from these principles.

If, then, the states of mind by which we possess truth and are never deceived about things that are invariable (or even things that are variable, in their respective domains) are:

• Scientific knowledge
• Practical wisdom
• Philosophic wisdom
• Intuitive reason

And if it cannot be any of the first three (practical wisdom, scientific knowledge, or philosophic wisdom) that grasps these ultimate first principles, the remaining alternative is that it is intuitive reason (Nous) that grasps the first principles.

7. Philosophic Wisdom (Sophia): The Highest Knowledge

Wisdom (Sophia) can be understood in a couple of ways:

1. In the arts: We attribute wisdom to their most finished and skilled exponents, for example, to Phidias as a brilliant sculptor and to Polyclitus as a master maker of portrait-statues. Here, by “wisdom,” we mean nothing more than excellence in art.
2. In a general sense: We think that some people are wise in general, not just in some particular field or in any other limited respect. As Homer says in his (lost) poem Margites: “Him did the gods make neither a digger nor yet a ploughman Nor wise in anything else” (implying a general lack of wisdom).

Therefore, philosophic wisdom (Sophia) must plainly be the most finished and perfect of the forms of knowledge. It follows that the wise person (the philosopher) must not only know what follows from the first principles (which is the domain of scientific knowledge), but must also possess truth about the first principles themselves (which is grasped by intuitive reason). Therefore, philosophic wisdom must be intuitive reason combined with scientific knowledge—it is scientific knowledge of the highest and most honorable objects, which has received, as it were, its proper completion from intuitive reason’s grasp of principles.

We say “of the highest objects” because it would be strange to think that the art of politics, or practical wisdom, is the best or highest kind of knowledge, since man is not the best thing in the universe.

• Now, if what is healthy or good is different for men and for fishes, but what is white or straight is always the same, anyone would say that what is philosophically wise (dealing with universal truths) is the same for all.
• But what is practically wise is different for different beings; for it is to that which observes well the various matters concerning itself that one ascribes practical wisdom, and it is to this capacity that one will entrust such matters.
• This is why we say that some even of the lower animals possess a kind of practical wisdom—namely, those which are found to have a power of foresight with regard to their own life and survival.

It is also evident that philosophic wisdom and the art of politics cannot be the same thing.

• For if the state of mind concerned with a man’s own individual interests were to be called philosophic wisdom, then there would be many different “philosophic wisdoms.” There would not be one philosophic wisdom concerned with the good of all animals (any more than there is one single art of medicine for all existing things), but a different philosophic wisdom about the good of each species.

But if the argument is made that man is the best of the animals, this makes no difference to the claim that philosophic wisdom is the highest knowledge. For there are other things much more divine in their nature even than man—for example, most conspicuously, the celestial bodies of which the heavens are framed.

From what has been said, it is plain, then, that philosophic wisdom is scientific knowledge, combined with intuitive reason, of the things that are highest by nature.

• This is why we say Anaxagoras, Thales, and men like them have philosophic wisdom but not practical wisdom. We see them as ignorant of what is to their own personal material advantage.
• And this is why we say that they know things that are remarkable, admirable, difficult, and divine, but ultimately “useless” in a practical, everyday sense—precisely because it is not human goods or personal advantages that they seek.

Practical wisdom, on the other hand:

• Is concerned with human affairs and things about which it is possible to deliberate.
• For we say this is above all the work of the person of practical wisdom: to deliberate well.
• But no one deliberates about things that are invariable (unchangeable), nor about things which do not have an end or goal, and specifically, an end that is a good that can be brought about by action.
• The person who is, without qualification, good at deliberating is the person who is capable of aiming, in accordance with calculation and reasoning, at the best for man of things attainable by action.
• Nor is practical wisdom concerned with universals only—it must also recognize the particulars. For it is practical, and practice (action) is concerned with particulars.
• This is why some who do not have theoretical knowledge, and especially those who have experience, are more practical and effective than others who only have theoretical knowledge.
  • For example, if a man knew (theoretically) that light meats are digestible and wholesome, but did not know which specific sorts of meat are light, he would not be able to produce health effectively.
  • But the person who knows that chicken is wholesome is more likely to produce health because they can apply that knowledge to a particular case.

Now, practical wisdom is concerned with action. Therefore, a person should ideally have both forms of it (knowledge of universals and knowledge of particulars/experience), or if they can only have one, the latter (knowledge of particulars) is preferable for effective action. But of practical wisdom, just as with philosophic wisdom, there must be a controlling or architectonic kind that oversees its domain.

8. Political Wisdom and Its Relation to Practical Wisdom

Political wisdom (or political science) and practical wisdom are fundamentally the same state of mind, but their essence or focus is not exactly the same. They are both about reasoning well to achieve good human ends, but they operate in different, though related, spheres.

Of the wisdom concerned with the city (the state or political community):

• The practical wisdom which plays a controlling or architectonic part (like a master architect designing the whole structure) is legislative wisdom. This is the wisdom involved in creating good laws, which are universal principles for the community.
• The practical wisdom which is related to this legislative wisdom as particulars are to their universal is known by the general name “political wisdom” in a more specific sense. This has to do with particular actions and deliberations within the city, for a decree (a specific political decision or order) is a thing to be carried out in the form of an individual act.

This is why the exponents of this art of particular political action—those who deal with decrees and day-to-day governance—are alone said to truly “take part in politics.” For these individuals alone “do things” in the political sphere, much as manual laborers “do things” in their respective crafts by performing particular actions.

Practical wisdom is also especially identified with that form of it which is concerned with a person themselves—with the individual. This is what is often known by the general name “practical wisdom.” Other kinds of practical wisdom include:

• Household management (oikonomia)
• Legislation (the making of laws)
• Politics (the art of governing the state)
  • Politics itself has two parts: deliberative (concerned with making decisions) and judicial (concerned with applying laws in judgments).

Now, knowing what is good for oneself will be one kind of knowledge, but it is very different from these other kinds.

• The person who knows and concerns themselves with their own individual interests is often thought to have practical wisdom.
• Politicians, on the other hand, are sometimes thought to be busybodies—people who are overly involved in many affairs, perhaps to the neglect of their own true good, or who seek power for its own sake.
• The playwright Euripides captures a similar sentiment: “But how could I be wise, who might at ease, Numbered among the army’s multitude, Have had an equal share? (This life of a busy public figure is) For those who aim too high and do too much.” Those who think like Euripides’ character seek their own good (often a quieter, less ambitious life) and consider that one ought to do so. From this opinion, then, has come the view that such people (who focus on their own well-being) have practical wisdom. Yet, perhaps one’s own individual good cannot truly exist without good household management and without some form of good government in the larger community. These things are interconnected. Furthermore, exactly how one should order one’s own affairs for the best is not always clear and requires careful inquiry.

Youth, Experience, and Practical Wisdom What we’ve been saying is confirmed by an observation:

• While young people can become skilled geometricians and mathematicians and wise in similar abstract matters, it is thought that a truly practically wise young person cannot be found.
• The reason for this is that practical wisdom is concerned not only with universals (general principles) but also with particulars (specific facts and situations). These particulars become familiar through experience.
• A young person, however, typically has no extensive experience, for it is length of time that provides experience.

Indeed, one might also ask this question: why can a boy become a mathematician, but not a philosopher (in the sense of having deep philosophic wisdom) or a physicist (a student of nature in the ancient sense)?

• It is because the objects of mathematics exist by abstraction (they are mental concepts separate from particular physical things).
• The first principles of these other subjects (like philosophy and natural science) often come from experience.
• Young people usually have no deep conviction or firsthand understanding about these experiential principles; they might merely use the proper language without a deep grasp. The essence of mathematical objects, however, can be plain enough to them through reasoning alone.

Error in Deliberation Further, error in deliberation (the process of thinking that underlies practical wisdom) can be about either:

• The universal (the general rule or principle). For example, we might fail to know that “all water that is heavy (stagnant and impure) is bad.”
• Or the particular (the specific fact). For example, we might fail to recognize that “this particular water in front of us is heavy (stagnant and impure).”

Practical Wisdom Is Not Scientific Knowledge It is evident that practical wisdom is not the same as scientific knowledge.

• For practical wisdom, as has been said, is concerned with the ultimate particular fact, since the thing to be done is always a particular action in a specific situation.
• In this way, it is opposed to intuitive reason (in one of its functions). Intuitive reason grasps the limiting premises or first principles, for which no further logical reason can be given (they are starting points).
• Practical wisdom, on the other hand, is concerned with the ultimate particular fact or situation, which is the object not of scientific knowledge but of perception.
  • This is not the perception of qualities peculiar to one sense (like seeing a color with our eyes).
  • It is a perception similar to that by which we perceive that the particular figure before us is a triangle (we recognize a specific instance as falling under a general concept).
  • For in that direction of understanding particulars, as well as in understanding the major premises (first principles), there will be a limit or a starting point grasped directly.
• But this direct grasp of the relevant particular in a situation is more like a form of perception than practical wisdom itself, though it is a different kind of perception than that of the qualities specific to each of the five senses. It’s an insightful understanding of the situation.

9. Excellence in Deliberation (Euboulia)

There is a difference between inquiry in general and deliberation. Deliberation is inquiry into a particular kind of thing—namely, practical matters that can be influenced by our actions.

We must now try to grasp the nature of excellence in deliberation (in Greek, euboulia).

• Is it a form of scientific knowledge?
• Is it opinion?
• Is it skill in conjecture (good guessing)?
• Or is it some other kind of thing?

It is not scientific knowledge.

• People do not inquire or deliberate about the things they already know with scientific certainty.
• But good deliberation is a kind of deliberation, and a person who deliberates is inquiring and calculating about something.

Nor is it skill in conjecture (good guessing).

• For conjecture both involves no systematic reasoning and is something that is quick in its operation.
• Men, however, often deliberate for a long time. They say that one should carry out quickly the conclusions of one’s deliberation, but should deliberate slowly and carefully.

Again, readiness of mind (being quick-witted) is different from excellence in deliberation; readiness of mind is more like a sort of skill in conjecture. Nor again is excellence in deliberation opinion of any sort.

But since the person who deliberates badly makes a mistake, while the person who deliberates well does so correctly, excellence in deliberation is clearly a kind of correctness.

• However, it is not correctness of knowledge (for there is no such thing as “correctness” of knowledge in the sense of “error” of knowledge; knowledge, if it is truly knowledge, is already correct).
• And it is not correctness of opinion, because the correctness of opinion is truth (an opinion is correct if it is true). Also, everything that is an object of opinion is, in a sense, already determined or formed as a belief, whereas deliberation is a process of inquiry.
• But excellence in deliberation clearly involves reasoning.

The remaining alternative, then, is that excellence in deliberation is correctness of thinking (dianoia) in a practical context.

• For this kind of thinking is not yet an assertion (like opinion is). While even opinion is not inquiry but has reached the stage of an assertion or belief, the person who is deliberating (whether they do so well or badly) is still searching for something and calculating.

But excellence in deliberation is a certain specific kind of correctness of deliberation. So, we must first inquire what deliberation is and what it is about. And, since there is more than one kind of correctness, plainly excellence in deliberation is not just any and every kind of correctness.

1. For the incontinent person (who lacks self-control) and the bad person, if they are clever, will arrive through their calculation at what they set before themselves as a goal. So, in a technical sense, they will have “deliberated correctly” to reach their aim. But they will have gotten for themselves a great evil. Good deliberation isn’t just effective calculation for any end.
   • To have deliberated well is thought to be a good thing. For it is this kind of correctness of deliberation that is excellence in deliberation—namely, that which tends to attain what is truly good.
2. But it is possible to attain even a good outcome by a false syllogism (a flawed process of reasoning). One might attain what one ought to do, but not by the right means, because the “middle term” (a crucial premise in the reasoning) was false. So, this too is not yet excellence in deliberation—this state by virtue of which one attains what one ought, but not by the right means or for the right reasons.
3. Again, it is possible to attain a good outcome by long deliberation, while another person might attain it quickly. Therefore, mere length or quickness does not define excellence in deliberation. Excellence in deliberation is rightness with regard to what is beneficial (the expedient)—rightness in respect of the end, the manner (the means), and the time.
4. Further, it is possible to have deliberated well either in the unqualified sense (with reference to the overall good life) or with reference to a particular end.
   • Excellence in deliberation in the unqualified sense, then, is that which succeeds with reference to what is the end in the unqualified sense (the overall good human life).
   • Excellence in deliberation in a particular sense is that which succeeds relatively to a particular, limited end.

If, then, it is characteristic of people of practical wisdom to have deliberated well, excellence in deliberation will be correctness of thought regarding what leads to the end, of which practical wisdom is the true apprehension or understanding.

10. Understanding (Sunesis)

Understanding (sunesis), and goodness of understanding (eusunesis)—virtues by which people are said to be “men of understanding” or “of good understanding”—are:

• Neither entirely the same as opinion or scientific knowledge. (For if they were, all people with opinions or scientific knowledge would automatically be men of understanding, which is not the case).
• Nor are they one of the particular sciences, such as medicine (the science of things connected with health) or geometry (the science of spatial magnitudes).

For understanding is:

• Neither about things that are always existent and unchangeable (the domain of scientific knowledge or philosophic wisdom).
• Nor about any and every one of the things that simply come into being (the domain of all sorts of experiences and observations).
• But it is about things which may become subjects of questioning and deliberation.

Hence, understanding is about the same objects as practical wisdom. But understanding and practical wisdom are not the same thing.

• Practical wisdom issues commands, since its end is what ought to be done or not to be done. It’s prescriptive.
• Understanding only judges. It’s critical and evaluative. (Understanding, in this context, is identical with “goodness of understanding,” and “men of understanding” are the same as “men of good understanding.”)

Now, understanding is neither the having nor the acquiring of practical wisdom.

• But just as “learning” is sometimes called “understanding” when it means the active exercise of the faculty of knowledge, so “understanding” here is applicable to the exercise of the faculty of opinion (or judgment) for the purpose of judging what someone else says about matters with which practical wisdom is concerned—and of judging soundly. For “to judge well” and “to judge soundly” are the same thing.
• And from this has come the use of the name “understanding” by virtue of which people are said to be “of good understanding”—namely, from the application of the word to the ability to grasp and evaluate practical matters soundly. (This is different from “understanding” used in the context of grasping scientific truth, although we often use the word “understanding” in that context as well.)

11. Judgment (Gnome) and the Convergence of Intellectual Virtues

What is called judgment (gnome), in virtue of which people are said to “be sympathetic judges” and to “have judgment,” is the right discrimination of the equitable. (Equity, as discussed in Book V, is a form of justice that corrects or goes beyond strict legalism to achieve true fairness).

• This is shown by the fact that we say the equitable man is above all others a person of sympathetic judgment. We identify equity with sympathetic judgment about certain facts or situations.
• And sympathetic judgment is judgment which discriminates what is equitable and does so correctly. Correct judgment, in this context, is that which judges what is true and fair in a particular situation.

Now, all the intellectual states we have considered (judgment, understanding, practical wisdom, and intuitive reason) converge, as might be expected, to the same point when applied to practical matters.

• When we speak of judgment, understanding, practical wisdom, and intuitive reason, we often credit the same people with possessing judgment, having reached “years of reason” (implying mature intuitive reason), and with having practical wisdom and understanding.
• For all these faculties, in their practical application, deal with ultimates, that is, with particular facts and situations.
• And being a person of understanding and of good or sympathetic judgment consists in being able to judge well about the things with which practical wisdom is concerned. For the principles of equity are common to all good people in their relations with other people.

Now, all things which have to be done are included among particulars or ultimates.

• Not only must the person of practical wisdom know particular facts, but understanding and judgment are also concerned with things to be done, and these are ultimates (specific, concrete actions).

And intuitive reason (Nous) is concerned with the ultimates in both directions of reasoning:

1. The intuitive reason which is presupposed by demonstrations (in scientific or philosophical reasoning) grasps the unchangeable and first terms (the primary, universal principles).
2. The intuitive reason involved in practical reasonings grasps the last and variable fact, that is, the minor premise or the particular circumstance of action.
   • For these variable particular facts are the starting-points for the apprehension of the end or goal in a practical situation (since universals, like general rules of action, are often reached from, or applied to, particulars).
   • Of these particulars, therefore, we must have perception, and this “perception” of the relevant particular in a practical context is a form of intuitive reason—a direct grasp or insight.

This is why these states (judgment, understanding, and the practical application of intuitive reason) are thought to be, in some sense, natural endowments.

• While no one is thought to be a philosopher (possessing full philosophic wisdom) purely by nature, people are thought to have by nature some capacity for judgment, understanding, and intuitive reason in practical matters.
• This is shown by the fact that we think our powers of judgment and insight correspond to our time of life, and that a particular age (maturity) brings with it intuitive reason and sound judgment. This implies that nature (our natural development) is a cause.
• (Hence, intuitive reason is both a beginning—grasping first principles for demonstration—and an end—grasping particular facts for action. For demonstrations are from these first principles, and practical actions are about these particular ultimate facts.)

Therefore, we ought to attend to the undemonstrated sayings and opinions of experienced and older people, or of people of practical wisdom, not less than to formal demonstrations. For because experience has given them an “eye” (an ability to see things correctly), they see aright.

We have stated, then, what practical wisdom and philosophic wisdom are, and with what each of them is concerned. We have also said that each is the virtue of a different part of the soul (practical wisdom of the calculative/deliberative part, philosophic wisdom of the scientific/contemplative part, with intuitive reason playing a role in both).

12. Is Intellectual Virtue Useful?

Difficulties might be raised as to the utility (usefulness) of these intellectual qualities of mind (philosophic wisdom and practical wisdom).

(1) The Case of Philosophic Wisdom:

• It might be argued that philosophic wisdom will contemplate none of the things that will make a man happy in a practical sense, for it is not concerned with any “coming into being” or practical application for producing happiness. It’s about understanding eternal truths.

(2) The Case of Practical Wisdom:

• And though practical wisdom does have this merit (it’s concerned with what is just, noble, and good for man, which leads to happiness), for what purpose do we need it if we are already good?
  • These just, noble, and good things are the very things which it is the mark of a good man to do.
  • And we are none the more able to act simply for knowing them if the moral virtues are already established states of character.
  • This is just as we are none the better able to act healthily merely for knowing the definition of things that are healthy and sound (in the sense not of producing health, but of issuing from an already existing state of health). For we are none the more able to perform healthy actions simply for having the theoretical knowledge of medicine or gymnastics if we lack the actual state of health or physical training.
• Furthermore, if we are to say that a person should have practical wisdom not for the sake of knowing moral truths but for the sake of becoming good, then:
  • Practical wisdom will be of no use to those who are already good.
  • Again, it is of no use to those who do not yet have moral virtue. For it will make no difference whether they have practical wisdom themselves or simply obey others who have it. It would be enough for us to do what we do in the case of health: though we wish to become healthy, we do not all learn the art of medicine; instead, we often rely on doctors.

(3) The Hierarchy Question:

• Besides this, it would be thought strange if practical wisdom, which seems inferior in its objects to philosophic wisdom (human goods vs. eternal truths), is to be put in authority over philosophic wisdom. This seems to be implied by the fact that the art or faculty which produces anything (or directs action) rules and issues commands about that thing, and practical wisdom directs life.

These, then, are the questions and difficulties we must discuss. So far, we have only stated them.

Resolving the Difficulties

(1) Intrinsic Worth:

• Now, first let us say that, in themselves, these states (philosophic wisdom and practical wisdom) must be worthy of choice because they are the virtues (excellences) of the two parts of the rational soul respectively, even if neither of them produced any external thing. Their value is intrinsic to perfecting our rational nature.

(2) How They Produce Happiness:

• Secondly, they do produce something.
  • Not in the way that the art of medicine produces health (as an external craft producing an outcome).
  • But as health itself (as a state of being) produces healthy living (it is constitutive of it).
  • In this way, philosophic wisdom produces happiness. For, being a part of virtue entire (a part of overall human excellence), by being possessed and by actualizing itself (being actively engaged in), it makes a person happy. It is a core component of a flourishing human life.

(3) Indispensable for Good Action:

• Again, the work of man (living a fully and properly human life) is achieved only in accordance with practical wisdom as well as with moral virtue.
  • Moral virtue makes us aim at the right mark (the right end or goal).
  • Practical wisdom makes us take the right means to achieve that end.
  • (Of the fourth part of the soul—the nutritive or vegetative part, concerned with growth and sustenance—there is no such moral or intellectual virtue, for there is nothing which it is in its power to do or not to do in a moral sense.)

(4) Practical Wisdom and Doing Good Acts:

• With regard to the objection that we are none the more able to do what is noble and just simply because of our practical wisdom, let us begin a little further back, starting with the following principle:
• As we say that some people who do just acts are not necessarily just people (e.g., those who do the acts ordained by the laws either unwillingly, or owing to ignorance, or for some other reason and not for the sake of the acts themselves—though, to be sure, they are doing what they should and all the things that the good man ought to do).
• So it is, it seems, that in order to be good, one must be in a certain state when one does the several acts. That is, one must do them as a result of choice and for the sake of the acts themselves.
• Now, moral virtue makes the choice (of the end) right.
• But the question of the things which should naturally be done to carry out our choice (the means to achieve the end) belongs not to moral virtue but to another faculty.

We must devote our attention to these matters and give a clearer statement about them.

• There is a faculty which is called cleverness (deinotes). This is such as to be able to do the things that tend towards the mark or goal we have set before ourselves, and to hit it.
  • Now, if the mark be noble, the cleverness is laudable (praiseworthy).
  • But if the mark be bad, the cleverness is mere smartness or cunning.
  • Hence, we call even people of practical wisdom “clever” or “smart” in a good sense.
• Practical wisdom is not this faculty (cleverness) itself, but it does not exist without this faculty. Cleverness is a natural capacity; practical wisdom is that capacity guided by good ends.
• And this “eye of the soul” (cleverness, which allows one to see the means to an end) acquires its formed state (of being true practical wisdom) not without the aid of moral virtue, as has been said and is plain.
• For the syllogisms (practical reasonings) which deal with acts to be done involve a starting-point or first principle, namely: “since the end, i.e., what is best, is of such and such a nature,” whatever it may be (let it for the sake of argument be whatever we please).
• And this true end or “what is best” is not evident except to the good man. For wickedness perverts us and causes us to be deceived about the starting-points (the true ends) of action.
• Therefore, it is evident that it is impossible to be practically wise without being morally good.

13. Moral Virtue and Its Connection to Practical Wisdom

We must therefore consider moral virtue also once more. For moral virtue, too, is similarly related to a natural capacity as practical wisdom is to cleverness.

• Just as practical wisdom is to cleverness (not the same thing, but like it—practical wisdom is cleverness directed towards good ends by moral virtue).
• So is natural virtue to virtue in the strict sense.

For all people think that each type of moral character belongs to its possessors in some sense by nature.

• From the very moment of birth, we are inclined to be somewhat just, or fitted for self-control, or brave, or to have the other moral qualities in a rudimentary form. These are natural dispositions.
• But yet, we seek something else as that which is good in the strict sense—we seek for the presence of such qualities in another, more developed way.
• For both children and brutes (animals) have these natural dispositions to these qualities. But without reason, these natural dispositions are evidently hurtful or can lead to harm.
  • (We only seem to see this much: while one may be led astray by them, just as a strong body which moves without sight may stumble badly because of its lack of sight, still, if a person once acquires reason, that makes a difference in their actions. And their state of character, while still like what it was in its natural basis, will then be virtue in the strict sense.)
• Therefore, just as in the part of us which forms opinions (the intellectual part) there are two types, cleverness (the natural capacity) and practical wisdom (the perfected virtue).
• So too in the moral part of us, there are two types: natural virtue (the inborn disposition) and virtue in the strict sense (the fully developed moral virtue).
• And of these, virtue in the strict sense involves practical wisdom.

This is why some say that all the virtues are forms of practical wisdom. And this is why Socrates, in one respect, was on the right track while in another he went astray:

• In thinking that all the virtues were forms of practical wisdom (i.e., reducing them to knowledge), he was wrong.
• But in saying they implied or required practical wisdom, he was right.

This is confirmed by the fact that even now, all people, when they define virtue, after naming the state of character and its objects, add “that (state) which is in accordance with the right rule.” Now, the right rule is that which is in accordance with practical wisdom.

• All people, then, seem somehow to sense or intuit (divine) that this kind of state is virtue—namely, that which is in accordance with practical wisdom.

But we must go a little further.

• For virtue is not merely the state that is in accordance with the right rule, but the state that implies the presence of the right rule within itself, that is, it is united with the right rule.
• And practical wisdom is a right rule about such moral matters.

Socrates, then, thought the virtues were rules or rational principles (because he thought they were all forms of scientific knowledge). We, on the other hand, think they involve or are guided by a rational principle, specifically practical wisdom.

It is clear, then, from what has been said, that:

• It is not possible to be good in the strict sense (to have fully developed moral virtue) without practical wisdom.
• It is not possible to be practically wise without moral virtue. These two are deeply interconnected.

But in this way, we can also refute the logical argument by which it might be contended that the virtues exist separately from each other. Someone might say that the same person is not best equipped by nature for all the virtues, so they might have already acquired one virtue when they have not yet acquired another.

• This is possible in respect of the natural virtues (our inborn tendencies towards certain good behaviors).
• But it is not possible in respect of those virtues by which a person is called “good” without qualification. For with the presence of the one key quality, practical wisdom, all the moral virtues will be given together. (Practical wisdom helps to unify and perfect all the moral virtues).

And it is plain that, even if practical wisdom were of no direct practical value in producing external outcomes, we should still have needed it because it is the virtue or excellence of that part of us in question (the calculative or deliberative part of the rational soul). Its development is good for its own sake.

It is also plain too that choice will not be right without practical wisdom, any more than it will be right without moral virtue.

• For moral virtue determines the end (it makes us aim at the right mark or goal).
• And practical wisdom makes us do the things that lead to that end (it helps us choose the right means).

Practical Wisdom’s Place: Not Above Philosophic Wisdom But again, practical wisdom is not supreme over philosophic wisdom; that is, it’s not superior to the virtue of the highest part of us (the contemplative, scientific part of the soul, whose excellence is philosophic wisdom).

• This is similar to how the art of medicine is not superior to health itself. Medicine does not use health as a tool; rather, it works to provide for health’s coming into being.
• So, practical wisdom issues orders, then, for the sake of philosophic wisdom (e.g., by managing life in such a way that contemplation and the pursuit of truth are possible), but it does not issue orders to philosophic wisdom itself (it doesn’t tell philosophic wisdom what to think or what truth is).

Furthermore, to maintain that practical wisdom is supreme over philosophic wisdom would be like saying that the art of politics rules the gods because it issues orders about all the affairs of the state (which might include religious ceremonies and temples). But this doesn’t mean politics commands the gods themselves; it only manages human affairs related to them. Similarly, practical wisdom manages human life, which can support the activity of philosophic wisdom, but it does not command or surpass philosophic wisdom in ultimate value or scope.

BOOK VII

1. States to Avoid: Vice, Incontinence, and Brutishness

Let us now make a fresh start in our discussion. We will point out that there are three kinds of moral states that people should avoid:

1. Vice (badness of character, the opposite of virtue).
2. Incontinence (lack of self-control, or weakness of will).
3. Brutishness (behaving like a wild beast, lacking normal human sensibilities).

The opposites (contraries) of two of these are clear:

• The contrary of vice is virtue (excellence of character).
• The contrary of incontinence is continence (self-control).
• To brutishness, it would be most fitting to oppose superhuman virtue—a heroic and divine kind of virtue. Homer, the poet, represented Priam saying this about Hector (the Trojan hero): that he was so very good, “For he seemed not the child of a mortal man, but as one that of God’s seed came.”

So, if, as they say, human beings can become like gods through an excess of virtue, then this superhuman kind of virtue must clearly be the state opposed to the brutish state.

• A brute (an animal) has no vice or virtue in the human moral sense.
• Similarly, a god (a divine being) has no vice or virtue; a god’s state is higher than human virtue.
• The state of a brute is a different kind of state from human vice.

Rarity of Divine Men and Brutish Men Now, it is rare to find a “godlike man.” The Spartans (known for their concise speech) used this term when they admired someone highly. Similarly, the truly brutish type is rarely found among humans.

• It is found chiefly among “barbarians” (a term ancient Greeks used for non-Greek peoples, often implying less civilized cultures).
• However, some brutish qualities can also be produced by diseases or physical deformities.
• We also use this evil name—brutish—for those people who go far beyond all ordinary standards of behavior because of their extreme vice. We will make some mention of this kind of brutish disposition later. We have discussed vice before.

Our Current Focus: Incontinence and Continence Now, we must discuss:

• Incontinence (lack of self-control).
• Softness (or effeminacy – malakia in Greek), meaning weakness in the face of pain or hardship.
• And their opposites: Continence (self-control) and Endurance (karteria).

We must treat each of these pairs (incontinence/continence, softness/endurance) neither as identical with virtue or wickedness, nor as a completely different category of moral state. They are related but distinct.

Our Method of Investigation As in all other cases, our method will be:

1. Set the observed facts (common opinions and beliefs) before us.
2. After first discussing the difficulties and puzzles they present.
3. Go on to prove, if possible, the truth of all the common opinions about these states of mind.
4. Or, failing that, prove the truth of the greater number of these opinions and the most authoritative ones. For if we both refute the objections and leave the common opinions undisturbed, we will have proved our case sufficiently.

Common Opinions About Self-Control (Continence) and Lack of It (Incontinence) Here are some common beliefs:

1. Both continence (self-control) and endurance (ability to withstand hardship) are thought to be good and praiseworthy qualities. Both incontinence (lack of self-control) and softness (weakness in facing pain) are thought to be bad and blameworthy.
2. The same person is thought to be continent if they are ready to stand by the result of their calculations or reasoning. They are thought to be incontinent if they are ready to abandon their reasoned conclusions.
3. The incontinent person, knowing that what they do is bad, does it as a result of passion or strong feeling. The continent person, knowing that their appetites or desires are bad, refuses—on account of their rational principle (reason)—to follow them.
4. The temperate person (who has well-ordered desires) is always called continent and disposed to endurance. However, regarding the continent person (who controls strong desires), some maintain they are always temperate, but others do not (believing continence implies a struggle that the truly temperate person no longer has). And some call the self-indulgent person (who chooses bad pleasures) “incontinent,” and the incontinent person “self-indulgent,” without making a clear distinction. Others, however, do distinguish between them.
5. People sometimes say that the person of practical wisdom cannot be incontinent. Yet, sometimes they say that some who are practically wise and clever are incontinent.
6. People are also said to be incontinent even with respect to anger, honor, and gain—not just bodily pleasures.

These, then, are the things that are commonly said.

2. Puzzles and Difficulties About Incontinence

Now, we may ask several puzzling questions:

(1) How can a person who judges rightly still behave without self-control?

• Some say it’s impossible for a person to act incontinently if they have knowledge of what is right.
• Socrates, for example, thought it would be strange if, when knowledge was present in a person, something else (like passion) could master that knowledge and drag it about like a slave.
• Socrates was entirely opposed to the view that incontinence (acting against one’s better judgment) exists. He held that no one, when they judge, acts against what they judge to be best. People only act in such a way due to ignorance.
• Now, this view of Socrates plainly contradicts the observed facts (we often see people seemingly acting against their better judgment). So, we must inquire about what happens to such a person. If they act due to ignorance, what is the specific manner of their ignorance? For it is evident that the person who behaves incontinently does not, before they get into this state of passion, think they ought to act as they do.

Do people act against knowledge or just opinion?

• There are some who concede certain of Socrates’ points but not others. They admit that nothing is stronger than knowledge. But they do not admit that no one acts contrary to what has seemed to them to be the better course.
• Therefore, these people say that the incontinent person does not have true knowledge when they are mastered by their pleasures, but only opinion.
• But if it is only opinion and not knowledge—if it is not a strong conviction that resists temptation, but only a weak one, like in people who hesitate—then we might sympathize with their failure to stand by such weak convictions against strong appetites.
• However, we do not sympathize with outright wickedness, nor with any of the other blameworthy states. So, if incontinence is blameworthy in a way that differs from simple weakness, it must involve more than just acting against a weak opinion.

Is it practical wisdom that gets overcome?

• Could it be practical wisdom whose resistance is mastered by passion? That is the strongest of all intellectual states.
• But this seems absurd. If this were true, the same person would be, at the same time, practically wise and incontinent. But no one would say that it is the part of a practically wise person to willingly do the basest or most shameful acts.
• Besides, it has been shown before (in Book VI) that the person of practical wisdom is one who will act (for they are concerned with individual facts and effective action) and who also has the other moral virtues. Incontinence seems incompatible with this.

(2) Does continence imply having strong and bad appetites?

• If continence (self-control) involves having strong and bad appetites that one must struggle against:
  • Then the temperate person (whose appetites are naturally moderate and good) will not be continent.
  • Nor will the continent person (who struggles) necessarily be temperate (since temperance implies harmony, not struggle).
• But the continent person must have such appetites for their self-control to be meaningful.
  • If their appetites are good, then the state of character that restrains them from following those good appetites would actually be bad. This would mean not all continence is good.
  • If their appetites are weak and not bad, there is nothing admirable in resisting them.
  • And if their appetites are weak and bad, there is nothing particularly great in resisting these either. (Self-control is most impressive against strong, bad desires).

(3) Can continence be bad if it means sticking to any opinion, even a false one?

• If continence makes a person ready to stand by any and every opinion, then it could be bad—for example, if it makes them stand rigidly by a false opinion.
• And if incontinence makes a person apt to abandon any and every opinion, then there might be a good kind of incontinence.
  • An example of this might be Sophocles’ character Neoptolemus in the play Philoctetes. Neoptolemus is praised for not standing by what Odysseus persuaded him to do (which was to deceive Philoctetes), because he is pained at telling a lie. He abandons Odysseus’s persuasive “opinion” for a better moral course.

(4) The Sophist’s Puzzle: Folly + Incontinence = Virtue?

• A sophistic argument (a clever but potentially misleading argument) presents a difficulty. These arguments often arise from people’s wish to expose seemingly paradoxical results from an opponent’s view, so they may be admired when they succeed. Such an argument can leave us in a bind. Our thought feels trapped when it won’t rest because the conclusion doesn’t satisfy it, and it cannot advance because it cannot refute the argument.
• There is an argument from which it follows that folly (foolishness) coupled with incontinence could be a virtue. Here’s how:
  • A person (due to incontinence) does the opposite of what they judge they should do.
  • But (due to folly) this person judges what is actually good to be evil, and something they should not do.
  • As a consequence, because they incontinently act against their foolish judgment, they will end up doing what is good (the thing their foolish judgment called evil) and not what is evil. (This is a trick of logic, not a sound moral argument).

(5) The Problem of Curability: Incontinence vs. Self-Indulgence

• A person who, on conviction and by deliberate choice, does and pursues and chooses what is pleasant (this is the self-indulgent man) would generally be thought to be better (or at least more treatable) than one who does so as a result not of calculation but of incontinence.
• This is because the self-indulgent person is easier to cure, since they may be persuaded to change their mind or conviction.
• But to the incontinent person, the proverb “when water chokes, what is one to wash it down with?” might be applied. If their reason and knowledge are already on the right side but are ineffective against their passions, what further resource can help them?
• If the incontinent person had been persuaded of the rightness of what they actually do (the indulgent act), they would have desisted when they were persuaded to change that conviction. But now, they act in spite of being persuaded (knowing) that something quite different is right.

(6) Is There an “Unqualified” Incontinence?

• If incontinence and continence can be concerned with any and every kind of object (any pleasure or pain):
  • Then who is it that is incontinent in the unqualified sense (just “incontinent,” without specifying “incontinent in regard to X”)?
  • No one has all the possible forms of incontinence, but we do commonly say that some people are “incontinent” without further qualification.

3. Understanding Incontinence: The Role of Knowledge

These are the kinds of difficulties that arise. Some of these points must be refuted, and the others (the common opinions that hold up) must be left in possession of the field. For the solution of a difficulty often leads to the discovery of the truth.

(1) First, we must consider whether incontinent people act knowingly or not, and if knowingly, in what sense they know. (2) Then, we must consider with what sorts of objects the incontinent man and the continent man are concerned (i.e., whether with any and every pleasure and pain, or with certain specific kinds). We also need to consider whether the continent man and the man of endurance are the same or different, and similarly with regard to other matters relevant to this inquiry.

The starting-point of our investigation is:

• (a) Are the continent man and the incontinent man differentiated by their objects, or by their attitude towards those objects? That is, is the incontinent man incontinent simply by being concerned with certain objects, or, instead, by his attitude, or perhaps by both these things?
• (b) The second question is whether incontinence and continence are concerned with any and every object or not.

The person who is incontinent in the unqualified sense (just “incontinent”):

• Is not concerned with any and every object. They are concerned precisely with those objects with which the self-indulgent man is concerned (primarily bodily pleasures).
• Nor are they characterized by being simply related to these objects in the same way as the self-indulgent person (for then their state would be the same as self-indulgence, which is a vice chosen willingly).
• Rather, the incontinent person is related to these objects in a certain way:
  • The self-indulgent person is led on in accordance with their own choice, thinking that they ought always to pursue the present pleasure.
  • The incontinent person does not think so (they know the pleasure is bad or excessive), but yet pursues it.

Does the Incontinent Person Act Against Knowledge or Just True Opinion? As for the suggestion that it is true opinion and not knowledge against which we act incontinently, that makes no real difference to the argument.

• Some people, when in a state of opinion, do not hesitate but think they know exactly.
• If, then, the idea is that those who have opinion are more likely to act against their judgment than those who have knowledge, owing to their weak conviction, we answer that there need be no difference between knowledge and opinion in this respect. Some people are no less convinced of what they think (their opinions) than others are of what they know. The philosopher Heraclitus, for example, held his views with great conviction.

But since we use the word “know” in two senses:

• For both the person who has knowledge but is not currently using it and the person who is actively using it are said to “know.” It will make a difference whether, when a person does what they should not, they have the knowledge but are not exercising it (not actively thinking about it or applying it), or whether they are exercising it.
• For the latter (acting wrongly while fully and actively exercising correct knowledge) seems strange.
• But the former (having the knowledge stored away but not actively using it at the moment of passion) does not seem so strange.

Two Kinds of Premises in Practical Reasoning Furthermore, since there are two kinds of premises in practical reasoning (universal rules and particular facts), there is nothing to prevent a person from having both premises and still acting against their knowledge, provided that they are using only the universal premise and not actively attending to the particular premise.

• For it is particular acts that have to be done.
• And there are also two kinds of universal terms: one is predicable of the agent (e.g., “Dry food is good for every man”), and the other is predicable of the object (e.g., “I am a man,” or “Such-and-such food is dry”).
• But whether “this specific food here and now is such-and-such (e.g., dry and therefore good for me according to the rule, or perhaps sweet and therefore to be avoided according to another rule)“—of this particular recognition, the incontinent person either does not have the active knowledge at the moment, or is not exercising that knowledge.
• There will, then, be an enormous difference between these manners of knowing. So, to “know” in one way (e.g., only knowing the general rule) when we act incontinently would not seem anything strange, while to “know” in the other way (being fully aware of how the rule applies to the specific particular before us, yet still acting against it) would be extraordinary.

Knowledge in a Passive State (Like Being Asleep, Mad, or Drunk) And further, the possession of knowledge in another sense than those just named is something that happens to people.

• Within the case of having knowledge but not using it, we see a difference of state, admitting of the possibility of having knowledge in a sense and yet not truly having it in an active, functional way. This is similar to the state of a person who is asleep, mad, or drunk.
• Now, this is just the condition of people under the influence of strong passions. For outbursts of anger, sexual appetites, and some other such passions, it is evident, actually alter our bodily condition, and in some people, even produce fits of madness.
• It is plain, then, that incontinent people must be said to be in a similar condition to people who are asleep, mad, or drunk. Their knowledge is temporarily overcome or non-functional.
• The fact that such people use the language that flows from knowledge proves nothing. For even people under the influence of these passions (like drunkenness or madness) might utter scientific proofs or verses of poetry (the original mentions verses of Empedocles, a philosopher-poet).
• And those who have just begun to learn a science can string together its phrases but do not yet truly know it; for it has to become part of themselves, truly integrated, and that takes time.
• So, we must suppose that the use of language by people in an incontinent state means no more than its utterance by actors on the stage—they can say the words, but the knowledge isn’t fully active or guiding their actions.

A Psychological View of Incontinence Again, we may also view the cause of incontinent action as follows, with reference to the facts of human nature and how we reason practically:

1. One opinion is universal (e.g., “One should avoid tasting sweet things if one is to be healthy”).
2. The other opinion is concerned with particular facts, and here we come to something within the sphere of perception (e.g., “This thing before me is sweet”).
3. When a single, action-guiding opinion results from these two premises:
   • In purely theoretical reasoning, the soul must affirm the conclusion.
   • In the case of opinions concerned with production or action, the soul must immediately act (if able and not prevented). For example, if the premises were “Everything sweet ought to be tasted” and “This is sweet” (in the sense of being one of the particular sweet things), the person who can act and is not prevented must at the same time actually act accordingly.

Now, in the case of incontinence:

• The universal opinion is present in us, forbidding us to taste (e.g., “Sweet things are unhealthy and should be avoided”).
• And there is also the opinion that “Everything sweet is pleasant,” and also the particular perception that “This thing here is sweet” (now, this perception, linked with the idea of pleasantness, is the opinion that is active and driving towards the object).
• And when appetite (for the sweet, pleasant thing) happens to be present in us:
  • The one opinion (the rational rule against tasting) bids us avoid the object.
  • But appetite leads us towards it (for appetite can move each of our bodily parts).
• So, it turns out that a person behaves incontinently under the influence (in a sense) of a rule and an opinion. And the opinion leading to the wrong action (e.g., “this is sweet and pleasant”) is not contrary in itself to the right rule, but only incidentally contrary. For it is the appetite that is directly contrary to the right rule, not necessarily the factual opinion about the object.

It also follows that this is the reason why lower animals are not incontinent. This is because they have no universal judgment (no abstract rules or principles), but only imagination and memory of particulars.

How the Incontinent Person Recovers Knowledge The explanation of how the “ignorance” (the temporary suspension of active knowledge) is dissolved and the incontinent person regains their full knowledge is the same as in the case of the person who is drunk or asleep. It is not peculiar to this condition of incontinence. We must go to the students of natural science (physiology or psychology) for a full explanation of these recovery processes.

Now, the last premise in practical reasoning is both:

1. An opinion about a perceptible object (e.g., “This is sweet”).
2. What determines our actions.

This last premise, a person who is in the state of passion (acting incontinently) either:

• Does not have it actively in mind.
• Or has it only in the sense in which “having knowledge” did not mean truly knowing and applying, but only talking or reciting phrases, as a drunken man may utter the verses of Empedocles without full comprehension or control.

And because the last term (the particular fact) is not universal, nor is it equally an object of scientific knowledge in the same way as the universal term (the rule), the position that Socrates sought to establish (that no one acts against true, fully activated knowledge) actually seems to result, in a way.

• For it is not in the presence of what is thought to be knowledge proper (full, active, scientific knowledge connecting universal and particular) that the affection of incontinence arises.
• Nor is it this kind of full knowledge that is “dragged about” as a result of the state of passion.
• But incontinence happens in the presence of perceptual knowledge (awareness of the particular object of desire) when the connection to, or the dominance of, the universal rule is disrupted by appetite.

This must suffice as our answer to the question of acting with and without knowledge, and how it is possible to behave incontinently even when one possesses some form of knowledge.

4. Unqualified Incontinence vs. Qualified Incontinence

(2) We must next discuss whether there is any one who is incontinent without qualification (simply “incontinent”), or whether all people who are incontinent are so only in a particular, qualified sense. And if there is such a thing as unqualified incontinence, with what sort of objects is it concerned?

It is evident that both continent persons and persons of endurance, and also incontinent and “soft” persons, are concerned with pleasures and pains.

Now, of the things that produce pleasure, some are necessary, while others are worthy of choice in themselves but admit of excess.

• The bodily causes of pleasure are necessary. By such, I mean both those concerned with food and those concerned with sexual intercourse—that is, the bodily matters with which we previously defined self-indulgence and temperance as being concerned.
• The others are not necessary (for survival) but are worthy of choice in themselves (they are generally seen as goods). Examples include victory, honor, wealth, and other good and pleasant things of this sort.

This being so: (a) Incontinence regarding non-necessary but choiceworthy things (like money, honor, anger):

• Those who go to excess with reference to these latter things (victory, honor, wealth, etc.), contrary to the right rule which is in themselves, are not called incontinent simply or without qualification.
• Instead, they are called incontinent with a qualification: “incontinent in respect of money,” “incontinent in respect of gain,” “incontinent in respect of honor,” or “incontinent in respect of anger.”
• They are not called “simply incontinent” on the ground that they are different from those who are incontinent about bodily pleasures, and they are called incontinent only by reason of a resemblance.
• (Compare the case of a specific man named Anthropos—which is also the Greek word for “Man” in general—who won a contest at the Olympic games. In his case, the general definition of “man” differed little from the specific description peculiar to him as an individual winner, but yet it was different. Similarly, incontinence for honor is like, but not identical to, unqualified incontinence.)
• This distinction is shown by the fact that incontinence either without qualification (regarding bodily pleasures) or in respect of some particular bodily pleasure is blamed not only as a fault but as a kind of vice.
• However, none of the people who are incontinent in these other respects (money, honor, anger) are so blamed (as being vicious in the same way).

(b) Incontinence regarding bodily enjoyments (this is unqualified incontinence):

• This is about the bodily enjoyments with which we say the temperate man and the self-indulgent man are concerned.
• The person who pursues the excesses of pleasant things—and shuns those of painful things, like hunger, thirst, heat, cold, and all the objects of touch and taste—not by choice, but contrary to their choice and their judgment, is called incontinent, not with the qualification “in respect of this or that” (e.g., of anger), but just simply or without qualification.
• This is confirmed by the fact that people are called “soft” (lacking endurance) with regard to these bodily pleasures and pains, but not with regard to any of the others (like pursuit of honor).
• And for this reason, we group together the incontinent man and the self-indulgent man, and the continent man and the temperate man—but not any of these other types of “qualified” incontinence.
  • This is because they (unqualified incontinence/continence and self-indulgence/temperance) are concerned somehow with the same pleasures and pains (bodily ones).
  • But though these states are concerned with the same objects, they are not similarly related to them. Some of them (the temperate and the self-indulgent) make a deliberate choice, while the others (the continent and the incontinent) do not (their actions are often contrary to their deliberate choice or involve a struggle).

This is why we should describe as more truly self-indulgent the person who, without appetite or with only a slight appetite, pursues the excesses of pleasure and avoids even moderate pains, than the person who does so because of their strong appetites.

• For what would the first person (the one with slight appetite who still overindulges by choice) do if they had, in addition, a vigorous appetite, and also experienced violent pain at the lack of the “necessary” objects of bodily pleasure? (They would presumably be far more excessively self-indulgent).

Now, let’s consider different kinds of appetites and pleasures:

• Some belong to the class of things that are, in a general sense, noble and good.
  • Some pleasant things are by nature worthy of choice (like wealth, gain, victory, honor).
  • Others are contrary to these (base things).
  • And others are intermediate (neither inherently noble nor base, but can be good or bad depending on circumstances), to use our previous distinction.
• With reference to all such objects—whether they are noble, good, or intermediate—people are not blamed simply for being affected by them, for desiring them, or for loving them.
• Instead, they are blamed for doing so in a certain way, that is, for going to excess.

This is why all those who, contrary to the right rule, are either mastered by or excessively pursue one of the objects which are naturally noble and good, are not necessarily wicked.

• For example, people who busy themselves more than they ought about honor, or about their children and parents. These things (honor, family) are good, and those who busy themselves about them appropriately are praised.
• But yet, there can be an excess even in these good things.
  • If, like Niobe in the myths (who boasted about her many children and defied the gods), one were to fight even against the gods out of excessive pride or grief for her children.
  • Or if one were to be as excessively devoted to one’s father as a man named Satyrus, nicknamed “the filial” (meaning the devoted son), who was thought to be very silly on this point due to his extreme devotion.
• So, there is no wickedness (or vice in the strict sense) with regard to these objects themselves, for the reason named: each of them is by nature something worthy of choice for its own sake.
• Yet, excesses in respect of them are bad and are to be avoided.

Similarly, there is no true incontinence (in the unqualified sense) with regard to these objects (like honor or family).

• For incontinence (in its strict sense, relating to bodily pleasures) is not only something to be avoided but is also a thing worthy of blame, much like a vice.
• But owing to a similarity in the state of feeling (being overcome by a desire or emotion), people sometimes apply the name “incontinence” to these other areas, but they add in each case what it is in respect of.
• This is like how we might describe a “bad doctor” or a “bad actor.” We wouldn’t call them “bad” simply as a person (morally wicked), but bad in their specific profession.
• So, just as in this case we do not apply the term “bad” without qualification because each of these conditions (being a bad doctor or bad actor) is not “badness” itself but only analogous to it (bad in a specific way).
• Similarly, it is clear that in the other case (of self-control), that alone must be taken to be incontinence and continence in the strict, unqualified sense which is concerned with the same objects as temperance and self-indulgence (that is, bodily pleasures and pains).
• We apply the term “incontinence” to anger by virtue of a resemblance in how the feeling can overcome reason. And this is why we say, with a qualification, “incontinent in respect of anger,” just as we say “incontinent in respect of honor” or “incontinent in respect of gain.”

5. Types of Pleasures and Brutish States

Let’s categorize things that are pleasant: (1) Some things are pleasant by nature.

• Of these, (a) some are so without qualification (they are generally and fundamentally good and pleasant for humans).
• And (b) others are so with reference to particular classes either of animals or of humans (what one species or group finds pleasant, another might not).

(2) Other things are not pleasant by nature, but some of them become so for different reasons:

• (a) Some become pleasant by reason of injuries to the system (e.g., physical damage or illness leading to unusual cravings).
• (b) Others become pleasant by reason of acquired habits (like addictions or developed tastes for things not naturally sought).
• (c) And others become pleasant by reason of originally bad or perverted natures.

This being so, it is possible with regard to each of these latter kinds of pleasure (those not pleasant by nature) to discover similar states of character to those we recognize with regard to more natural pleasures. I mean, for example: (A) The brutish states. These are extreme perversions of desire, often involving cruelty or unnatural appetites.

• As in the case of the female figure from myths who, they say, rips open pregnant women and devours the infants.
• Or of the things in which some of the savage tribes around the Black Sea are said to delight—such as eating raw meat or human flesh, or even (as stories claimed) lending their children to one another to feast upon.
• Or the story told of Phalaris, a tyrant who supposedly roasted his victims alive in a bronze bull.

These states are brutish. (B) Other unnatural desires or behaviors arise as a result of disease, or in some cases, of madness.

• Examples include the mythical man who sacrificed and ate his own mother.
• Or the story of a slave who ate the liver of his fellow slave. (C) And others are morbid (unhealthy or abnormal) states resulting from custom or habit.
• Examples include the compulsive habit of plucking out one’s hair, or of gnawing one’s nails, or even eating things like coals or earth.
• In addition to these, the text mentions pederasty (sexual relations between men and boys). The author states that for some people, such desires arise “by nature,” while for others, like those who have been victims of lust from childhood, they arise from habit. (It’s important to note that the idea of such desires arising “by nature” reflects ancient Greek societal views and not modern scientific or ethical understanding; we are reporting the author’s categories here.)

Now, for those in whom nature is the cause of such a state (an unusual or morbid desire), no one would call them “incontinent” in the same way they would someone struggling with ordinary human appetites.

• (The author adds an analogy: any more than one would apply the term “incontinent” to women simply because of the passive part they play in sexual copulation – this again reflects outdated views and is used here by the author to make a point about what he considers “natural” versus chosen or struggled against.)
• Nor would one apply the term “incontinent” to those who are in a morbid condition as a result of habit.

To have these various types of morbid habits or brutish desires is beyond the limits of ordinary human vice, just as brutishness itself is.

• For a person who has them, to master them or be mastered by them is not simple continence or incontinence, but rather something analogous to it.
• It’s like the person who is in this condition in respect of fits of anger: they are to be called “incontinent in respect of that feeling (anger),” but not “incontinent simply” or without qualification.

For every excessive state—whether of folly, of cowardice, of self-indulgence, or of bad temper—is either brutish (falling below the human level) or morbid (disease-like and abnormal).

• The person who is by nature apt to fear everything, even the squeak of a mouse, is cowardly with a brutish cowardice.
• While the person who (as in a story) feared a weasel did so as a consequence of disease (a phobia).
• And of foolish people:
  • Those who by nature are thoughtless and live by their senses alone are brutish, like some races of distant barbarians (according to ancient Greek views).
  • While those who are so as a result of disease (e.g., epilepsy, which could affect cognition) or of madness are morbid.

Of these characteristics, it is possible for a person to have some of them only at times, and not to be mastered by them.

• For example, the tyrant Phalaris might have, at times, restrained a desire to eat the flesh of a child or an appetite for unnatural sexual pleasure (if such stories were true).
• But it is also possible to be mastered by such desires, not merely to have the feelings.

Thus, just as the wickedness which is on the human level is called wickedness simply, while that which falls outside the human norm is called wickedness not simply but with the qualification “brutish” or “morbid.” In the same way, it is plain that some incontinence is brutish and some is morbid, while only that incontinence which corresponds to ordinary human self-indulgence is incontinence simply.

It is plain, then, that incontinence and continence (in the unqualified sense) are concerned only with the same objects as self-indulgence and temperance (i.e., bodily pleasures and pains). And that what is concerned with other objects (like honor, gain, or anger) is a type of incontinence distinct from the unqualified kind, and is called incontinence by a metaphor or analogy, and not simply.

6. Anger vs. Appetite: Which Incontinence Is Worse?

We will now proceed to see that incontinence in respect of anger is less disgraceful than incontinence in respect of the appetites (for bodily pleasures).

(1) Anger seems to listen to reason, at least partly.

• Anger appears to listen to argument or reason to some extent, but to mishear it.
• It’s like hasty servants who run out before they have heard the whole of what one says, and then muddle the order.
• Or like dogs that bark if there is merely a knock at the door, before looking to see if it is a friend.
• So anger, by reason of the warmth and hastiness of its nature, though it hears something from reason, does not hear the full command, and it springs to take revenge.
• For argument or imagination informs us that we have been insulted or slighted. Anger, reasoning as it were that “anything like this must be fought against,” boils up straightway.
• Appetite, on the other hand, if argument or perception merely says that an object is pleasant, springs to the enjoyment of it without such partial reasoning.
• Therefore, anger obeys reason in a sense, but appetite does not. It is therefore more disgraceful to be incontinent regarding appetite. The person who is incontinent in respect of anger is, in a sense, conquered by a (misunderstood) argument, while the other person is conquered by appetite, and not by argument at all.

(2) We pardon natural desires more easily.

• Furthermore, we pardon people more easily for following natural desires, since we pardon them more easily for following such appetites as are common to all human beings, and insofar as they are common.
• Now, anger and bad temper are more natural than the appetites for excessive or unnecessary objects (like extreme gluttony for luxury foods).
• Consider, for instance, the man who defended himself on the charge of striking his father by saying, “Yes, but he struck his father, and his father struck his, and” (pointing to his child) “this boy will strike me when he is a man; it runs in the family!”
• Or the man who, when he was being dragged along by his son, told him to stop at the doorway, explaining that he himself had dragged his father only as far as that. (These stories illustrate anger as something perhaps passed down or reactive, seen as somewhat “natural” by the people in the stories, however flawed.)

(3) Plotting makes an act more criminal; anger doesn’t plot.

• Further, those who are more given to plotting against others are more criminal or blameworthy.
• Now, a passionate or angry person is not typically given to plotting, nor is anger itself a plotting emotion—it is usually open and reactive.
• But the nature of appetite is often associated with deception. This is illustrated by what the poets call Aphrodite (the goddess of love and desire), “guile-weaving daughter of Cyprus,” and by Homer’s words about her “embroidered girdle”: “And the whisper of wooing is there, Whose subtlety stealeth the wits of the wise, how prudent soe’er.” Appetite can be seen as more insidious and cunning.
• Therefore, if this form of incontinence (regarding appetite) is more criminal and disgraceful than that in respect of anger (because appetite can be deceptive and lead to more calculated wrongs), it is both incontinence without qualification and, in a sense, approaches vice.

(4) Outrage involves pleasure, anger involves pain.

• Further, no one commits a wanton outrage (hubris – an act of arrogant and insolent violence or disrespect) with a feeling of pain. Everyone who acts in anger acts with pain. The person who commits a wanton outrage, however, often acts with a kind of malicious pleasure.
• If, then, those acts at which it is most just to be angry are considered more criminal than others, then the incontinence which is due to appetite is the more criminal. For there is no wanton outrage necessarily involved in anger (anger is a reaction to perceived wrong, often painful), whereas acts driven by appetite can be pure self-gratification without any such element of pained reaction.

Plainly, then, the incontinence concerned with appetite is more disgraceful than that concerned with anger. And (unqualified) continence and incontinence are concerned with bodily appetites and pleasures.

But we must grasp the differences among these bodily pleasures and appetites themselves.

• As has been said at the beginning of our discussions, some are human and natural both in their kind and in their magnitude (normal, healthy desires). Others are brutish (perverted, animalistic). And others are due to organic injuries and diseases.
• Only with the first of these (human and natural bodily pleasures) are temperance and self-indulgence concerned.
• This is why we call the lower animals neither temperate nor self-indulgent, except by a metaphor. We might do so only if some one race of animals exceeds another as a whole in wantonness, destructiveness, and omnivorous greed. Animals have no power of choice or calculation in the human sense. Their excesses are departures from their natural norm, just as, among humans, madmen are departures from the human norm.

Now, brutishness is a less evil than vice, though it is more alarming.

• This is because, in brutishness, it is not that the better part of the soul (reason) has been perverted, as it is in a vicious human being. Brutes simply have no such better part (reason in the human sense).
• Comparing brutishness to vice is like comparing a lifeless thing with a living thing in respect of badness. The badness of that which has no originative source of movement or choice (like an inanimate object, or a being without reason) is always less hurtful in a moral sense (though it might be physically dangerous). Reason is an originative source of moral action.
• Thus, it is like comparing injustice in the abstract (as a concept) with an unjust man. Each is, in some sense, worse. For a bad man will do ten thousand times as much evil (morally culpable evil) as a brute animal can.

7. States Regarding Bodily Pleasures and Pains: Continence, Incontinence, Softness, Endurance

With regard to the pleasures and pains, and appetites and aversions, arising through touch and taste—to which both self-indulgence and temperance were formerly narrowed down—it is possible to be in such a state as to be:

• Defeated even by those of them which most people master.
• Or to master even those by which most people are defeated.

Among these possibilities:

• Those relating to pleasures are incontinence (being defeated) and continence (mastering).
• Those relating to pains are softness (being defeated) and endurance (mastering).

The state of most people is intermediate, even if they lean more towards the worse states (being somewhat weak regarding pleasures or pains).

Now, since some pleasures are necessary while others are not, and are necessary only up to a certain point while the excesses of them are not (nor are the deficiencies good), and this is equally true of appetites and pains:

• The person who pursues the excesses of things pleasant, or pursues necessary objects to excess, and does so by choice, for their own sake and not at all for the sake of any result distinct from them, is self-indulgent.
  • Such a person is of necessity unlikely to repent (feel remorse and wish to change), and therefore incurable, since a person who cannot repent cannot be cured or reformed.
• The person who is deficient in their pursuit of these bodily pleasures is the opposite of self-indulgent (perhaps an ascetic or an insensible type).
• The person who is intermediate is temperate.

Similarly, there is the person who avoids bodily pains not because he is defeated by them but by choice. (This could be part of a temperate or courageous disposition, a reasoned avoidance rather than a collapse under pressure).

Of those who do not choose such acts (of pursuing excessive pleasure or yielding to pain):

• One kind of person is led to them as a result of the pleasure involved (this is typical incontinence regarding pleasure).
• Another kind is led because they avoid the pain arising from the unfulfilled appetite (e.g., giving in to hunger pangs excessively not for the pleasure of eating but to stop the pain of hunger). These types differ from one another.

Now, anyone would think worse of a person with no appetite or with only a weak appetite if they were to do something disgraceful, than if they did it under the influence of a powerful appetite. And we would think worse of them if they struck a blow not in anger than if they did it in anger. For what would such a person (who acts badly without strong passion) have done if they had been strongly affected by passion? This is why the self-indulgent person (who chooses excess coolly) is considered worse than the incontinent person (who struggles and acts against better judgment due to passion).

Of the states named, then:

• The latter (being overcome by pain that one chooses not to endure, or yielding to pain excessively) is rather a kind of softness.
• The former (choosing excessive pleasure) is self-indulgence.

While to the incontinent man is opposed the continent man. To the soft man is opposed the man of endurance.

• For endurance consists in resisting pain or hardship.
• Continence consists in conquering desire.
• And resisting and conquering are different, just as not being beaten is different from actually winning. This is why continence is also more worthy of choice than mere endurance (conquering desire is a greater achievement than just holding out against pain).

Now, the person who is defective in respect of resistance to those things which most people both resist and resist successfully is soft and effeminate.

• For effeminacy too is a kind of softness.
• Such a person might (metaphorically) trail their cloak on the ground to avoid the minor pain or effort of lifting it. They might play the invalid without really thinking themselves wretched or deserving of pity, though the truly wretched person they are imitating is suffering.

The case is similar with regard to continence and incontinence concerning pleasures.

• If a person is defeated by violent and excessive pleasures or pains, there is nothing particularly wonderful or surprising in that. Indeed, we are ready to pardon them if they have at least resisted.
  • Examples from drama include Theodectes’ character Philoctetes, who cries out when bitten by the snake.
  • Or Carcinus’ character Cercyon in the play Alope.
  • And like people who try to restrain their laughter but then burst out into a loud guffaw, as apparently happened to someone named Xenophantus.
• But it is surprising if a person is defeated by and cannot resist pleasures or pains which most people can hold out against, especially when this weakness is not due to heredity or disease.
  • Examples of potentially excusable weakness given are the (supposed) hereditary softness of the kings of the Scythians, or that (supposed) inherent softness which distinguishes the female sex from the male (these are, again, reflections of ancient cultural beliefs, not scientific facts).

The lover of amusement, too, is often thought to be self-indulgent, but is really more accurately described as soft.

• For amusement is a relaxation, since it is a rest from work.
• The lover of amusement is one of the people who go to excess in this (they seek too much rest and relaxation, perhaps to avoid the “pain” of effort).

Two Kinds of Incontinence Of incontinence, one kind is impetuosity (propeteia – a tendency to rush headlong) and another is weakness (astheneia).

1. Impetuosity:
   • Some people, after deliberating and reaching a conclusion, fail, owing to their emotion, to stand by the conclusions of their deliberation.
   • Others, because they have not deliberated at all, are simply led by their emotion.
   • (Since some people—just as people who first tickle others are often not ticklish themselves—if they have first perceived and seen what is coming and have first roused themselves and their calculative faculty, are not defeated by their emotion, whether it be pleasant or painful.)
   • It is keen and excitable people (those who are quick to react or feel intensely) that suffer especially from the impetuous form of incontinence. For the former, by reason of their quickness, and the latter, by reason of the violence of their passions, do not await the argument of reason because they are apt to follow their imagination and immediate feelings.
2. Weakness: (This type is implied as the contrast to impetuosity). These are people who may deliberate and know what is right, but are too weak in will to resist their passions when temptation arises. They don’t necessarily rush into things without thinking, but their resolutions crumble under pressure.

8. Incontinence vs. Vice: Repentance, Curability, and Choice

The self-indulgent man, as was said, is not apt to repent (feel remorse or regret for his choices), for he stands by his choice to pursue excessive pleasure. But the incontinent man is likely to repent. This is because he acts against his better judgment and often feels bad about it afterwards.

This is why the situation is not as it was expressed in the initial formulation of the problem (which might have blurred the lines between the two). The self-indulgent man is incurable (because he sees no wrong in his choices), and the incontinent man is curable (because he recognizes his fault and may be helped to strengthen his will).

• For wickedness (vice) is like a chronic disease such as dropsy (edema) or consumption (tuberculosis). It’s a deep-seated, relatively permanent badness.
• Incontinence, on the other hand, is like epilepsy; the former (vice) is a permanent, continuous badness, while the latter (incontinence) is an intermittent or episodic badness.

And generally, incontinence and vice are different in kind.

• Vice is unconscious of itself in the sense that the vicious person often does not recognize their chosen path as evil, or they have come to rationalize it as good for them.
• Incontinence is not unconscious of itself; the incontinent person is typically aware that what they are doing is wrong.
  • (Of incontinent men themselves, those who become temporarily “beside themselves” with passion—the impetuous type—are perhaps better than those who have the rational principle clear in their minds but still do not abide by it due to weakness. The latter are defeated by a perhaps weaker passion and do not act without some degree of previous deliberation, unlike the impetuous ones who are swept away without thinking.)
• For the incontinent man is like people who get drunk quickly and on little wine—that is, on less alcohol than most people require to become intoxicated. (Meaning, they are easily overcome by their passions).

Evidently, then, incontinence is not vice (though perhaps it is vice in a qualified or partial sense).

• For incontinence is contrary to choice (the person chooses what is good but does what is bad).
• While vice is in accordance with choice (the vicious person chooses what is bad, or what appears good to their corrupted judgment).
• This is not to say they aren’t similar in respect of the actions they lead to. As in the saying of Demodocus about the Milesians: “The Milesians are not without sense, but they do the things that senseless people do.” So too, incontinent people are not criminal or vicious by settled character, but they will do criminal or wrongful acts.

Now, since:

• The incontinent man is apt to pursue, not on conviction, bodily pleasures that are excessive and contrary to the right rule.
• While the self-indulgent man is convinced that he should pursue them, because he is the sort of man who has chosen this way of life. It is, on the contrary, the former (the incontinent man) that is easily persuaded to change his mind (about the value of his actions), while the latter (the self-indulgent man) is not.

For virtue and vice respectively preserve and destroy the first principle.

• In actions, the final cause (the end or goal) is the first principle, just as the hypotheses (axioms or basic assumptions) are the first principles in mathematics.
• Neither in mathematics is it argument that teaches the first principles, nor is it so in ethics.
• Virtue—either natural virtue or virtue produced by habituation—is what teaches right opinion about the first principle (the true good or end for human beings).
• Such a person (who has a right opinion about the first principle and acts accordingly) is temperate. Their contrary is the self-indulgent person.

But there is a sort of person who is carried away as a result of passion and contrary to the right rule. This is a person whom passion masters so that they do not act according to the right rule. But passion does not master them to the extent of making them ready to believe that they ought to pursue such pleasures without reserve.

• This is the incontinent man.
• He is better than the self-indulgent man, and not bad without qualification.
• For the best thing in him, the first principle (his knowledge of what is good), is preserved.

And contrary to him (the incontinent man) is another kind of person: he who abides by his convictions and is not carried away, at least not as a result of passion. (This is the continent man). It is evident from these considerations that the latter state (continence) is a good state, and the former (incontinence) a bad one.

9. Sticking to the Right Rule and Choice

Is the person continent who abides by any and every rule and any and every choice, or the person who abides by the right choice? And is a person incontinent who abandons any and every choice and any and every rule, or specifically the person who abandons the rule that is not false and the choice that is right? This is how we put the question before in our statement of the problems surrounding incontinence.

Or is it that, incidentally, the continent person might stick to any choice, and the incontinent person abandon any choice? But per se (in itself, or essentially), the continent person abides by the true rule and the right choice, and the incontinent person fails to do so. If anyone chooses or pursues this (a particular means) for the sake of that (a particular end), per se they pursue and choose the latter (the end), but only incidentally the former (the means). When we speak of choosing or pursuing without qualification, we mean the end.

But when we speak “without qualification” or in an essential sense, we mean what is true or right per se (in itself).

• Therefore, in a certain incidental sense, the continent person might be said to abide by, and the incontinent person to abandon, any and every opinion.
• But without qualification (essentially), the continent person abides by the true opinion and the right rule.

Strong-Headed or Obstinate People There are some people who are very apt to abide by their own opinion, and they are often called strong-headed or obstinate.

• These are people who are hard to persuade in the first instance and are not easily persuaded to change their minds.
• They have something in them that looks like the continent person (in their firmness), just as the wasteful person is in some ways like the generous person, and the rash person is like the confident person. But they are different in many important respects.
• The continent person will not yield to passion and appetite, but on occasion, they will be easy to persuade by good argument if it shows their current course is not right.
• The obstinate people, however, refuse to yield to argument. They do form appetites, and many of them are led by their pleasures—often the pleasure of “winning” an argument or not having to admit they were wrong.
• The types of people who are strong-headed in this way include:
  • The opinionated (those who are overly attached to their own opinions).
  • The ignorant (who stick to what they think they know, even if it’s wrong).
  • The boorish (rude or insensitive people who don’t listen to others).
• The opinionated, in particular, are often influenced by pleasure and pain: they delight in the “victory” they gain if they are not persuaded to change their minds, and they are pained if their decisions or opinions become null and void (like when official decrees are overturned).
• So, these strong-headed people are actually more like the incontinent person (being driven by the pleasures and pains associated with their opinions) than the truly continent person (who is guided by the right rule and truth).

Abandoning a Resolution for a Noble Pleasure Is Not Incontinence There are some people who fail to abide by their resolutions, but not as a result of incontinence.

• An example is Neoptolemus in Sophocles’ play Philoctetes. Odysseus had persuaded Neoptolemus to tell a lie to trick Philoctetes. Neoptolemus initially agreed but then did not stand fast by this plan.
• It was for the sake of a pleasure that he did not stand fast—but it was a noble pleasure. For telling the truth was noble and right to him, even though he had been persuaded by Odysseus to tell the lie.
• This shows that not everyone who does something for the sake of pleasure is either self-indulgent, bad, or incontinent. A person is only one of these if they do something for the sake of a disgraceful or shameful pleasure.

The Person Who Takes Too Little Delight Since there is also a sort of person who takes less delight than they should in bodily things, and who, because of this, also does not abide by the rule (perhaps being overly austere or detached in an unhealthy way), the continent person is the one who is intermediate between this person and the incontinent person.

• The incontinent person fails to abide by the rule because they delight too much in bodily pleasures.
• This other type of person fails to abide by a balanced approach because they delight in them too little.
• The continent person, being in the middle, abides by the rule and does not change on either account (neither giving in to too much pleasure nor shunning pleasure excessively).

Now, if continence is good, both the contrary states (incontinence, and this state of taking too little pleasure and thus not following a balanced rule) must be bad, as they actually appear to be.

• But because the other extreme (taking too little pleasure) is seen in few people and occurs seldom, continence is usually thought to be contrary only to incontinence. This is similar to how temperance is usually thought to be contrary only to self-indulgence (since few people err on the side of too little bodily enjoyment in a blameworthy way).

The “Continence” of the Temperate Person is Analogous Since many names are applied by analogy (comparing similar but not identical things), it is by analogy that we have come to speak of the “continence” of the temperate man.

• For both the continent man and the temperate man are such that they do nothing contrary to the right rule for the sake of bodily pleasures.
• But they differ in this:
  • The continent man has bad appetites (strong desires that conflict with reason) but controls them.
  • The temperate man does not have bad appetites, or his appetites are naturally moderate and aligned with reason.
  • The temperate man is such as not to feel pleasure that is contrary to the rule (his pleasures are in harmony with what is good).
  • The continent man is such as to feel pleasure from bad appetites, but not to be led by it.

And the incontinent man and the self-indulgent man are also like one another in some ways. They are different, but both pursue bodily pleasures.

• The self-indulgent man, however, also thinks that he ought to pursue these pleasures (he has chosen them as good).
• The incontinent man does not think this (he knows his pursuit is wrong, but gives in).

10. Can a Practically Wise Person Be Incontinent?

It is not possible for the same person to have practical wisdom and also be incontinent.

• For it has been shown (in Book VI) that a person is, at the same time, practically wise and good in respect of character. Incontinence is a flaw in character, and thus incompatible with full practical wisdom.
• Further, a person has practical wisdom not by knowing only but by also being able to act in accordance with that knowledge. The incontinent person, by definition, is unable to act consistently with what they know to be best.
• However, there is nothing to prevent a clever man (one who is merely skillful in finding means to an end, without necessarily having good ends) from being incontinent. This is why it is sometimes actually thought that some people have practical wisdom but are incontinent—because cleverness and practical wisdom are different, as we described in our earlier discussions (Book VI). They are near together in respect of their reasoning capacity, but they differ in respect of their purpose or end (practical wisdom aims at the good, cleverness can aim at any end, good or bad).

The incontinent person is not like the person who knows and is actively contemplating a truth (where knowledge is fully engaged). Instead, the incontinent person is more like someone who is asleep or drunk—their knowledge is present but not fully active or in control.

• And the incontinent person acts willingly (for they act, in a sense, with knowledge both of what they do and of the immediate end to which they do it, i.e., the pleasure).
• But they are not wicked in the same way as the self-indulgent person, since their chosen purpose or rule is good. So, they are, in a way, half-wicked, or rather, they fail in a way that is less complete than vice.
• And they are not a criminal in the sense of acting with malice aforethought or deliberate choice of evil.

Of the two types of incontinent person we identified (impetuous and weak):

• The one (the weak type) does not abide by the conclusions of their deliberation.
• While the excitable (impetuous) person does not deliberate properly at all.

And thus, the incontinent person is like a city which passes all the right decrees and has good laws, but makes no use of them. As Anaxandrides (a comic poet) jestingly remarked: “The city willed it, that cares nought for laws.” But the wicked man (the self-indulgent or vicious person) is like a city that does use its laws, but has wicked laws to use.

Now, incontinence and continence are concerned with that which is in excess of the state characteristic of most men.

• For the continent man abides by his resolutions more firmly than most people can.
• And the incontinent man abides by them less firmly than most people can.

Curability of Different Forms of Incontinence Of the forms of incontinence:

• That of excitable (impetuous) people is more curable than that of those who deliberate but do not abide by their decisions (the weak type).
• And those who are incontinent through habituation (long-standing bad habits) are more curable than those in whom incontinence is innate or part of their fundamental nature.
• For it is easier to change a habit than to change one’s nature. Even habit is hard to change, precisely because it becomes like nature, as the poet Evenus says: “I say that habit’s but a long practice, friend, And this becomes men’s nature in the end.”

We have now stated what continence, incontinence, endurance, and softness are, and how these states are related to each other.

11. The Study of Pleasure and Pain: Why It’s Important

The study of pleasure and pain belongs to the province of the political philosopher or statesman.

• This is because the political philosopher is the architect of the end or goal for society (the common good), and it is with a view to this end that we call one thing bad and another good without qualification.

Furthermore, it is one of our necessary tasks to consider pleasure and pain for these reasons:

• We previously laid it down that moral virtue and vice are concerned with pains and pleasures.
• Most people say that happiness involves pleasure. This is why the blessed or happy man is called makarios in Greek, a name thought to be derived from a word meaning enjoyment (chairein).

Common Opinions About Pleasure Now, there are different views about pleasure:

1. Some people think that no pleasure is a good, either in itself or incidentally (as a side effect). They believe that the good and pleasure are not the same thing.
2. Others think that some pleasures are good, but that most are bad.
3. Again, there is a third view: that even if all pleasures are good, yet the best thing in the world cannot be pleasure itself.

(1) Arguments for the view that pleasure is not a good at all:

• (a) Every pleasure is a perceptible process towards a natural state (e.g., eating is a process of replenishing a deficiency to reach a state of satisfaction). And no process is of the same kind as its end goal (e.g., the process of building is not of the same kind as the house which is its end).
• (b) A temperate man avoids pleasures (meaning, excessive or base pleasures).
• (c) A man of practical wisdom pursues what is free from pain, not what is pleasant.
• (d) Pleasures are a hindrance to thought, and the more so the more one delights in them (e.g., in intense sexual pleasure, for no one could think of anything else while absorbed in this).
• (e) There is no art or craft of pleasure (meaning, pleasure itself isn’t something skillfully produced like a product of art). But every good is thought to be the product of some art or skill.
• (f) Children and brutes (animals) pursue pleasures, implying pleasure is a lower, unreasoned aim.

(2) Reasons for the view that not all pleasures are good:

• (a) There are pleasures that are actually base and objects of reproach (shameful pleasures).
• (b) There are harmful pleasures, for some pleasant things are unhealthy.

(3) Reason for the view that the best thing in the world is not pleasure:

• Pleasure is not an end but a process.

12. Why Those Arguments Are Not Conclusive Against Pleasure

These are pretty much the things that are said against pleasure being a good. However, that it does not follow from these grounds that pleasure is not a good, or even the chief good, is plain from the following considerations.

(A) Pleasure, Processes, and States

• (a) “Good” can be meant in two senses: one thing is good simply or without qualification, and another thing is good for a particular person or in particular circumstances. Natural constitutions and states of being, and therefore also the corresponding movements and processes, will be correspondingly divisible.
  • Of those pleasures (or processes leading to them) which are thought to be bad, some will be bad if taken without qualification, but not bad for a particular person, and may even be worthy of their choice in certain situations.
  • Some will not be worthy of choice even for a particular person, except perhaps only at a particular time and for a short period, though not good without qualification.
  • While others are not even true pleasures, but only seem to be so. These include all those which involve pain and whose end is curative (e.g., the processes of medical treatment that go on in sick persons, which might bring relief that feels like pleasure but is really just the removal of pain accompanying a restorative process).
• (b) Furthermore, one kind of good is an activity, and another kind of good is a state. The processes that restore us to our natural state (e.g., eating when hungry) are only incidentally pleasant.
  • For that matter, the activity at work in the appetites for them (e.g., the act of eating) is the activity of so much of our state and nature as has remained unimpaired or is striving for restoration.
  • For there are actually pleasures that involve no pain or preceding appetite (e.g., the pleasures of contemplation or learning), where the nature in such a case is not defective at all.
  • That the other pleasures (restorative ones) are incidental is indicated by the fact that people do not enjoy the same pleasant objects when their nature is in its settled, healthy state as they do when it is being replenished from a deficient state.
    • In the former case (settled state), they enjoy the things that are pleasant without qualification (truly and naturally pleasant).
    • In the latter case (replenishing state), they may enjoy the contraries of these as well (for then they might find even sharp and bitter things pleasant if they satisfy an intense need), none of which is pleasant either by nature or without qualification.
    • The states these restorative processes produce, therefore, are not pleasures naturally or without qualification; for as pleasant things differ, so do the pleasures arising from them.
• (c) Again, it is not necessary that there should be something else better than pleasure, as some say the end is better than the process.
  • For pleasures are not all processes, nor do they all involve a process to an end beyond themselves. Many pleasures are activities and are themselves ends.
  • Nor do they arise only when we are becoming something (like becoming healthy), but often when we are exercising some faculty or capacity.
  • And not all pleasures have an end different from themselves, but only the pleasures of persons who are being led to the perfecting of their nature (like the pleasure of recovery from illness).
  • This is why it is not right to say that pleasure is a “perceptible process.” It should rather be called an activity of the natural state, and instead of “perceptible,” it should be called “unimpeded” activity. (Pleasure is the unimpeded activity of a natural state or faculty).
  • It is thought by some people to be a process just because they think it is, in the strict sense, good; and they mistakenly think that all activity is a process, which it is not.

(B) Are pleasures bad because some pleasant things are unhealthy?

• This is like saying that healthy things are bad because some healthy things are bad for money-making. Both are bad in that particular respect (health for money-making, some pleasures for health), but they are not bad for that reason alone or in their essential nature. Indeed, even intense thinking itself is sometimes injurious to health, but that doesn’t make thinking itself bad.

(C) Does pleasure hinder thought or other activities?

• Neither practical wisdom nor any other state of being is impeded by the pleasure that arises from that very activity itself. It is foreign or alien pleasures that impede.
• For example, the pleasures arising from thinking and learning will make us think and learn all the more. It is unrelated pleasures (like wanting to eat when you should be studying) that cause distraction.

(D) Is it bad that there’s no “art of pleasure”?

• The fact that no pleasure is the product of any specific art arises naturally enough. There is no art of any other activity either (like an art of seeing or an art of breathing), but only of the corresponding faculty or capacity (like medicine aims to restore the capacity for health, which then functions naturally).
• Though, for that matter, the arts of the perfumer and the cook are often thought to be arts of producing pleasure.

(E) Do the actions of temperate men, wise men, children, and animals prove pleasure is bad?

• The arguments based on the grounds that the temperate man avoids (certain) pleasures, that the man of practical wisdom pursues the painless life, and that children and brutes pursue pleasure, are all refuted by the same consideration.
• We have pointed out (in distinguishing types of pleasure) in what sense some pleasures are good without qualification and in what sense some are not good.
• Now, both brutes and children pursue pleasures of the latter kind (those which imply appetite and pain, i.e., the bodily pleasures, especially the excesses of them, in respect of which the self-indulgent man is self-indulgent).
• The man of practical wisdom pursues tranquil freedom from that kind of pleasure (the disruptive, excessive bodily ones).
• This is why the temperate man avoids these excessive bodily pleasures; for even he has pleasures of his own (the noble pleasures associated with virtuous activity).

13. Pleasure as a Good, Perhaps Even the Chief Good

But further: (F) It is agreed that pain is bad and to be avoided.

• For some pain is bad without qualification, and other pain is bad because it is in some respect an impediment to us (hinders our proper functioning).
• Now, the contrary of that which is to be avoided (qua something to be avoided and bad) is good.
• Pleasure, then, is necessarily a good.
• For the answer of Speusippus (a philosopher who argued against pleasure) – that pleasure is contrary both to pain (an evil) and to good (as the greater is contrary both to the less and to the equal) – is not successful. He would not actually say that pleasure is essentially just a species of evil itself.

(G) If certain pleasures are bad, that does not prevent the chief good from being some particular kind of pleasure.

• This is just as the chief good may be some form of knowledge, even though certain kinds of knowledge might be trivial or even bad (e.g., knowledge of how to do harm).
• Perhaps it is even necessary, if each natural disposition or faculty has unimpeded activities, that, whether the unimpeded activity of all our dispositions, or that of some one of them, is happiness, this activity should be the thing most worthy of our choice. And this unimpeded activity is pleasure.
• Thus, the chief good would be some form of pleasure, though most pleasures (especially common bodily ones pursued to excess) might perhaps be bad without qualification.

And for this reason, all people think that the happy life is pleasant and weave pleasure into their ideal of happiness—and reasonably too.

• For no activity is perfect when it is impeded, and happiness is a perfect thing (a complete and self-sufficient end).
• This is why the happy person needs the goods of the body and external goods, i.e., those of fortune (luck), precisely so that they may not be impeded in these ways from their virtuous activities.
• Those who say that the victim on the rack or the person who falls into great misfortunes is happy if they are good, are, whether they mean to or not, talking nonsense. (Virtue is necessary, but not always sufficient for full, unimpeded happiness).
• Now, because we need fortune (external goods) as well as other things, some people think good fortune is the same thing as happiness. But it is not, for even good fortune itself, when in excess, can be an impediment to true happiness (e.g., by fostering idleness or arrogance). Perhaps excessive good fortune should then no longer even be called “good fortune,” for its limit is fixed by reference to what contributes to true happiness.

And indeed, the fact that all things, both brutes and humans, pursue pleasure is an indication of its being, somehow, the chief good (or at least deeply connected to it).

• As the old saying goes: “No voice is wholly lost that many peoples utter…” (meaning, such a universal pursuit must point to something fundamentally true or valuable).

But since no one nature or state either is or is thought to be the best for all, neither do all pursue the same specific pleasure. Yet, all pursue pleasure in some form.

• And perhaps they actually pursue not the pleasure they think they pursue, nor that which they would say they pursue, but fundamentally the same pleasure—a deep, natural striving for unimpeded, fulfilling activity. For all things have by nature something divine in them.
• But the bodily pleasures have, in a way, appropriated the name “pleasure” for themselves. This is both because we most often steer our course for them (they are immediate and powerful) and because all humans share in them. Thus, because bodily pleasures alone are familiar to everyone, many people think there are no other kinds of pleasure.

It is evident also that if pleasure—that is, the unimpeded activity of our faculties—is not a good, it will not be the case that the happy person lives a pleasant life.

• For to what end should they need pleasure, if it is not a good?
• If pleasure is not a good, then perhaps pain is neither an evil nor a good. Why then should a happy person avoid pain?
• Therefore, too, the life of the good man will not be pleasanter than that of anyone else, if his virtuous activities are not themselves more pleasant than other activities.

14. Understanding Bodily Pleasures and Why They Seem So Desirable

(G) With regard to bodily pleasures: Those who say that some pleasures are very much to be chosen (namely, the noble pleasures associated with virtue), but not the bodily pleasures (i.e., those with which the self-indulgent man is concerned), must consider why, then, the contrary pains (bodily pains) are bad.

• For the contrary of bad is good.
• Are the necessary bodily pleasures (like eating when hungry) good only in the sense in which even that which is merely “not bad” is considered a kind of good? Or are they good up to a certain point?
• Is it that where you have states and processes of which there cannot be too much (like virtuous activity), there cannot be too much of the corresponding pleasure? And that where there can be too much of the one (e.g., eating), there can be too much of the other (the pleasure of eating) also?
• Now, there can be too much of bodily goods. And the bad man (the self-indulgent) is bad by virtue of pursuing the excess, not by virtue of pursuing the necessary pleasures. (For all people enjoy in some way or other both dainty foods and wines and sexual intercourse, but not all people do so as they ought, i.e., in moderation).
• The contrary is the case with pain for the self-indulgent person (or rather, the “soft” person who cannot endure pain): they do not simply avoid the excess of pain; they try to avoid pain altogether. And this is peculiar to them. For the alternative to an excess of pleasure is not necessarily pain, except to the person who pursues this excess (and then feels pain at its absence).

Since we should state not only the truth, but also the cause of error—for this contributes towards producing conviction (since when a reasonable explanation is given of why the false view appears true, this tends to produce belief in the true view)—therefore we must state why the bodily pleasures appear more worthy of choice to many people than other pleasures.

(a) Firstly, then, it is because they expel pain.

• Owing to the excesses of pain that people experience, they pursue excessive pleasure, and in general bodily pleasure, as being a kind of cure for the pain.
• Now, curative agencies often produce intense feeling—which is the reason why they are pursued—because they show up sharply against the contrary pain they are relieving.
  • (Indeed, pleasure is thought by some not to be good for these two reasons, as has been said:
    • (1) Some of them are activities belonging to a bad nature—either congenital, as in the case of a brute animal, or due to habit, i.e., those of bad men.
    • (2) Others are meant to cure a defective nature, and it is better to be in a healthy state than to be merely getting into it. But these pleasures of relief arise during the process of being made perfect or restored, and are therefore only incidentally good.)

(b) Further, bodily pleasures are pursued because of their violence or intensity by those who cannot enjoy other, higher pleasures.

• (At all events, such people sometimes go out of their way to manufacture thirsts or other desires for themselves, just to experience the pleasure of satisfying them. When these artificially created desires and their satisfactions are harmless, the practice is irreproachable; when they are hurtful, it is bad.)
• For they feel they have nothing else to enjoy. And, besides, a neutral state (one without intense pleasure or pain) is painful to many people because of their nature.
• For the animal nature is always in travail (a state of labor or unease), as the students of natural science also testify. They say that even sight and hearing are, in a subtle way, constantly involving effort or “pain” (in the sense of ongoing physiological process); but we have become used to this, as they maintain. (This suggests a baseline of bodily unease that makes the intense, distracting nature of some bodily pleasures particularly sought after by some.)

Similarly, during youth, people are, owing to the growth that is constantly going on, in a physical and emotional situation somewhat like that of drunken men. And youth itself is generally a pleasant time, perhaps because of this continuous process of growth and development.

On the other hand, people who have an excitable nature (a restless or easily agitated temperament) always seem to need some form of relief or stimulation.

• This is because even their body is often in a state of torment or unease due to its special (excitable) composition.
• They are also always under the influence of violent or strong desires.
• But pain (whether from this internal unease or from unfulfilled desire) is driven out or counteracted by:
  • The contrary pleasure (a pleasure that directly opposes the source of pain).
  • Or by any chance pleasure, if it is strong enough to overcome the pain.
• And for these reasons—because they are constantly seeking strong pleasures to find relief from their internal state—such people can easily become self-indulgent and bad.

Pleasures Without Pain and Natural Pleasures However, the pleasures that do not involve preceding pains (like the pleasure of learning or contemplating, which don’t arise from a painful deficiency) do not admit of excess in the same way bodily pleasures do.

• These are among the things that are pleasant by nature and not just incidentally pleasant.
• By things pleasant incidentally, I mean those that act as cures or reliefs.
  • (For example, when people are cured of an illness, the process is often thought pleasant. This is because some action of the part of their system that remains healthy is working to restore balance, and this restoration from a painful state feels good).
• By things naturally pleasant, I mean those that stimulate the healthy and unimpeded activity of our natural state (like the joy of understanding or the pleasure of a healthy body functioning well).

Why Nothing is Always Pleasant to Us There is no one single thing that is always pleasant to human beings. This is because our nature is not simple.

• There is another element in us as well, inasmuch as we are perishable creatures (we are complex beings, subject to change, decay, and internal conflicts).
• So, if one element of our nature (e.g., our body in one state) does something, this action might be unnatural or feel contrary to the other element or another state of our nature (e.g., if overly full, eating is no longer pleasant).
• When the two elements or states within us are evenly balanced, what is done often seems neither painful nor pleasant (it’s a neutral state).
• For if the nature of anything were perfectly simple (not composite, not subject to internal variation or conflict), the same action would always be most pleasant to it.

God’s Single, Simple Pleasure This is why God (conceived as a perfect, simple, and unchanging being) always enjoys a single and simple pleasure.

• For in God, there is not only an activity of movement (as in the created world) but, more importantly, an activity of immobility or perfect, unchanging contemplation.
• And true pleasure, in its highest form, is found more in rest (stability, perfection, unimpeded activity) than in movement (change, process, becoming).

Why Change Seems Sweet to Us But “change in all things is sweet,” as the poet says. This is true for us humans primarily because of some vice or defect in our nature.

• For just as it is the vicious or flawed person who is often changeable and unstable in character.
• So too, the nature that needs constant change to find pleasure or avoid pain is a vicious or defective nature. It is not simple, nor is it perfectly good.

We have now discussed:

• Continence (self-control) and incontinence (lack of self-control).
• Pleasure and pain.
• We have explored what each of these is.
• We have also looked at in what sense some of them are good and others are bad.

It remains now to speak of friendship.

BOOK VIII

1. Why Friendship is Essential and Noble

After what we have discussed about virtues and character, it’s natural to talk about friendship next. Friendship is either a virtue itself or something that involves virtue. Besides that, it is absolutely necessary for a good life.

The Necessity of Friendship

• No one would choose to live without friends, even if they had all other good things in the world.
• Even rich people, and those who hold high office or have great power, are thought to need friends most of all.
  • What is the use of having such prosperity if there’s no opportunity to do good for others (beneficence)? Beneficence is mainly exercised towards friends, and in its most praiseworthy form.
  • Also, how can prosperity be protected and preserved without friends? The greater the prosperity, the more exposed it is to risk.
• In times of poverty and in other misfortunes, people think friends are their only refuge.
• Friendship also helps the young to keep from making mistakes.
• It aids older people by providing for their needs and helping with activities that are becoming difficult due to weakness.
• For those in the prime of life, friendship stimulates them to noble actions. As the saying goes, “two going together” can achieve more. With friends, people are more able both to think clearly and to act effectively.

Friendship in Nature and Society

• It seems that parents naturally feel friendship for their offspring, and offspring for their parents. This isn’t just among humans but also among birds and most animals.
• Members of the same species or race feel friendship for each other, and this is especially true for human beings. That’s why we praise people who are “lovers of their fellowmen” (philanthropists).
• We can even see in our travels how near and dear every human being can feel to every other human being.
• Friendship also seems to hold societies and states together. Lawgivers often seem to care more for promoting friendship (or social harmony) than for strict justice.
  • Unanimity (a state of agreement and shared mind) seems to be something like friendship, and this is what good leaders aim for most of all. They try to expel faction (internal conflict and division) as their worst enemy.
• When people are friends, they often have no need for strict justice between them (because they naturally care for each other’s well-being).
• But even when people are just, they still need friendship as well. And the truest or highest form of justice is often thought to be a kind of friendly quality.

Friendship is Noble Friendship is not only necessary but also noble (fine and admirable).

• We praise those who love their friends.
• It is thought to be a fine thing to have many friends.
• And again, we often think that it is the same people who are good individuals and who are good friends.

Debates About Friendship However, not a few things about friendship are matters of debate and differing opinions.

• Some define it as a kind of likeness and say that people who are like each other become friends. This leads to sayings like “like to like,” or “birds of a feather flock together.”
• Others, on the contrary, say that “two of a trade never agree” (implying that similarity can lead to rivalry, and perhaps opposites attract).
• On this very question of what makes people friends, some look for deeper and more physical or natural causes:
  • The playwright Euripides said that “parched earth loves the rain, and stately heaven when filled with rain loves to fall to earth” (suggesting an attraction of opposites or complementary things).
  • The philosopher Heraclitus said that “it is what opposes that helps,” and “from different tones comes the fairest tune,” and “all things are produced through strife” (again, suggesting that opposites or differences can create harmony or new things).
  • Empedocles, another philosopher, along with others, expressed the opposite view: that like aims at like.

We can leave these deep physical or cosmological problems about attraction and opposition alone for now, as they do not belong to our current inquiry. Let us examine those questions about friendship which are human and involve character and feeling. For example:

• Can friendship arise between any two people, or is it true that people cannot be friends if they are wicked?
• Is there only one species (kind) of friendship, or are there more than one?
  • Those who think there is only one kind of friendship because it admits of different degrees (some friendships are stronger or weaker than others) have relied on an inadequate indication. For even things that are different in species can admit of degrees (e.g., different kinds of sweetness can all be more or less sweet). We have discussed this general matter of degrees and species before.

2. What We Love: The Basis of Friendship

The different kinds of friendship may perhaps become clearer if we first come to know the object of love (what it is that people love).

• For it seems that not everything is loved, but only the lovable.
• And the lovable is generally understood to be that which is:
  1. Good
  2. Pleasant
  3. Useful
• It would seem that “useful” means that by which some good or pleasure is produced. So, ultimately, it is the good and the pleasant that are lovable as ends (things loved for their own sake), while the useful is loved as a means to these ends.

Now, do people love “the good” (what is good in an absolute, objective sense) or what is “good for them” (what benefits them personally)? These two sometimes clash. The same question applies to what is pleasant.

• It is generally thought that each person loves what is good for himself.
• And it’s also thought that “the good” (in an absolute sense) is lovable without qualification, and what is good for each person is lovable for that person.
• However, it often seems that each person loves not what is objectively good for them, but what seems good to them.
• This distinction, however, will not make a big difference for our current argument. We shall just have to say that the object of love is “that which seems lovable” to the person.

There are, then, three grounds on which people love: goodness, pleasantness, and usefulness.

Friendship Requires Mutual, Recognized Goodwill

• When we speak of the love of lifeless objects (like loving wine or a piece of art), we do not use the word “friendship.” This is because:
  • There is no mutual love (the object doesn’t love back).
  • Nor is there a wishing of good to the other (for it would surely be ridiculous to wish your wine well; if you wish anything for it, it is that it may keep well so that you may have it yourself).
• But to a friend, we say we ought to wish what is good for their sake.
• To those who wish good to others in this way, we ascribe only goodwill if the wish is not reciprocated (if the other person doesn’t wish good back).
• Goodwill, when it is reciprocal (mutual), is friendship.
• Or must we also add that this mutual goodwill must be recognized by both parties? For many people have goodwill to those whom they have not seen but judge to be good or useful from afar. And one of these people might return this feeling, also from afar.
  • These people seem to bear goodwill to each other. But how could one call them friends when they do not know about their mutual feelings?
• To be friends, then, they must:
  1. Be mutually recognized as bearing goodwill towards each other.
  2. Wish well to each other for one of the reasons mentioned above (because the other is good, pleasant, or useful).

3. The Three Kinds of Friendship

Now, these reasons for loving (goodness, pleasure, utility) differ from each other in kind. So, therefore, do the corresponding forms of love and friendship. There are, therefore, three kinds of friendship, equal in number to the things that are lovable. For with respect to each lovable quality (goodness, pleasure, utility), there can be a mutual and recognized love. And those who love each other wish well to each other in that respect in which they love one another (i.e., for their goodness, their pleasantness, or their usefulness).

1. Friendships Based on Utility (Usefulness)

• Those who love each other for their utility do not love each other for themselves (for who the other person truly is).
• They love each other in virtue of some good or benefit which they get from each other.
• So, they love for the sake of what is good for themselves, not primarily for the sake of the friend.
• They love the other person not in so far as they are that particular individual, but only in so far as they are useful.

2. Friendships Based on Pleasure

• The same applies to those who love for the sake of pleasure.
• It is not for their character that people love ready-witted or entertaining people, but simply because they find them pleasant.
• So, those who love for pleasure do so for the sake of what is pleasant to themselves.
• They love the other person not in so far as they are that particular individual, but only in so far as they are pleasant.

Friendships of Utility and Pleasure are Incidental

• Thus, these friendships (based on utility or pleasure) are only incidental.
• The loved person is not loved for being the person they are, but only as providing some good (in utility friendships) or some pleasure (in pleasure friendships).
• Such friendships, then, are easily dissolved if the parties do not remain as they were. For if one party is no longer pleasant or useful, the other ceases to love them.

Utility, in particular, is not a permanent thing but is always changing.

• Thus, when the motive of the friendship (the utility) is gone, the friendship is dissolved, inasmuch as it existed only for those particular ends.
• This kind of friendship based on utility seems to exist chiefly:
  • Between old people (for at that age, people often pursue not what is pleasant but what is useful).
  • And, of those who are in their prime or are young, between those who are primarily focused on pursuing utility.
• Such people often do not live much with each other either. For sometimes they do not even find each other pleasant.
• Therefore, they do not need such companionship unless they are useful to each other. They are pleasant to each other only in so far as they rouse in each other hopes of some good thing to come (some future benefit).
• Among such friendships based on utility, people also sometimes class the “friendship” of a host and guest (which is often based on mutual, though temporary, usefulness and social convention).

Friendship Among Young People (Often Based on Pleasure)

• On the other hand, the friendship of young people seems to aim primarily at pleasure.
• For young people live largely under the guidance of emotion, and they pursue above all what is pleasant to themselves and what is immediately before them.
• But with increasing age, their pleasures become different.
• This is why they quickly become friends and quickly cease to be so. Their friendship changes with the object that is found pleasant, and such pleasure alters quickly.
• Young people are also often amorous (prone to romantic love). For the greater part of the friendship of love (erotike philia) depends on emotion and aims at pleasure. This is why they fall in love and quickly fall out of love, changing their affections often, sometimes even within a single day.
• But these young people (friends for pleasure, including lovers) do wish to spend their days and lives together. For it is in this way that they attain the purpose of their friendship—shared pleasant activities.

3. Perfect Friendship: Based on Goodness (Virtue)

• Perfect friendship is the friendship of people who are good, and who are alike in virtue.
• For these good people wish well alike to each other as good individuals, and they themselves are good.
• Now, those who wish well to their friends for their friends’ own sake are most truly friends. For they do this by reason of their own good nature and not incidentally (not just for utility or pleasure).
• Therefore, their friendship lasts as long as they are good—and goodness is an enduring thing.
• And each friend is both good without qualification (good in an absolute sense) and good to his friend (beneficial and a source of goodness for the friend). For good people are both good without qualification and useful to each other.
• So too, they are pleasant. For good people are pleasant both without qualification (their character is agreeable) and to each other. This is because to each person, their own virtuous activities and other similar virtuous activities are pleasurable, and the actions of good people are either the same as or like their own.
• And such a friendship, based on goodness, is, as might be expected, permanent. This is because there meet in it all the qualities that friends should have.
  • For all friendship is ultimately for the sake of some good or some pleasure—either good or pleasure in the abstract, or such good or pleasure as will be enjoyed by the person who has the friendly feeling.
  • And all friendship is based on a certain resemblance between the friends.
  • In a friendship of good people, all these qualities (goodness, utility, pleasantness) belong to the friendship by virtue of the very nature of the friends themselves. For in this kind of friendship, the other qualities (utility and pleasantness) are also alike in both friends. And that which is good without qualification is also, for such people, without qualification pleasant. And these (goodness and true pleasantness) are the most lovable qualities.
• Love and friendship, therefore, are found most fully and in their best form between such good people.

But it is natural that such perfect friendships should be infrequent.

• For such good and virtuous people are rare.
• Further, such friendship requires time and familiarity. As the proverb says, people cannot truly know each other till they have “eaten salt together” (meaning, shared life and experiences over a considerable time).
• Nor can they admit each other to friendship or truly be friends until each has been found lovable and has been trusted by the other.
• Those who quickly show the outward marks of friendship to each other may wish to be friends, but they are not truly friends unless they both are lovable (possess good character) and know this fact about each other. For a wish for friendship may arise quickly, but true friendship does not.

4. Comparing the Three Kinds of Friendship

This kind of friendship based on goodness, then, is perfect both in respect of duration (it lasts) and in all other respects. In it, each friend gets from the other in all respects the same as, or something like what, he gives. This is what ought to happen between friends.

• Friendship for the sake of pleasure bears a resemblance to this perfect kind, for good people too are pleasant to each other.
• So too does friendship for the sake of utility, for good people are also useful to each other.

Among people whose friendships are of these inferior sorts (pleasure or utility):

• Friendships are most permanent when the friends get the same thing from each other (e.g., pleasure) and, importantly, not only that but also from the same source.
  • This happens, for example, between ready-witted people who amuse each other.
  • It does not happen in the same way between a lover and a beloved (in many romantic relationships, especially those based primarily on fleeting attraction). For these often do not take pleasure in the same things: the lover might take pleasure in seeing the beloved, while the beloved takes pleasure in receiving attentions from their lover.
  • And when the “bloom of youth” is passing, the friendship (or love affair) sometimes passes too. For the one may find no pleasure in the sight of the other any longer, and the other may get no more attentions from the first.
  • However, many lovers, on the other hand, are constant, if familiarity has led them to love each other’s characters, these characters being alike and good.
• But those who exchange not pleasure but utility in their amours (love affairs based on mutual usefulness rather than true affection) are both less truly friends and less constant.
• Those who are friends for the sake of utility part when the advantage is at an end. For they were lovers not of each other, but of the profit or benefit they received.

So, for the sake of pleasure or utility, then:

• Even bad people may be friends of each other.
• Or good people may be friends of bad people (e.g., a good person might find a witty but morally flawed person pleasant for a time, or find a bad person useful for some purpose).
• Or one who is neither good nor bad may be a friend to any sort of person on these grounds.
• But for their own sake (in a perfect friendship based on character), clearly only good people can be friends. For bad people do not delight in each other (for who they are) unless some advantage comes from the relation.

The friendship of the good, too, and this alone, is proof against slander.

• For it is not easy to trust anyone’s negative talk about a person whom one has long known and tested for oneself.
• And it is among good people that trust, and the feeling that “he would never wrong me,” and all the other things that are demanded in true friendship are found.
• In the other kinds of friendship (based on pleasure or utility), however, there is nothing to prevent these evils (like slander causing distrust) from arising.

Because people commonly apply the name of “friends” more broadly:

• They apply it even to those whose motive is utility, in which sense even states or nations are said to be friendly (for the alliances of states seem to aim at mutual advantage).
• And they apply it to those who love each other for the sake of pleasure, in which sense children are often called friends.
• Therefore, we too perhaps ought to call such people friends, and say that there are several kinds of friendship:
  1. Firstly and in the proper sense: That of good people as good. This is true friendship.
  2. By analogy, the other kinds (based on utility or pleasure). They are friends in virtue of something good (utility provides a good, pleasure is a good for lovers of pleasure) and something akin to what is found in true friendship.
• But these two kinds of friendship (utility and pleasure) are not often united in the same relationship. Nor do the same people easily become friends for the sake of both utility and pleasure. For things that are only incidentally connected (like a person being both useful and pleasant by chance, rather than these qualities stemming from their good character) are not often coupled together for long.

Friendship being divided into these kinds:

• Bad people will be friends for the sake of pleasure or of utility, being like each other in this respect.
• Good people will be friends for their own sake, that is, in virtue of their goodness. These good people, then, are friends without qualification (true friends). The others are friends only incidentally and through a resemblance to true friendship.

5. Friendship: State of Character vs. Active Living Together

Just as in regard to the virtues some people are called good in respect of a state of character (a stable disposition) and others in respect of an activity (actually doing virtuous things). So too in the case of friendship:

• Those who live together delight in each other and confer benefits on each other. This is active friendship.
• But those who are asleep or locally separated are not currently performing the activities of friendship. However, they are disposed to perform them.
• Distance does not break off the friendship absolutely, but only the activity of it.
• But if the absence is lasting, it seems actually to make people forget their friendship. Hence the saying, “out of sight, out of mind.”

Neither old people nor sour (ill-tempered) people seem to make friends easily.

• For there is little that is pleasant in them.
• And no one can spend their days with someone whose company is painful, or at least not pleasant. Nature seems above all to avoid the painful and to aim at the pleasant.

Those, however, who approve of each other but do not live together seem to be well-disposed towards each other rather than actual friends in the fullest sense.

• For there is nothing so characteristic of friends as living together.
• While it is true that people who are in need desire benefits (which friends can provide), even those who are supremely happy desire to spend their days together. For solitude suits such happy people least of all.
• But people cannot live together if they are not pleasant to each other and do not enjoy the same things, as friends who are true companions seem to do.

The truest friendship, then, is that of the good, as we have frequently said.

• For that which is without qualification good or pleasant seems to be lovable and desirable.
• And for each person, that which is good or pleasant to him is what is lovable and desirable for him.
• And the good person is lovable and desirable to another good person for both these reasons (being good in himself, and being good/pleasant for his friend).

Now, it looks as if:

• Love (affection) were a feeling (pathos).
• Friendship were a state of character (hexis).
• For love (as a feeling) may be felt just as much towards lifeless things (like a beautiful statue).
• But mutual love (a component of friendship) involves choice, and choice springs from a state of character.
• And people wish well to those whom they love (their friends) for their friends’ sake, not as a result of a mere feeling but as a result of a stable state of character.

And in loving a friend, people love what is good for themselves.

• For the good person, in becoming a friend, becomes a good to his friend. (Each benefits from the other’s goodness).
• Each friend, then, both loves what is good for himself, and makes an equal return in goodwill and in pleasantness.
• For friendship is often said to be equality, and both of these (goodwill and pleasantness, equally returned) are found most in the friendship of good people.

6. Why Sour and Elderly People Make Friends Less Easily; Limits on True Friendship

Between sour (ill-tempered) and elderly people, friendship arises less readily.

• This is because they are generally less good-tempered and enjoy companionship less.
• Good temper and enjoyment of companionship are thought to be the greatest marks of friendship and are productive of it.
• This is why, while young people become friends quickly, old people do not. It is because people do not easily become friends with those in whom they do not delight. And similarly, sour people do not quickly make friends either.
• However, such people (sour or elderly individuals) may still bear goodwill to each other. They may wish one another well and aid one another in need.
• But they are hardly true friends in the fullest sense because they do not spend their days together nor delight in each other, and these activities are thought to be the greatest marks of friendship.

One cannot be a friend to many people in the sense of having friendship of the perfect type with them.

• This is just as one cannot be in love (eran – intense romantic love) with many people at once. For such love is a sort of excess of feeling, and it is the nature of such strong feeling to be directed only towards one person at a time.
• And it is not easy for many people at the same time to please the same person very greatly, or perhaps even to be considered truly good in that person’s eyes (which is necessary for perfect friendship).
• One must, too, acquire some experience of the other person and become familiar with them, and that is very hard to do deeply with many people.

But with a view to utility or pleasure, it is possible that many people should please one.

• For many people are useful, or many people can be pleasant.
• And these services (utility) or moments of pleasure take little time to establish or experience.

Of these two kinds of incidental friendship (utility and pleasure):

• That which is for the sake of pleasure is the more like true friendship. This is especially so when both parties get the same things from each other and delight in each other or in the same things, as often happens in the friendships of the young. For generosity is more often found in such friendships based on shared pleasure.
• Friendship based on utility is more characteristic of the commercially minded.

People who are supremely happy, too, have no real need of useful friends (as they possess most external goods). But they do need pleasant friends.

• For they wish to live with someone, and share their lives.
• And though they can endure what is painful for a short time, no one could put up with it continuously.
• Nor could one put up even with “the Good itself” (absolute goodness) if it were constantly painful to them. (This is a strong statement emphasizing the human need for pleasantness in companionship).
• This is why happy people look out for friends who are pleasant.

Perhaps they should look for friends who, besides being pleasant, are also good people, and good for them too (meaning, beneficial in a virtuous way). If they find such friends, these friends will have all the characteristics that good friends should have (being good, pleasant, and useful because of their goodness).

Friendships of People in Power People in positions of authority, like rulers or very wealthy individuals, seem to have friends who fall into distinct classes:

• Some people are useful to them.
• Others are pleasant to them.
• However, the same people are rarely both useful and pleasant in the right way (i.e., their usefulness isn’t tied to noble goals, and their pleasantness isn’t accompanied by virtue). This is because powerful people often do not seek out friends whose pleasantness comes with virtue, or whose usefulness is aimed at noble objectives.
• In their desire for pleasure, they often look for ready-witted people (those who are entertaining).
• For their other needs, they choose friends who are clever at doing what they are told (useful for carrying out tasks). These two characteristics—being witty and being cleverly useful—are rarely combined in the same person who is also virtuous.

Now, we have said before that the truly good person is at the same time pleasant and useful because of their goodness.

• But such a good person does not easily become the close friend of someone who greatly surpasses them in station (rank or power), unless that person of higher station also surpasses the good person in virtue.
• If this condition (the superior also being more virtuous) is not met, the good person of lower station cannot establish a true equality in the friendship by being proportionally exceeded in both respects (i.e., lower in station but not correspondingly lower in virtue, or higher in virtue but not recognized as such by the superior).
• But people who surpass others in both high station and great virtue are not so easy to find.

However that may be, the types of friendships we mentioned earlier (those based on virtue, pleasure, or utility between equals) involve equality.

• In these friendships, the friends get the same things from one another and wish the same things for one another.
• Or, they exchange one thing for another, for example, pleasure for utility.
• We have said, however, that these friendships based purely on pleasure or utility are both less truly friendships and less permanent than friendships based on goodness.

Why Imperfect Friendships Still Seem Like Friendships It is because of their likeness and their unlikeness to the same thing (perfect friendship based on virtue) that these other types are thought both to be friendships and not to be friendships.

• They seem to be friendships because of their likeness to the friendship of virtue. One of them involves pleasure, and the other involves utility, and these characteristics (being pleasant and useful) also belong to the friendship of virtue.
• They appear not to be true friendships (or less so) because the friendship of virtue is proof against slander and is permanent, while these other kinds change quickly. They also differ from true friendship in many other respects. This is because of their unlikeness to the friendship of virtue.

7. Friendships Between Unequals

But there is another kind of friendship: that which involves an inequality between the parties. Examples include the friendship:

• Of a father to a son, and in general, of an elder person to a younger person.
• Of a husband to a wife.
• And in general, of a ruler to a subject.

These friendships based on inequality also differ from each other.

• The friendship that exists between parents and children is not the same as that between rulers and subjects.
• Even the friendship of a father to a son is not the same as that of a son to a father (the roles and expectations differ).
• Nor is the friendship of a husband to a wife the same as that of a wife to a husband.

For the virtue (the specific excellence) and the function (the role) of each of these individuals is different. And so are the reasons for which they love each other. The love and the friendship are therefore different as well.

• In these unequal friendships, each party neither gets the same things from the other, nor should they necessarily seek the same things.
• But when children give to their parents what they ought to give to those who brought them into the world (like respect and care in old age), and when parents give what they should to their children (like nurture and education), the friendship of such persons will be abiding (lasting) and excellent.

In all friendships that involve inequality, the love also should be proportional.

• This means the better or more virtuous person (or the one providing greater benefit) should be loved more than they love in return.
• So should the more useful person. This applies similarly in each of the other cases of unequal relationships.
• For when the love given is in proportion to the merit (worth or value) of the parties, then, in a sense, a kind of equality arises (a proportional equality). This proportional equality is certainly held to be a characteristic of friendship.

Equality in Justice vs. Friendship But equality does not seem to take the same form in acts of justice as it does in friendship.

• In acts of justice, what is equal in the primary sense is that which is in proportion to merit (this is distributive justice). Quantitative equality (everyone getting an identical amount) is secondary.
• But in friendship (especially between equals), quantitative equality (equal exchange of goodwill or pleasure) is primary, and proportion to merit is secondary (more relevant for balancing unequal friendships).

This becomes clear if there is a great interval or gap in respect of virtue, vice, wealth, or anything else between the parties.

• For then they are no longer friends, and do not even expect to be so.
• This is most obvious in the case of the gods; for they surpass us humans most decisively in all good things (so, true friendship in the human sense is not possible with them).
• It is also clear in the case of kings. Men who are much their inferiors do not expect to be friends with kings in the way they are with equals. Nor do people of no account expect to be friends with the best or wisest individuals.
• In such cases of great inequality, it is not possible to define exactly up to what point friends can remain friends. For much can be taken away from strict equality, and friendship can still remain. But when one party is removed to a very great distance (as God is from humans), the possibility of friendship ceases.

Do We Wish Our Friends to Become Gods? This actually brings up a question: do friends really wish for their friends the greatest possible goods, for example, that their friends should become gods?

• If a friend became a god, they would no longer be friends to their human companion (the gap would be too great).
• And therefore, they (as gods) would not be good things for their human friend in the way friends are good things for each other. (For friends are good things, and part of that good is the relationship itself).
• The answer is that if we were right in saying earlier that a friend wishes good to their friend for that friend’s own sake, then the friend must remain the sort of being they are, whatever that may be.
• Therefore, it is for their friend, only so long as they remain a human being, that one will wish the greatest human goods.
• But perhaps one would not wish for all the greatest goods, if those goods meant the end of the friendship or the friend ceasing to be who they are. For, ultimately, it is for oneself (as a human being needing friendship) that each person most of all wishes what is good in the context of friendship.

8. Loving Is More Central to Friendship Than Being Loved

Most people seem, often owing to ambition, to wish to be loved rather than to love.

• This is why most people love flattery. For the flatterer is like a friend in an inferior position, or at least pretends to be such and pretends to love more than they are actually loved in return.
• And being loved seems to be similar to being honored, and being honored is what most people aim at.

But it seems that people choose honor not for its own sake, but incidentally (for what it leads to).

• Most people enjoy being honored by those in positions of authority because of their hopes. They think that if they want anything, they will get it from these powerful people. Therefore, they delight in honor as a token or sign of favor to come.
• Those who desire honor from good people, and from people who know (who are wise), are aiming at confirming their own opinion of themselves. They delight in being honored by such people, therefore, because they gain confidence in their own goodness based on the judgment of those who speak well of them.
• In being loved, on the other hand, people delight for its own sake. From this, it would seem that being loved is better than being honored, and that friendship (which involves being loved) is desirable in itself.

However, friendship seems to lie more in loving rather than in being loved.

• This is indicated by the delight that mothers take in loving their children.
  • Some mothers hand over their children to be brought up by others. As long as they know their children’s fate and well-being, they continue to love them. They often do not seek to be loved in return with the same intensity (especially if they cannot have both active loving and being actively loved).
  • Mothers seem to be satisfied if they see their children prospering. And they themselves love their children even if the children, owing to their ignorance or youth, give them nothing of what might be considered a mother’s due in return.
• Now, since friendship depends more on loving, and it is those who love their friends that are praised, loving seems to be the characteristic virtue or excellence of friends.
• So, it is only those people in whom this capacity for loving is found in due measure that are lasting friends, and only their friendship that endures.

How Unequals Can Be Friends It is in this way (through a proportionate exchange of affection, where perhaps the “lesser” person loves more intensely or the “greater” person provides more benefits that inspire love) more than any other that even unequal individuals can be friends. They can be “equalized” in a proportional sense.

Equality, Likeness, and Stability in Friendship

• Equality and likeness are key aspects of friendship, especially the likeness of those who are alike in virtue.
  • Because virtuous people are steadfast in themselves (their character is stable), they hold fast to each other.
  • They neither ask for nor provide base or shameful services to each other. Indeed, one might say they even prevent such things.
  • For it is characteristic of good people neither to go wrong themselves nor to let their friends do so.
• Wicked people have no steadfastness (for they do not remain even like to themselves; their characters are unstable). They might become “friends” for a short time because they delight in each other’s wickedness, but such associations are not stable.
• Friends who are together for utility or pleasure last longer—that is, as long as they continue to provide each other with enjoyments or advantages.

Friendship Between Contraries (Opposites)

• Friendship for utility’s sake seems to be the kind that can most easily exist between contraries (opposites). For example:
  • Between a poor person and a rich person.
  • Between an ignorant person and a learned person.
  • For what a person actually lacks, they aim to get, and they give something else in return.
• One might also bring the “lover and beloved” or “beautiful and ugly” pairing under this heading if their relationship is seen as an exchange of different, complementary “utilities.”
• This is why lovers sometimes seem ridiculous when they demand to be loved with the same intensity or in the same way that they love.
  • If both are equally lovable, their claim to be loved equally can perhaps be justified.
  • But when one party has nothing particularly lovable about them (in the eyes of the other, or in terms of what the other seeks), their demand to be loved as they love is ridiculous.
• Perhaps, however, a contrary (an opposite) does not even aim at its contrary by its own nature, but only incidentally. The true desire might be for what is intermediate, because that is what is good.
  • For example, it is good for a dry thing not to become completely wet, but to come to an intermediate state of moisture. The same applies to a hot thing and its contrary, and in all other similar cases. We may dismiss these subjects about the attraction of contraries for now, for they are indeed somewhat foreign to our main inquiry into friendship.

9. Friendship and Justice: Shared Ground in Communities

Friendship and justice seem, as we said at the outset of our discussion, to be concerned with the same objects and exhibited between the same persons.

• For in every community (any association of people), there is thought to be some form of justice, and friendship too.
• At least, people address as “friends” their fellow-voyagers and fellow-soldiers, and so too those associated with them in any other kind of community.
• And the extent of their association (how much they share and do together) is the extent of their friendship, just as it is the extent to which justice exists between them.
• The proverb “what friends have is common property” expresses a truth, for friendship depends on community or sharing.

Now, brothers and comrades (close companions) have nearly all things in common.

• But other associates to whom we have referred have definite, more limited things in common—some share more things, others fewer.
• For of friendships, too, some are more truly friendships (involving deeper and wider sharing) and others less so.
• And the claims of justice also differ depending on the relationship.
  • The duties of parents to children, and those of brothers to each other, are not the same.
  • Nor are those of comrades and those of fellow-citizens the same.
  • And so, too, with the other kinds of friendship.
• There is a difference, therefore, also between the acts that are unjust towards each of these classes of associates. And the injustice increases by being exhibited towards those who are friends in a fuller sense.
  • For example, it is a more terrible thing to defraud a comrade than a mere fellow-citizen.
  • It is more terrible not to help a brother than a stranger.
  • And it is more terrible to wound a father than anyone else.
• The demands of justice also seem to increase with the intensity of the friendship. This implies that friendship and justice exist between the same persons and have an equal scope or extension.

All Communities as Parts of the Political Community Now, all forms of community are like parts of the political community (the state or city).

• People journey together (form associations) with a view to some particular advantage, and to provide something that they need for the purposes of life.
• And it is for the sake of advantage that the political community too seems both to have come together originally and to endure. For this common advantage is what legislators aim at, and they call “just” that which is to the common advantage.

Now, the other, smaller communities aim at advantage bit by bit, or for particular purposes. For example:

• Sailors aim at what is advantageous on a voyage (e.g., with a view to making money or some other similar goal).
• Fellow-soldiers aim at what is advantageous in war (whether it is wealth, or victory, or the taking of a city that they seek).
• Members of tribes and demes (local administrative units in ancient Greece) act similarly for their particular shared interests. (Some communities seem to arise for the sake of pleasure, for instance, religious guilds and social clubs. These exist respectively for the sake of offering sacrifice together and for companionship.) But all these smaller communities seem to fall under the political community. For the political community aims not merely at present advantage but at what is advantageous for life as a whole.
• The political community does this by offering sacrifices and arranging gatherings for this purpose, by assigning honors to the gods, and by providing pleasant relaxations and amusements for its citizens.
• For the ancient sacrifices and gatherings (like harvest festivals) seem to take place after the harvest as a sort of offering of first-fruits, because it was at these seasons that people had the most leisure. All the communities, then, seem to be parts of the political community. And the particular kinds of friendship will correspond to the particular kinds of community.

10. Political Constitutions and Their Household Analogies

There are three main kinds of (good) political constitution, and an equal number of deviation-forms—perversions, as it were, of these good forms. The good constitutions are:

1. Monarchy: Rule by one person for the common good.
2. Aristocracy: Rule by the few best people for the common good.
3. Timocracy: Rule based on a property qualification, where those who own property govern for the common good. (It seems appropriate to call this “timocratic,” though most people are accustomed to calling it a “polity” or constitutional government).

• The best of these good forms is monarchy.
• The worst (of these good forms, or least good) is timocracy.

The deviations (perverted forms) are:

1. The deviation from monarchy is tyranny.
   • Both are forms of one-man rule, but there is the greatest difference between them. The tyrant looks to his own advantage, while the true king looks to the advantage of his subjects.
   • For a person is not a true king unless he is self-sufficient and excels his subjects in all good things. Such a person needs nothing further for himself and therefore will not look to his own private interests but to those of his subjects. A king who is not like that would be a mere titular king (a king in name only).
   • Now, tyranny is the very contrary of this; the tyrant pursues his own good.
   • It is clearer in the case of tyranny that it is the worst deviation-form, because the contrary of the best is the worst.
   • Monarchy passes over into tyranny when the rule becomes corrupted; for tyranny is the evil form of one-man rule, and the bad king becomes a tyrant.
2. The deviation from aristocracy is oligarchy.
   • Aristocracy passes over into oligarchy due to the badness of the rulers. They distribute what belongs to the city contrary to equity (fairness)—giving all or most of the good things to themselves, and assigning public office always to the same people (or their cronies), paying most regard to wealth rather than merit.
   • Thus, the rulers are few and are bad people instead of being the most worthy.
3. The deviation from timocracy is democracy.
   • These two (timocracy and democracy) are coterminous (they border each other, are closely related). This is because the ideal even of timocracy is to be the rule of the majority (among those who meet the property qualification), and all who have the property qualification in a timocracy count as equal.
   • Democracy is the least bad of the deviations; for in its case, the form of constitution is only a slight deviation from timocracy (it broadens the base of power further, often removing property qualifications). These, then, are the changes to which constitutions are most subject, for these are often the smallest and easiest transitions from one form to another.

One may find resemblances to these constitutions and, as it were, patterns of them, even in households.

• The association of a father with his sons bears the form of monarchy, since the father cares for his children. This is why Homer calls Zeus (the king of the gods) “father.” The ideal of monarchy is to be paternal rule (rule like a good father).
  • But among the Persians (as an example of a different culture), the rule of the father is often tyrannical; they were said to use their sons almost like slaves.
• Also tyrannical is the rule of a master over his slaves. For it is the advantage of the master that is primarily brought about in it.
  • Now, this master-slave rule (within the context of ancient societies that accepted slavery) seems to be a “correct” form of government for that specific relationship, but the Persian type of fatherly rule (if tyrannical) is perverted. For the modes of rule appropriate to different relations are diverse.
• The association of husband and wife seems to be aristocratic. For the husband typically rules in accordance with his worth and in those matters in which a man should rule, but the matters that appropriately befit a woman he hands over to her.
  • If the husband rules in everything, the relation passes over into oligarchy; for in doing so, he is not acting in accordance with their respective worth or roles, and not ruling by virtue of his true superiority in all areas.
  • Sometimes, however, women rule, for example, because they are heiresses. In such cases, their rule is not by virtue of excellence but due to wealth and power, as in oligarchies.
• The association of brothers is like timocracy. For they are generally equal, except in so far as they differ in age. Hence, if they differ very much in age, the friendship is no longer of the typical fraternal (brotherly) type.
• Democracy is found chiefly in masterless dwellings (where there is no single head of the household, for here everyone is on an equality), and in those households in which the ruler is weak and everyone has license to do as he pleases.

11. Friendship and Justice Within Different Constitutions

Each of the constitutions may be seen to involve friendship just in so far as it involves justice.

• The friendship between a king and his subjects depends on an excess of benefits conferred by the king. For he confers benefits on his subjects if, being a good man, he cares for them with a view to their well-being, as a shepherd does for his sheep. (This is why Homer called Agamemnon “shepherd of the peoples”).
• Such too is the friendship of a father for his children, though this exceeds the king-subject friendship in the greatness of the benefits conferred. For the father is responsible for the existence of his children, which is thought to be the greatest good, and for their nurture and upbringing.
  • These benefits (existence, nurture) are ascribed to ancestors as well.
  • Further, by nature, a father tends to rule over his sons, ancestors over their descendants, and a king over his subjects.
  • These friendships imply a superiority of one party over the other, which is why ancestors are honored. The justice, therefore, that exists between persons so related is not the same on both sides but is in every case proportioned to merit or contribution. For that is true of the friendship as well (love and respect should be proportional).
• The friendship of husband and wife, again, is the same kind that is found in an aristocracy. For it is ideally in accordance with virtue—the better partner (in a particular sphere) gets more of what is good (e.g., more say in certain matters), and each gets what befits him or her. And so, too, with the justice in these relations.
• The friendship of brothers is like that of comrades. For they are equal and of like age, and such persons are for the most part alike in their feelings and their character.
• Like this, too, is the friendship appropriate to a timocratic government. For in such a constitution, the ideal is for the citizens to be equal and fair. Therefore, rule is taken in turn, and on equal terms. And the friendship appropriate here will correspond to this equality.

But in the deviation-forms of constitution (tyranny, oligarchy, extreme democracy):

• As justice hardly exists, so too does friendship.
• Friendship exists least in the worst form, tyranny. In a tyranny, there is little or no friendship between ruler and ruled.
  • For where there is nothing common to ruler and ruled, there is not friendship either, since there is not justice.
  • This is like the relationship between a craftsman and his tool, or (in some philosophical views) the soul and the body, or a master and his slave. The latter in each case (tool, body, slave) is benefited in some way by that which uses it, but there is no friendship nor justice (in the political sense) towards lifeless things.
  • But neither is there friendship towards a horse or an ox (in the human sense), nor to a slave as a slave.
  • For there is nothing common to the two parties (master and slave as such). The slave is a living tool, and the tool a lifeless slave.
  • As a slave, then, one cannot be friends with him.

But, as a human being, one can be friends with a slave.

• For there seems to be some form of justice possible between any human being and any other who can share in a system of law or be a party to an agreement.
• Therefore, there can also be friendship with a slave in so far as he is a human being. So, while in tyrannies friendship and justice hardly exist, in democracies they exist more fully. This is because where the citizens are equal, they have much in common.

12. Friendships Within Families and Other Close Groups

Every form of friendship, then, involves association or community, as has been said. However, one might mark off from the rest both the friendship of kindred (family members) and that of comrades (close companions).

• The friendships of fellow-citizens, fellow-tribesmen, fellow-voyagers, and the like are more like mere friendships of association. They seem to rest on a sort of compact or agreement.
• With these, we might also class the friendship of host and guest.

Friendship Among Family Members (Kinsmen) The friendship of kinsmen itself, while it seems to be of many kinds, appears to depend in every case on parental friendship.

• Parents love their children as being, in a sense, a part of themselves.
• Children love their parents as being something that originated from them.

Now, there are some differences in this love:

1. Parents know their offspring better than their children know that they are their children (especially in the earliest stages, or regarding certainty of parentage).
2. The originator (the parent) feels their offspring to be their own more strongly than the offspring feel their begetter (parent) is “theirs” in the same way.
   • This is because the product belongs to the producer (e.g., a tooth or hair or anything else belongs to the person whose it is).
   • But the producer does not belong to the product in the same way, or belongs in a lesser degree.
3. The length of time produces the same result. Parents love their children as soon as these are born. But children love their parents only after time has passed and they have acquired understanding or the power of discrimination by their senses. From these considerations, it is also plain why mothers often love their children more intensely or devotedly than fathers do (due to the closer initial physical bond and perhaps greater certainty and early investment).

So:

• Parents love their children as they love themselves (for their children, by virtue of their separate existence, are a sort of “other selves”).
• Children love their parents as being born of them.
• Brothers love each other as being born of the same parents. Their shared identity with their parents makes them, in a way, identical with each other (which is the reason why people talk of “the same blood,” “the same stock,” and so on). They are, therefore, in a sense the same thing, though existing in separate individuals.

Two things that contribute greatly to friendship, especially between brothers, are:

1. A common upbringing.
2. Similarity of age. For, as the saying goes, “two of an age take to each other,” and people brought up together tend to become comrades. Whence, the friendship of brothers is very similar to that of comrades. And cousins and other kinsmen are bound up together by their derivation from brothers (that is, by being descended from the same set of parents further up the family line, like grandparents). They come to be closer together or farther apart in their bonds by virtue of the nearness or distance of the original common ancestor.

The Nature of Specific Family Friendships

• The friendship of children to parents (and, by analogy, of humans to gods) is a relation to them as to something good and superior.
  • For parents (and gods) have conferred the greatest benefits, since they are the causes of their children’s (or humans’) being, of their nourishment, and of their education from birth.
  • This kind of friendship also possesses pleasantness and utility, often more so than the friendship of strangers, inasmuch as their life is lived more in common.
• The friendship of brothers has the characteristics found in that of comrades (especially when these brothers are good people), and in general, it’s like the friendship between people who are like each other.
  • This is because they belong more to each other and start with a love for each other from their very birth.
  • And it’s because those born of the same parents, brought up together, and similarly educated are more alike in character.
  • The test of time has been applied most fully and convincingly in their case, solidifying the bond.
• Between other kinsmen, friendly relations are found in due proportion to their degree of relatedness.

Friendship Between Husband and Wife

• Between husband and wife, friendship seems to exist by nature. For humans are naturally inclined to form couples—even more so, perhaps, than to form cities. This is because the household is earlier and more necessary than the city, and reproduction is a drive more common to humans and animals.
• With the other animals, the union between male and female often extends only to the point of reproduction.
• But human beings live together not only for the sake of reproduction but also for the various purposes of life. For from the start, the functions are divided, and those of man and woman are different. So they help each other by throwing their particular gifts into the common stock of the household.
• It is for these reasons that both utility and pleasure seem to be found in this kind of friendship between husband and wife.
• But this friendship may also be based on virtue, if the parties are good people. For each has their own specific virtue, and they will delight in this fact in each other.
• And children seem to be a bond of union between husband and wife (which is one reason why childless people sometimes part more easily). For children are a good common to both parents, and what is common holds them together.

How a husband and wife, and in general how friend and friend, ought mutually to behave seems to be the same question as how it is just for them to behave. For a person does not seem to have the same duties to a friend, a stranger, a comrade, and a schoolfellow; the requirements of justice and friendship vary with the relationship.

13. Complaints in Friendship: Especially in Utility-Based Ones

There are three kinds of friendship, as we said at the outset of our inquiry. In respect of each kind, some friends are on a basis of equality, and others by virtue of a superiority (one friend being in some way superior to the other).

• For not only can equally good people become friends, but a better person can make friends with a worse person.
• Similarly, in friendships of pleasure or utility, the friends may be equal or unequal in the benefits they confer or receive.

This being so:

• Equals must achieve the required balance on a basis of equality in love and in all other respects.
• Unequals must render what is in proportion to their superiority or inferiority to maintain a balance.

Complaints and reproaches arise either only or chiefly in the friendship of utility. This is only to be expected.

• For those who are friends on the ground of virtue are anxious to do well by each other (since that is a mark of virtue and of friendship). Between people who are competing with each other in this noble way, there cannot be complaints or quarrels. No one is offended by a person who loves them and does well by them—if they are a person of nice feeling, they will “take revenge” by doing well by the other in return. And the person who excels the other in the services rendered will not complain of their friend, since they get what they aim at (the good of their friend, or the good of acting virtuously). For each person in such a friendship desires what is good.
• Nor do complaints arise much even in friendships of pleasure. For both parties get at the same time what they desire, if they enjoy spending their time together. And even a person who complained of another for not affording him pleasure would seem ridiculous, since it is in his power not to spend his days with that person.

But the friendship of utility is full of complaints.

• Because they use each other for their own interests, they always want to get the better of the bargain.
• They often think they have gotten less than they should.
• They blame their partners because they do not get all they “want and deserve.”
• And those who do well by others (the givers of utility) often cannot help them or provide benefits as much as those whom they benefit want or expect.

Two Kinds of Utility Friendship: Moral and Legal Now, it seems that, just as justice is of two kinds (one unwritten or moral, and the other legal or according to contract), one kind of friendship of utility is moral (based on character and trust) and the other is legal (based on explicit terms). And so, complaints arise most of all when people do not dissolve the relationship in the spirit of the same type of friendship in which they originally contracted it.

• The legal type of utility friendship is that which is on fixed terms.
  • Its purely commercial variety is on the basis of immediate payment.
  • The more liberal variety allows time for repayment but stipulates for a definite quid pro quo (something for something).
  • In this liberal variety, the debt is clear and not ambiguous, but in the postponement of payment, it contains an element of friendliness or trust.
  • And so some states do not allow lawsuits arising out of such informal credit agreements, but think that people who have bargained on a basis of credit ought to accept the consequences if the other party defaults.
• The moral type of utility friendship is not on fixed terms.
  • One person makes a gift, or does whatever service they do, as to a friend.
  • But they often expect to receive as much or more in return, as if they had not given but actually lent something.
  • And if a person is worse off when the relationship is dissolved than they were when it was contracted (e.g., they gave more than they received), they will complain.
  • This happens because all or most people, while they wish for what is noble (like giving freely to a friend), actually choose what is advantageous (like getting a fair return). Now, it is noble to do well by another without a view to repayment, but it is the receiving of benefits that is advantageous.

The Obligation to Return Benefits Therefore, if we can, we should return the equivalent of what we have received in such moral-utility friendships.

• For we must not make a person our friend against their will by accepting a benefit we can’t repay, making them feel an unwanted obligation.
• We must recognize that if we were mistaken at the first and took a benefit from a person we should not have taken it from—since it was not from a true friend who expected nothing, nor from one who did the service just for the sake of acting nobly—then we must settle up just as if we had been benefited on fixed terms.
• Indeed, one would generally agree to repay if one could. (If one could not, even the giver would likely not have expected one to do so). Therefore, if it is possible, we must repay.
• But at the outset (when a benefit is offered), we must consider the person by whom we are being benefited and on what terms they are acting, in order that we may accept the benefit on those terms, or else decline it.

How to Measure a Service Given in Friendship It is a debatable point whether we ought to measure a service by its utility to the receiver and make the return with a view to that, or by the benevolence (goodwill and effort) of the giver.

• For those who have received benefits often say they have received from their benefactors what meant little to the givers and what they might have gotten from others—thus minimizing the service.
• The givers, on the contrary, often say it was the biggest thing they had to give, and what could not have been gotten from others, and that it was given in times of danger or similar great need—thus maximizing the service.

Now:

• If the friendship is one that aims at utility, surely the advantage to the receiver is the measure. For it is the receiver who asks for the service, and the other person helps them on the assumption that they will receive an equivalent benefit in return. So the assistance has been precisely as great as the advantage to the receiver, and therefore they must return as much as they have received, or even more (for that would be nobler).
• In friendships based on virtue, on the other hand, complaints do not arise. But the purpose or intention (prohairesis) of the doer is a sort of measure. For in purpose lies the essential element of virtue and character.

14. Disagreements in Friendships Based on Superiority

Differences also arise in friendships based on superiority (where the friends are unequal).

• Each party often expects to get more out of the friendship because of their status or contribution. But when this happens (when both make conflicting demands for “more”), the friendship is often dissolved.
• Not only does the better man (e.g., more virtuous) think he ought to get more (e.g., more honor or respect), since more should be assigned to a good man.
• But the more useful man (e.g., one providing more material benefits) similarly expects to get more (e.g., more gratitude or return service). They say a useless man should not get as much as they should, since the relationship becomes like an act of public service (charity) and not a friendship if the proceeds of the friendship do not match the worth of the benefits conferred.
• For they think that, just as in a commercial partnership those who put more capital in get more profit out, so it should be in friendship.

But the person who is in a state of need and inferiority makes the opposite claim.

• They think it is the part of a good friend to help those who are in need.
• “What,” they say, “is the use of being the friend of a good man or a powerful man, if one is to get nothing out of it?”

Resolving Claims in Unequal Friendships At all events, it seems that each party is justified in their claim in some way, and that each should get more out of the friendship than the other—not more of the same thing, however.

• The superior person should get more honor.
• The inferior person should get more gain (material help or advantage). For honor is the prize of virtue and of beneficence, while gain is the assistance required by inferiority or need.

It seems to be so in constitutional arrangements (how states are organized) also:

• The person who contributes nothing good to the common stock is not honored.
• For what belongs to the public is given to the person who benefits the public, and honor does belong to the public (to bestow as it sees fit).
• It is not possible to get wealth from the common stock and at the same time receive great honor for the same contribution. For no one puts up with receiving the smaller share in all things.
• Therefore, to the person who loses in wealth (e.g., by spending their own money for the public good), they assign honor.
• And to the person who is willing to be paid for their services (and thus doesn’t seek honor primarily), they assign wealth.
• Since the proportion to merit equalizes the parties and preserves the friendship (or the stability of the political association), as we have said.

This then is also the way in which we should associate with unequals in friendship:

• The person who is benefited in respect of wealth or virtue must give honor in return, repaying what they can in that form.
• For friendship asks a person to do what they can, not necessarily what is perfectly proportional to the merits of the case in an absolute sense.
• Since perfect proportional repayment cannot always be done, for example, in honors paid to the gods or to parents. For no one could ever return to them the exact equivalent of what they receive.
• But the person who serves them to the utmost of their power is thought to be a good person.

This is why it would generally not seem open to a person to disown his father (though a father may, in extreme cases, disown his son).

• Being in debt (for life and upbringing), the son should always aim to repay.
• But there is nothing a son can do by which he will have done the absolute equivalent of what he has received from his parents, so that he is, in a sense, always in their debt.
• But creditors can choose to remit a debt (forgive it), and a father can therefore do so too.
• At the same time, it is thought that presumably no father would repudiate a son who was not far gone in wickedness. For apart from the natural friendship of father and son, it is human nature not to reject a son’s assistance or presence.
• But the son, if he is wicked, will naturally avoid aiding his father, or will not be zealous about it. For most people wish to get benefits, but they avoid the effort of doing them for others, seeing it as unprofitable.

So much for these questions about friendship.

BOOK IX

1. Fairness and Disputes in Friendships Between Unequals

In all friendships between people who are dissimilar (for example, unequal in status or offering different things to the relationship), it is, as we have said before, proportion that equalizes the parties and preserves the friendship.

• For example, in the political or economic form of friendship (like an exchange of goods or services), a shoemaker gets a return for his shoes that is in proportion to his worth or the value of his work. The weaver and all other craftsmen do the same.
• Now, in these economic exchanges, a common measure has been provided in the form of money. Therefore, everything is referred to money and measured by it.

Disputes in Friendships of Lovers But in the friendship of lovers, which is often between dissimilar people (e.g., one values pleasure, the other utility, or their contributions are different), sometimes the lover complains that his excessive love is not met by love in return (though perhaps there is nothing particularly lovable about him from the other’s perspective).

• And often the beloved complains that the lover, who formerly promised everything, now performs or provides nothing.
• Such incidents happen when the lover loves the beloved for the sake of pleasure, while the beloved loves the lover for the sake of utility (benefit), and they do not both continue to possess the qualities that the other expected.
• If these (pleasure and utility) are the objects of the friendship, the friendship is dissolved when they do not get the things that formed the motives of their love.
  • For each person did not love the other person themselves, but rather the qualities (pleasure or utility) they had.
  • And these qualities were not enduring or permanent; that is why such friendships are also transient (short-lived).
• But the love of characters (friendship based on virtue), as has been said before, endures because it is self-dependent (it relies on the enduring good character of the individuals).

When Expectations Aren’t Met Differences also arise in friendships when what people get is something different from what they desire or expect.

• When we do not get what we aim at, it feels like getting nothing at all.
• Consider the story of a person who made promises to a lyre-player (a musician). He promised the musician more reward, the better he sang. But in the morning, when the lyre-player demanded the fulfillment of these promises, the person said that he had already given “pleasure for pleasure” (meaning, the pleasure the musician got from the promises, or the promiser got from listening, was the “payment” for the pleasure of the singing).
  • Now, if this (an exchange of pleasure for pleasure) had been what each person wanted, all would have been well.
  • But if the one person wanted enjoyment (the musician expecting a tangible reward) and the other person wanted gain (the promiser perhaps just wanted the entertainment cheaply, or simply made an empty promise), and the one has what he wants while the other has not, the terms of their association will not have been properly fulfilled.
  • For what each person in fact wants is what they pay attention to, and it is for the sake of that (their desired outcome) that they will give whatever they have to give.

Who Decides the Value of a Service? In friendships involving an exchange of services or benefits, who is to fix the worth of the service? Is it the person who makes the sacrifice or provides the benefit, or the person who has received the advantage?

• Often, the person who provided the service seems to leave it to the receiver to determine its value.
• This is what they say Protagoras (a famous Sophist teacher) used to do. Whenever he taught anything, he asked the learner to assess the value of the knowledge, and he accepted the amount the learner fixed.
• But in such matters, some people approve of the saying, “Let a man have his fixed reward” (meaning, terms should be clear beforehand).

Complaints Against Those Who Don’t Deliver Those who get the money first and then do none of the things they said they would, often because their promises were too extravagant, naturally find themselves the objects of complaint. They do not fulfill what they agreed to.

• The Sophists (teachers of rhetoric and philosophy for a fee) are perhaps sometimes compelled to make such extravagant promises because people might not be willing to give much money for the things they actually know or can teach.
• These people, then, if they do not do what they have been paid for, are naturally made the objects of complaint.

Returns in Friendships Based on Virtue or Learning But where there is no formal contract of service, as in friendships based on virtue, those who give up something for the sake of the other party cannot (as we have said) be complained against in the same way. This is because that is the nature of the friendship of virtue—giving for the sake of the friend.

• The return made to them must be based on their purpose or intention, for purpose is the characteristic thing in a friend and in virtue.
• And so too, it seems, should one make a return to those with whom one has studied philosophy. Their worth cannot be measured against money, and they can get no material honor which will truly balance their services. But still, it is perhaps enough, as it is with the gods and with one’s parents, to give them what one can (like honor, respect, and support).

Gifts Made Expecting a Return If the gift or service was not of this noble sort (given purely for the friend’s sake), but was made with a view to a return (as in friendships based on “moral utility,” where there’s an expectation of reciprocity without a formal contract):

• It is no doubt preferable that the return made should be one that seems fair to both parties.
• But if this cannot be achieved, it would seem not only necessary that the person who gets the first service should fix the reward, but also that this is just.
• For if the original giver gets in return the equivalent of the advantage the beneficiary has received, or the price the beneficiary would have paid for the pleasure if they had bought it, the original giver will have received what is fair from the other.

We see this happening too with things put up for sale. And in some places, there are laws providing that no legal actions shall arise out of voluntary contracts made on credit. The assumption is that one should settle accounts with a person to whom one has given credit in the same spirit in which one originally bargained with them.

• The law in such places sometimes holds that it is more just that the person to whom credit was given should fix the terms of repayment than that the person who gave the credit should do so.
• This is because most things are not assessed at the same value by those who currently have them and by those who want to get them. Each person tends to value highly what is their own and what they are offering.
• Yet, in these legal contexts, the return is sometimes made on the terms fixed by the receiver of the credit.
• But no doubt the receiver, in assessing the value, should consider it not at what it seems worth to them after they have it (when they might devalue it), but at what they assessed it before they had it (when they desired it and saw its value).

2. Deciding Between Conflicting Obligations

A further problem is set by such questions as:

• Should one, in all things, give preference to one’s father and obey him?
• Or, when one is ill, should one trust a doctor (even if one’s father suggests a different course of action)?
• And when one has to elect a general for an army, should one elect a person with proven military skill (even if a friend or father is also a candidate but less skilled)?
• Similarly, should one render a service by preference to a friend or to a good person (if they are different people)?
• And should one show gratitude to a benefactor (someone who has done you a big favor) or oblige a friend (do a favor for a friend), if one cannot do both?

All such questions are hard, are they not, to decide with precision? For they admit of many variations of all sorts, in respect both of the magnitude (importance) of the service and of its nobility or necessity.

General Guidelines for Conflicting Duties

• But that we should not give the preference in all things to the same person is plain enough.
• And we must, for the most part, return benefits received rather than simply doing new favors for friends (who have not yet benefited us in this particular instance). This is similar to how we must pay back a loan to a creditor rather than using that money to make a new loan to a friend, if our resources are limited.
• But perhaps even this is not always true. For example:
  • Should a man who has been ransomed (rescued by payment) out of the hands of brigands ransom his own ransomer in return, whoever that ransomer may be? (Or should he pay him if the ransomer was not captured but now demands payment for the past service?)
  • Or, if his father is now captured, should he ransom his father instead?
  • It would seem that he should ransom his father in preference even to himself (if it came to that).
• As we have said, then, generally the debt should be paid. But if the alternative action (the gift or new service) is exceedingly noble or exceedingly necessary, one should defer to these considerations. These may override a simple debt.
• For sometimes it is not even fair to return the exact equivalent of what one has received. This might be the case when one person has done a service to someone whom they know to be good, while the other (the original recipient) is now in a position to make a return to someone whom they believe to be bad. (Giving a benefit to a bad person might enable them to do more harm).
• For that matter, one should sometimes not lend in return to someone who has previously lent to oneself. For instance, if the original lender lent money to a good man, expecting to recover his loan. But now, the original lender (who is perhaps believed to be a bad person) has no hope of recovering a new loan from the current person he is asking. If the facts really are so, the demand for a reciprocal loan is not fair. And if the facts are not so, but people think they are, they would be held to be doing nothing strange in refusing the loan.
• As we have often pointed out, then, discussions about feelings and actions have just as much definiteness as their subject-matter—which is often complex and variable.

Giving What is Appropriate to Each Relationship It is plain enough that we should not make the same return or give the same preference to everyone. Nor should we give a father preference in everything, just as one does not sacrifice everything to Zeus (the king of the gods).

• But since we ought to render different things to parents, brothers, comrades, and benefactors, we ought to render to each class of person what is appropriate and becoming to that relationship.
• And this is what people seem, in fact, to do:
  • To marriages, they invite their kinsfolk. For kinsfolk have a part in the family and therefore in the doings that affect the family.
  • And at funerals also, they think that kinsfolk, before all others, should meet, for the same reason.
  • And it would be thought that in the matter of food and sustenance, we should help our parents before all others. This is because we owe our own nourishment to them, and it is more honorable to help in this respect the authors of our being, even before ourselves.
  • And honor, too, one should give to one’s parents, as one does to the gods. But not just any and every honor. For that matter, one should not give the same honor to one’s father and one’s mother. Nor again should one give them the honor due to a philosopher or to a general, but rather the honor specifically due to a father, or again to a mother.
  • To all older persons, too, one should give honor appropriate to their age, for example, by rising to receive them, finding seats for them, and so on.
  • While to comrades and brothers, one should allow freedom of speech and the common use of all things.
  • To kinsmen, too, and fellow-tribesmen, and fellow-citizens, and to every other class of person, one should always try to assign what is appropriate. One should also compare the claims of each class with respect to nearness of relation, and to virtue or usefulness.
• The comparison is easier when the persons belong to the same class (e.g., choosing between two friends). It is more laborious when they are different (e.g., choosing between a father and a benefactor).
• Yet we must not on that account shrink from the task, but must decide the question as best we can.

3. When and How to End Friendships

Another question that arises is whether friendships should or should not be broken off when the other party does not remain the same person they were.

Ending Friendships of Utility or Pleasure

• Perhaps we may say that there is nothing strange in breaking off a friendship based on utility or pleasure when our friends no longer have these attributes (they are no longer useful or pleasant to us).
• For it was these attributes that we were friends with, in a sense. And when these have failed, it is reasonable to love no longer (in that specific way).

Complaints When Deceived About the Friendship’s Basis

• But one might complain of another if, when that person loved us for our usefulness or pleasantness, they pretended to love us for our character.
• For, as we said at the outset, most differences and problems arise between friends when they are not friends in the spirit in which they think they are.
• So, when a person has deceived themselves and has thought they were being loved for their character, when the other person was doing nothing of the kind, they must blame themselves.
• But when a person has been deceived by the pretenses of the other person, it is just that they should complain against their deceiver. They will complain with more justice than one does against people who counterfeit currency (make fake money), inasmuch as the wrongdoing (deception in friendship) is concerned with something more valuable (trust and character).

When a Friend (Believed Good) Turns Bad

• But if one accepts another person as good, and then that person turns out badly and is clearly seen to do so, must one still love them?
• Surely it is impossible, since not everything can be loved, but only what is good.
• What is evil neither can nor should be loved. For it is not one’s duty to be a lover of evil, nor to become like what is bad. And we have said that like is dear to like (good people are friends with good people).
• Must the friendship, then, be broken off immediately?
• Or is this not so in all cases, but only when one’s friends are incurable in their wickedness?
• If they are capable of being reformed, one should rather come to the assistance of their character or their property (helping them get back on track). This is better and more characteristic of true friendship.
• But a person who breaks off such a friendship (with someone who has become incurably bad) would seem to be doing nothing strange. For it was not to a person of this sort that they were originally a friend. When their friend has changed for the worse, therefore, and they are unable to save or reform them, they give them up.

When One Friend Greatly Improves in Virtue

• But what if one friend remained the same while the other became much better and far outstripped them in virtue? Should the latter (the improved friend) still treat the former as a friend in the same way as before?
• Surely they cannot.
• When the interval or gap in virtue becomes great, this becomes most plain. For example, in the case of childish friendships:
  • If one friend remained a child in intellect while the other became a fully developed and mature person, how could they be friends?
  • They would neither approve of the same things nor delight in and be pained by the same things.
  • For not even with regard to each other will their tastes and values agree. And without this agreement (as we saw), they cannot be true friends, for they cannot truly live together (share a common life of mind and activity). We have discussed these matters already.

How to Behave Towards Former Friends

• Should the improved person, then, behave no differently towards their former friend than they would if they had never been their friend at all?
• Surely, they should keep a remembrance of their former intimacy.
• And just as we think we ought to oblige (do favors for) friends rather than strangers, so to those who have been our friends, we ought to make some allowance or show some consideration for our former friendship, especially when the breach (the ending of the close friendship) has not been due to an excess of wickedness on the part of the friend left behind.

4. Self-Love as the Model for Friendship

Friendly relations with one’s neighbors, and the marks or characteristics by which friendships are defined, seem to have proceeded from a person’s relations to themselves. We define a friend in various ways, all of which can be seen in how a good person relates to themselves:

1. A friend is one who wishes and does what is good (or what seems good) for the sake of their friend.
2. A friend is one who wishes their friend to exist and live, for that friend’s own sake. (This is how mothers feel towards their children, and how friends feel who have had a conflict but have reconciled and value the relationship).
3. Others define a friend as one who lives with another and shares their life.
4. And as one who has the same tastes as another.
5. Or as one who grieves and rejoices with their friend. (This too is found in mothers most of all). It is by some one of these characteristics that friendship, too, is defined.

Now, each of these is true of the good person’s relation to themselves (and of all other people in so far as they think themselves good; for virtue and the good person seem, as has been said, to be the measure or standard for every class of things).

• For the good person’s opinions are harmonious with each other. They desire the same things with all their soul.
• And therefore, they wish for themselves what is good and what seems so, and they do it (for it is characteristic of the good person to actively work out or achieve the good). And they do so for their own sake (for they do it for the sake of the intellectual element in them, which is thought to be the person themselves, their true self).
• And they wish themselves to live and to be preserved, and especially that element by virtue of which they think (their rational soul).
• For existence is good to the virtuous person, and each person wishes for themselves what is good.
• No one would choose to possess the whole world if they first had to become some one else entirely, losing their own identity. (For that matter, even God already possesses the good). A person wishes for good things only on condition of being whatever they are.
• And the element that thinks (reason) would seem to be the individual person, or to be so more than any other element in them.
• And such a person wishes to live with themselves; for they do so with pleasure.
  • The memories of their past acts are delightful.
  • Their hopes for the future are good, and therefore pleasant.
  • Their mind is also well stored with subjects of contemplation.
• And they grieve and rejoice, more than any other, with themselves. For the same thing is always painful to them, and the same thing is always pleasant; it’s not one thing at one time and another at another. They have, so to speak, nothing to repent of (their actions are consistent with their good character).

Therefore, since each of these characteristics (wishing and doing good, wishing for existence, living together with oneself agreeably, having same tastes, grieving/rejoicing with oneself) belongs to the good person in relation to themselves, and since a good person is related to their friend as to themselves (for a true friend is, in a sense, another self), friendship too is thought to be one of these attributes. And those who have these attributes are thought to be friends.

• Whether there is or is not friendship, strictly speaking, between a person and themselves is a question we may dismiss for the present. There would seem to be something like friendship insofar as a person is “two or more” (i.e., has different parts of their soul that can be in harmony or conflict), to judge from the aforementioned attributes of friendship, and from the fact that the extreme of friendship is likened to one’s love for oneself.

Can Bad People Be Friends With Themselves? But the attributes of self-friendship named above seem to belong, in some flawed way, even to the majority of people, “poor creatures” (morally speaking) though they may be.

• Are we to say then that in so far as they are satisfied with themselves and think they are good (even if they are not), they share in these attributes?
• Certainly, no one who is thoroughly bad and impious (wicked and disrespectful of what is sacred) has these attributes of self-friendship, or even seems to do so.
• They hardly belong even to inferior people (those who are morally weak or flawed but not utterly bad). For such people are often at variance with themselves. They have appetites for some things and rational desires for other, conflicting things.
  • This is true, for instance, of incontinent people. They choose, instead of the things they themselves think are good, things that are pleasant but hurtful.
  • While others again, through cowardice and laziness, shrink from doing what they think is best for themselves.
• And those who have done many terrible deeds and are hated for their wickedness often even shrink from life and destroy themselves.
• And wicked people seek for other people with whom to spend their days, and they shun themselves.
  • For they remember many a grievous deed they have done, and they anticipate doing others like them, when they are by themselves. But when they are with others, they can forget these things.
  • And having nothing lovable in them, they have no feeling of love or friendship towards themselves.
• Therefore, also, such people do not truly rejoice or grieve with themselves. For their soul is rent by faction (internal conflict). One element in it, by reason of its wickedness, grieves when it abstains from certain bad acts (because it misses the pleasure), while the other part (perhaps a lingering trace of reason) is pleased by the abstention. And one part pulls them this way and the other that, as if they were pulling them in pieces.
• If a person cannot at the same time be actually pained and pleased, at all events after a short time they are pained because they were pleased by a bad act, and they could have wished that these things had not been pleasant to them. For bad people are laden with repentance and regret.

Therefore, the bad person does not seem to be amicably disposed even to themselves, because there is nothing in them to love.

• So, if to be in such a state is the height of wretchedness, we should strain every nerve to avoid wickedness and should endeavor to be good.
• For so, and only so, can one be either friendly to oneself or a true friend to another.

5. Goodwill: A Starting Point for Friendship

Goodwill (eunoia) is a friendly sort of relation, but it is not identical with friendship.

• For one may have goodwill both towards people whom one does not know, and without their knowing it, but one cannot have friendship under those conditions. This has indeed been said already.
• But goodwill is not even friendly feeling (philesis, the affection found in friendship).
  • For goodwill does not involve intensity or desire, whereas these often accompany friendly feeling.
  • And friendly feeling implies intimacy and familiarity, while goodwill may arise quite suddenly, as it sometimes does towards competitors in a contest. We might come to feel goodwill for them and to share in their wishes for success, but we would not necessarily do anything with them or seek their close companionship. For, as we said, we can feel goodwill suddenly and love them only superficially in such cases.

Goodwill seems, then, to be a beginning of friendship, much like the pleasure of the eye (finding someone visually attractive) is often the beginning of romantic love.

But when we speak “without qualification”—meaning, in its essential sense—we are talking about what is true or right per se (in itself).

• Therefore, while in an incidental way, the continent person might abide by any opinion and the incontinent person abandon any opinion, without qualification (essentially), the continent person abides by the true opinion and the right rule.

Obstinate People vs. Continent People There are some people who are very apt to stick to their own opinions. These people are often called strong-headed or obstinate.

• They are hard to persuade in the first instance and are not easily convinced to change their minds.
• These individuals have something in them that looks like the continent person (because of their firmness). This is similar to how the wasteful person might, in some ways, resemble the generous person, or the rash person might resemble the confident person. But they are different in many important respects.
• The continent person will not yield to passion and appetite. However, on occasion, the continent person will be easy to persuade by good argument if it shows their current course or belief is not right.
• The obstinate people, on the other hand, refuse to yield to argument. They do form appetites and desires, and many of them are actually led by their pleasures—often the pleasure of feeling victorious in an argument or avoiding the pain of admitting they were wrong.
• The types of people who are strong-headed in this way include:
  • The opinionated (those who are overly attached to their own views, whether right or wrong).
  • The ignorant (who cling to what they think they know, even if it’s incorrect, because they are not open to learning).
  • The boorish (rude or insensitive individuals who disregard the reasoning of others).
• The opinionated, in particular, are often influenced by pleasure and pain. They delight in the “victory” they feel if they are not persuaded to change their minds. They are pained if their decisions or firmly held opinions are shown to be void or wrong (just like when official decrees are sometimes overturned).
• So, these strong-headed or obstinate people are actually more like the incontinent person (being driven by the pleasures and pains associated with holding onto their opinions) than the truly continent person (who is guided by the right rule and truth, and is open to reason).

Not Standing By a Resolution for a Noble Reason is Not Incontinence There are also some people who fail to abide by their resolutions, but this is not as a result of incontinence.

• An example is Neoptolemus in Sophocles’ play Philoctetes. Odysseus had persuaded Neoptolemus to tell a lie to deceive Philoctetes. Neoptolemus initially agreed but later did not stand fast by this plan.
• It was for the sake of a pleasure that he did not stand fast—but it was a noble pleasure. For telling the truth was noble and right to him, even though he had been persuaded by Odysseus to tell the lie. He chose the nobler course, which brought him a higher kind of satisfaction.
• This shows that not everyone who does something for the sake of pleasure is either self-indulgent, bad, or incontinent. A person is only one of these if they do something for the sake of a disgraceful or shameful pleasure.

The Person Who Takes Too Little Pleasure There is also a sort of person who takes less delight than they should in bodily things, and who, because of this extreme, also does not consistently abide by the rational rule (perhaps being overly ascetic or denying harmless pleasures in an unbalanced way).

• The continent person is the one who is intermediate between this person (who delights too little) and the incontinent person (who delights too much).
• The incontinent person fails to abide by the rule because they delight too much in bodily pleasures.
• This other type of person fails to abide by a balanced approach because they delight in them too little.
• The continent person, being in the middle, abides by the rule and does not change or lose balance on either account (neither giving in to too much pleasure nor shunning appropriate pleasure excessively).

Now, if continence (the balanced state of self-control) is good, both the contrary states (incontinence, and this state of taking too little pleasure and thus not following a balanced rule) must be bad, as they indeed appear to be.

• But because the other extreme (taking too little pleasure) is seen in few people and occurs seldom, continence is usually thought to be contrary only to incontinence.
• This is similar to how temperance (having well-ordered desires) is usually thought to be contrary only to self-indulgence (since few people err on the side of too little bodily enjoyment in a blameworthy way that would constitute a vice).

“Continence” in the Temperate Person is by Analogy Since many names are applied by analogy (comparing things that are similar but not identical), it is by analogy that we have come to speak of the “continence” of the temperate man.

• For both the continent man and the temperate man are such that they do nothing contrary to the right rule for the sake of bodily pleasures.
• But they differ significantly:
  • The continent man has bad or strong appetites (desires that conflict with reason) but actively controls them.
  • The temperate man does not have bad or excessively strong appetites; their appetites are naturally moderate and aligned with reason.
  • The temperate man is such as not to feel pleasure that is contrary to the rule (their pleasures are in harmony with what is good and reasonable).
  • The continent man is such as to feel pleasure from potentially bad appetites, but is not led by it due to his self-control.

And the incontinent man and the self-indulgent man are also alike in some ways (both pursue bodily pleasures), but they are different:

• The self-indulgent man not only pursues these pleasures but also thinks that he ought to do so (he has made a choice that these pleasures are the good to pursue).
• The incontinent man does not think this (he generally knows his pursuit is wrong or excessive, but gives in to his desires).

10. Practical Wisdom and Incontinence Don’t Mix

The same person cannot have practical wisdom AND be incontinent.

• It has been shown before (in Book VI) that a person is, at the same time, practically wise and good in respect of character. Incontinence is a flaw in character where passion overrides reason, and this is incompatible with the full goodness of character required for practical wisdom.
• Furthermore, a person has practical wisdom not by knowing only what is good, but by also being able to act in accordance with that knowledge. The incontinent person, by definition, is unable to consistently act according to what they know to be best.
• However, there is nothing to prevent a merely clever man (one who is skillful in figuring out how to achieve goals, but whose goals may not be good) from being incontinent.
  • This is why it is sometimes actually thought that some people have practical wisdom but are incontinent—it’s because cleverness and practical wisdom can look similar (as we discussed in Book VI). They are close in respect of their reasoning ability, but they differ critically in respect of their purpose or end (practical wisdom always aims at the true good, while cleverness can serve any end, good or bad).

The incontinent person is not like the person who knows and is actively contemplating a truth (where knowledge is fully engaged and dominant).

• Instead, the incontinent person, when overcome by passion, is more like someone who is asleep or drunk—their knowledge is present in some sense, but it is dormant or impaired and not guiding their actions.
• The incontinent person acts willingly (for they act, in a sense, with awareness of what they are doing and the immediate end they are pursuing, which is usually pleasure), but they are not wicked in the same way as the self-indulgent person (who deliberately chooses bad ends). The incontinent person’s chosen purpose or rational principle is generally good; so, they are perhaps “half-wicked,” or rather, they fail in a way that is less complete than vice.
• And they are not a criminal in the sense of acting with malice aforethought or a deliberate choice of evil.

Of the two main types of incontinent person:

• One (the “weak” type) does not abide by the conclusions of their deliberation.
• The other (the “excitable” or “impetuous” type) does not deliberate properly at all but is swept away by passion.

And thus, the incontinent man is like a city that passes all the right decrees and has good laws, but makes no use of them. As the comic poet Anaxandrides jestingly remarked: “The city willed it, that cares nought for laws.”

• But the wicked man (the self-indulgent or vicious person) is like a city that does use its laws, but unfortunately has wicked laws to use.

Now, incontinence and continence are concerned with that which is in excess of the state characteristic of most men.

• For the continent man abides by his resolutions more firmly than most people can.
• And the incontinent man abides by them less firmly than most people can.

How Curable Are Different Forms of Incontinence?

• Of the forms of incontinence, that of excitable (impetuous) people is generally more curable than that of those who deliberate but then do not abide by their decisions (the weak type).
• And those who are incontinent through habituation (long-standing bad habits) are more curable than those in whom incontinence is innate or part of their fundamental nature.
• For it is easier to change a habit than to change one’s nature. Even habit is hard to change, precisely because, through long practice, it becomes like nature. As the poet Evenus says: “I say that habit’s but a long practice, friend, And this becomes men’s nature in the end.”

We have now stated what continence, incontinence, endurance, and softness are, and how these states are related to each other.

11. Why We Must Study Pleasure and Pain

The study of pleasure and pain properly belongs to the province of the political philosopher or statesman.

• This is because the political philosopher is the architect of the end or ultimate goal for society (the common good). It is with a view to this end that we call one thing bad and another good without qualification (in an absolute sense).

Furthermore, it is one of our necessary tasks to consider pleasure and pain for these reasons:

• We previously established that moral virtue and vice are concerned with pains and pleasures.
• And most people say that happiness involves pleasure. This is why the “blessed” or truly happy person is called makarios in Greek, a name thought to be derived from a word meaning enjoyment (chairein).

Common Opinions About Pleasure Now, there are different views about pleasure:

1. Some people think that no pleasure is a good thing, either in itself or incidentally (as a side effect). They believe that “the good” and “pleasure” are not the same thing.
2. Others think that some pleasures are good, but that most are bad.
3. Again, there is a third view: that even if all pleasures are good, the best thing in the world cannot be pleasure itself.

(1) Arguments for the view that pleasure is not a good at all:

• (a) Every pleasure is a perceptible process towards a natural state. For example, eating is a process of replenishing a deficiency to reach a state of satisfaction. And no process is of the same kind as its end goal (e.g., the process of building is not of the same kind as the house which is its end).
• (b) A temperate person avoids pleasures (meaning, they avoid excessive or base pleasures).
• (c) A person of practical wisdom pursues what is free from pain, not primarily what is pleasant.
• (d) Pleasures are a hindrance to thought, and the more so the more one delights in them. For example, in intense sexual pleasure, no one could think of anything else while absorbed in this.
• (e) There is no art or craft specifically of pleasure itself (meaning, pleasure isn’t something skillfully produced like a product of art, though there are arts that produce pleasant things). But every good is thought to be the product of some art or skill.
• (f) Children and brutes (animals) pursue pleasures, which implies that pleasure is a lower, unreasoned aim.

(2) Reasons for the view that not all pleasures are good:

• (a) There are pleasures that are actually base and objects of reproach (shameful pleasures).
• (b) There are harmful pleasures, for some pleasant things are unhealthy.

(3) Reason for the view that the best thing in the world is not pleasure itself:

• Pleasure is not an end but a process towards an end.

12. Are These Arguments Against Pleasure Valid? Not Really.

These are pretty much the arguments that are made against pleasure being a good. However, that it does not follow from these grounds that pleasure is not a good, or even the chief good, is plain from the following considerations.

(A) Pleasure, Processes, and Natural States

• (a) “Good” can be meant in two senses: one thing is good simply or without qualification (good for any human being in a healthy state), and another thing is good for a particular person or in particular circumstances. Natural constitutions and states of being, and therefore also the corresponding movements and processes of replenishment, will be correspondingly divisible.
  • Of those pleasures (or processes leading to them) which are thought to be bad:
    • Some will be bad if taken without qualification, but not bad for a particular person in a specific state, and may even be worthy of their choice in certain situations (e.g., a bitter medicine).
    • Some will not be worthy of choice even for a particular person, except perhaps only at a particular time and for a short period, though not good without qualification.
    • While others are not even true pleasures, but only seem to be so. These include all those which involve pain and whose end is curative (e.g., the processes of medical treatment that go on in sick persons, which might bring relief that feels like pleasure but is really just the removal of pain accompanying a restorative process).
• (b) Furthermore, one kind of good is an activity, and another kind of good is a state. The processes that restore us to our natural state (e.g., eating when hungry to restore bodily balance) are only incidentally pleasant.
  • For that matter, the activity at work in the appetites for them (e.g., the act of eating when hungry) is the activity of so much of our natural state and constitution as has remained unimpaired or is striving for restoration from a deficient state.
  • For there are actually pleasures that involve no preceding pain or appetite (e.g., the pleasures of contemplation, learning, or appreciating beauty). In such cases, our nature is not defective or lacking anything at all.
  • That the other pleasures (the restorative ones) are incidental is indicated by the fact that people do not enjoy the same pleasant objects when their nature is in its settled, healthy state as they do when it is being replenished from a deficient state.
    • In the former case (a settled, healthy state), they enjoy the things that are pleasant without qualification (things that are truly and naturally pleasant for a healthy being).
    • In the latter case (a replenishing, deficient state), they may enjoy the contraries of these as well. For then they might find even sharp and bitter things pleasant if these things satisfy an intense need or counteract a painful state. None of these (sharp or bitter things under such conditions) is pleasant either by nature or without qualification.
    • The states these restorative processes produce, therefore, are not pleasures naturally or without qualification; for as pleasant things differ according to our state, so do the pleasures arising from them.
• (c) Again, it is not necessary that there should be something else better than pleasure, as some people argue that the end is always better than the process toward it.
  • For pleasures are not all processes, nor do they all involve a process to an end beyond themselves. Many pleasures are activities and are themselves ends (e.g., the activity of enjoying music).
  • Nor do pleasures arise only when we are becoming something (like becoming healthy or satisfied after hunger). They often arise when we are exercising some faculty or capacity (like the pleasure of thinking or seeing).
  • And not all pleasures have an end different from themselves. Only the pleasures of persons who are being led to the perfecting of their nature (like the pleasure of recovery from illness, which aims at the state of health) have such an external end.
  • This is why it is not right to say that pleasure is a “perceptible process.” It should rather be called an “activity of the natural state,” and instead of “perceptible process,” it should be called “unimpeded activity.” (Pleasure is the unimpeded, natural activity of a faculty or state).
  • It is thought by some people to be a process just because they think it is, in the strict sense, a good. And they mistakenly think that all activity is a process, which it is not. (Activity can be an end in itself).

(B) Are pleasures bad just because some pleasant things are unhealthy?

• This argument is like saying that healthy things are bad because some healthy things (like certain diets or exercises) are bad for money-making.
• Both are bad in that particular respect (some pleasures for health, some healthy things for finances), but they are not bad for that reason alone or in their essential nature.
• Indeed, even intense thinking itself is sometimes injurious to health, but that doesn’t make thinking itself a bad thing.

(C) Does pleasure hinder thought or other good activities?

• Neither practical wisdom nor any other good state of being is impeded by the pleasure that arises from that very activity itself.
• It is foreign or alien pleasures that impede or distract.
• For example, the pleasures arising from thinking and learning will actually make us think and learn all the more. It is unrelated pleasures (like wanting to check social media when you should be studying) that cause distraction.

(D) Is it a problem that there’s no specific “art of pleasure”?

• The fact that no pleasure (as an activity itself) is the product of any specific art arises naturally enough. There is no art of any other activity either (like an art of seeing or an art of breathing). There are arts only of the corresponding faculty or capacity that enables the activity (like medicine aims to restore the body’s capacity for health, which then functions naturally and pleasantly).
• Though, for that matter, the arts of the perfumer and the cook are often thought to be arts that aim at producing pleasure.

(E) Do the actions of temperate people, wise people, children, and animals prove that pleasure is inherently bad?

• The arguments based on the grounds that the temperate person avoids (certain) pleasures, that the person of practical wisdom pursues the painless life, and that children and brutes (animals) pursue pleasure, are all refuted by the same consideration.
• We have pointed out (in distinguishing types of pleasure) in what sense some pleasures are good without qualification (e.g., noble pleasures from virtuous activity) and in what sense some are not good (e.g., excessive or base bodily pleasures).
• Now, both brutes and children pursue pleasures of the latter kind—those which often imply strong appetite and preceding pain, i.e., the bodily pleasures (especially the excesses of them, in respect of which the self-indulgent person is self-indulgent).
• The person of practical wisdom pursues tranquil freedom from that kind of disruptive pleasure.
• This is why the temperate person avoids these excessive bodily pleasures; for even the temperate person has pleasures of their own (the noble and moderate pleasures associated with virtuous activity and a well-ordered life).

13. Pleasure as a Good, Perhaps Even the Chief Good

But further: (F) It is generally agreed that pain is bad and something to be avoided.

• For some pain is bad without qualification (absolutely bad).
• And other pain is bad because it is in some respect an impediment to us (it hinders our proper functioning or well-being).
• Now, the contrary of that which is to be avoided (insofar as it is something to be avoided and is bad) is good.
• Pleasure, then, is necessarily a good.
• For the counter-argument by Speusippus (a philosopher who argued against pleasure, suggesting it was merely a neutral state between pain and some other good) – that pleasure is contrary both to pain (an evil) and to good (just as the mathematical “greater” is contrary both to the “less” and to the “equal”) – is not successful. Speusippus would not actually say that pleasure is essentially just a species of evil itself.

(G) Even if certain specific pleasures are bad, that does not prevent the chief good from being some particular kind of pleasure.

• This is just as the chief good may be some form of knowledge, even though certain kinds of knowledge might be trivial or even harmful (e.g., knowledge of how to do evil).
• Perhaps it is even necessary, if each natural disposition or faculty has its own unimpeded activities, that whether the unimpeded activity of all our dispositions combined, or that of some one of them in particular, is happiness, this activity should be the thing most worthy of our choice. And this unimpeded activity is itself pleasure.
• Thus, the chief good would be some form of pleasure (the pleasure accompanying the highest and most complete virtuous activity), though most common pleasures (especially bodily ones pursued to excess) might perhaps be bad without qualification.

And for this reason, all people think that the happy life is a pleasant life. They weave pleasure into their ideal of happiness—and they do so reasonably.

• For no activity is perfect or complete when it is impeded, and happiness is a perfect and complete thing (it is the ultimate end, lacking nothing).
• This is why the happy person needs a certain amount of the goods of the body and external goods, i.e., those of fortune (good luck), precisely so that they may not be impeded in these ways from their virtuous and pleasant activities.
• Those who say that the victim on the torture rack, or the person who falls into great misfortunes, is happy if only they are good, are, whether they mean to or not, talking nonsense. (Virtue is necessary for happiness, but external conditions can impede the activity of happiness and its associated pleasure).
• Now, because we need good fortune (a certain level of external well-being) as well as other things for a happy life, some people think that good fortune is the same thing as happiness. But it is not, for even good fortune itself, when it is in excess, can be an impediment to true happiness (e.g., by fostering idleness, arrogance, or a focus on superficialities). Perhaps excessive good fortune should then no longer even be called “good fortune,” for its ideal limit is fixed by reference to what truly contributes to happiness.

And indeed, the fact that all things, both brutes (animals) and humans, pursue pleasure is an indication of its being, somehow, the chief good (or at least something deeply and fundamentally connected to what is good).

• As the old saying goes: “No voice is wholly lost that many peoples utter…” (meaning, such a universal pursuit must point to something fundamentally true or valuable in human and animal nature).

But since no one single nature or state either is, or is thought to be, the best for all beings, neither do all beings pursue the same specific pleasure. Yet, all beings pursue pleasure in some form.

• And perhaps they actually pursue not the pleasure they think they pursue, nor that which they would say they pursue, but fundamentally the same underlying pleasure—a deep, natural striving for unimpeded, fulfilling activity and well-being. For all things have by nature something divine in them (a natural orientation towards their own perfection and good).
• But the bodily pleasures have, in a way, “appropriated” the name “pleasure” for themselves in common language. This is both because we most often steer our course for them (they are immediate and powerful in their appeal) and because all human beings share in them. Thus, because bodily pleasures alone are familiar to everyone, many people mistakenly think there are no other kinds of pleasure (like the pleasures of the mind or of noble action).

It is also evident that if pleasure—that is, the unimpeded activity of our faculties—is not a good, then it will not be the case that the happy person lives a pleasant life.

• For to what end should they need pleasure, if it is not a good thing?
• If pleasure is not a good, then perhaps pain is neither an evil nor a good. Why then should a happy person avoid pain?
• Therefore, too, the life of the good and virtuous person will not necessarily be pleasanter than that of anyone else, if their virtuous activities are not themselves more pleasant than other, non-virtuous activities.

14. Why Bodily Pleasures Seem So Special

(G) With regard to bodily pleasures: Those who say that some pleasures are very much to be chosen (namely, the noble pleasures associated with virtue), but not the bodily pleasures (i.e., those with which the self-indulgent man is concerned), must consider why, then, the contrary pains (bodily pains) are considered bad.

• For the contrary of bad is good. If bodily pain is bad, then some form of bodily pleasure (its contrary) must be good.
• Are the necessary bodily pleasures (like eating when hungry) good only in the sense in which even that which is merely “not bad” is considered a kind of good? Or are they good up to a certain point?
• Is it the case that where you have states and processes of which there cannot be too much (like virtuous activity and its accompanying noble pleasure), there cannot be too much of the corresponding pleasure? And that where there can be too much of the one (e.g., eating too much food), there can be too much of the other (the pleasure of eating) also?
• Now, there can be too much of bodily goods. And the bad man (the self-indulgent person) is bad by virtue of pursuing the excess, not by virtue of pursuing the necessary pleasures. (For all people enjoy in some way or other both dainty foods and wines and sexual intercourse, but not all people do so as they ought—that is, in moderation and at the right times).
• The contrary is the case with pain for the self-indulgent person (or rather, for the “soft” person who cannot endure pain): they do not simply avoid the excess of pain; they try to avoid pain altogether. And this is peculiar to them. For the alternative to an excess of pleasure is not necessarily pain, except perhaps to the person who habitually pursues this excess (and then feels pain or craving at its absence).

Since we should state not only the truth, but also the cause of common errors regarding these matters—for this contributes towards producing conviction in the truth (since when a reasonable explanation is given of why a false view appears true, this tends to make people believe the true view more strongly)—therefore we must state why the bodily pleasures appear more worthy of choice to many people than other, perhaps higher, pleasures.

(a) Firstly, then, it is because they expel or drive out pain.

• Owing to the excesses of pain that people sometimes experience, they pursue excessive pleasure, and in general bodily pleasure, as being a kind of cure for the pain.
• Now, curative agencies (things that heal or relieve pain) often produce intense feeling—which is the reason why they are pursued—because they show up sharply against the contrary pain they are relieving.
  • (Indeed, pleasure is thought by some not to be good for these two reasons, as has been said previously:
    • (1) Some bodily pleasures are activities belonging to a bad or undeveloped nature—either congenital (inborn), as in the case of a brute animal, or due to bad habit, i.e., those of bad people.
    • (2) Other bodily pleasures are meant to cure a defective or deficient nature (like eating to cure hunger). And it is better to be in a healthy state than to be merely getting into it. But these pleasures of relief arise during the process of being made perfect or restored, and are therefore only incidentally good, not good in themselves.)

(b) Further, bodily pleasures are pursued because of their violence or intensity by those who cannot enjoy other, higher or more refined pleasures.

• (At all events, such people sometimes go out of their way to manufacture thirsts or other desires for themselves, just to experience the intense pleasure of satisfying them. When these artificially created desires and their satisfactions are harmless, the practice is perhaps not blameworthy; when they are hurtful, it is bad.)
• For they feel they have nothing else to enjoy. And, besides, a neutral state (one without intense pleasure or intense pain) is painful to many people because of their particular nature or constitution.
• For the animal nature (our physical being) is always in travail (a state of constant labor, activity, or slight unease), as the students of natural science also testify. They say that even processes like sight and hearing are, in a subtle way, constantly involving effort or are “painful” (in the sense of ongoing physiological processes that are not pure rest); but we have become used to this, as these natural scientists maintain. (This suggests a baseline of bodily unease or activity that makes the intense, distracting nature of some bodily pleasures particularly sought after by those who are especially sensitive to this unease or who lack other sources of joy).

Similarly, during youth, people are, owing to the growth that is constantly going on, in a physical and emotional situation somewhat like that of drunken men (full of energy, change, and perhaps some instability). And youth itself is generally a pleasant time.

On the other hand, people of an excitable nature (a restless or easily agitated temperament) always seem to need some form of relief or intense stimulation.

• This is because even their body is often, as it were, in a state of torment or unease owing to its special (excitable) composition.
• And they are always under the influence of violent or strong desire.
• But pain (whether from this internal unease or from unfulfilled desire) is driven out or counteracted by:
  • The contrary pleasure (a pleasure that directly opposes the source of pain).
  • Or by any chance pleasure, if it is strong enough to overcome the pain.
• And for these reasons—because they are constantly seeking strong pleasures to find relief from their internal state—such people can easily become self-indulgent and bad (by habitually choosing immediate, intense, often bodily, pleasures over more stable or noble goods).

But the pleasures that do not involve preceding pains (like the pleasure of learning, contemplating, or appreciating beauty, which don’t arise from a painful deficiency that needs to be filled) do not admit of excess in the same way that bodily pleasures do.

• These are among the things that are pleasant by nature and not just incidentally pleasant.
• By things pleasant incidentally, I mean those that act as cures or reliefs.
  • (For example, when people are cured of an illness, the process is often thought pleasant. This is because, as a result, some action of the part of their system that remains healthy is working to restore balance, and this restoration from a painful state feels good).
• By things naturally pleasant, I mean those that stimulate the healthy and unimpeded activity of our healthy nature (like the joy of understanding, the pleasure of virtuous action, or the simple pleasure of a healthy body functioning well without prior distress).

There is no one single thing that is always pleasant to human beings. This is because our nature is not simple.

• There is another element in us as well (besides our purely rational or spiritual side), inasmuch as we are perishable creatures (we are complex beings, made of body and soul, subject to change, decay, and internal conflicts between different parts of our nature).
• So, if one element of our nature (e.g., our body in one state, or a particular desire) does something, this action might be unnatural or feel contrary to the other nature or element within us (e.g., if overly full from eating, the act of eating is no longer pleasant to our bodily nature, or a base bodily pleasure might conflict with our rational nature’s desire for what is noble).
• When the two elements or different aspects of our nature are evenly balanced, what is done often seems neither painful nor pleasant (it’s a neutral state, a state of equilibrium).
• For if the nature of anything were perfectly simple (not composite, not subject to internal variation or conflict), the same action would always be most pleasant to it.

This is why God (conceived in Greek philosophy as a perfect, simple, and unchanging being) always enjoys a single and simple pleasure.

• For in God, there is not only an activity of movement (as we see in the created, changing world), but, more importantly for a perfect being, an activity of immobility or perfect, unchanging contemplation and self-sufficiency.
• And pleasure, in its highest and purest form, is found more in rest (stability, perfection, unimpeded activity of a perfect nature) than in movement (change, process, becoming, which often implies a prior lack or imperfection).

But “change in all things is sweet,” as the poet says. This is true for us humans primarily because of some vice or defect or incompleteness in our nature.

• For just as it is the vicious or flawed person who is often changeable and unstable in their character and desires.
• So too, the nature that needs constant change to find pleasure or to escape the pain of monotony or internal conflict is a vicious or defective nature (in the sense of being imperfect and not self-sufficient). For such a nature is not simple nor perfectly good.

We have now discussed continence and incontinence, and pleasure and pain. We have explored what each of these is, and in what sense some of them are good and others are bad. It remains now to speak of friendship.

Life itself is good and pleasant. This is because life is something definite and clear. Things that are definite are a kind of good. And what is naturally good is also good for a person who strives to be good. This is why life seems enjoyable to everyone.

However, we should not say this about a life that is wicked and corrupt. We also shouldn’t say it about a life full of pain. Such a life is unclear and messy, like its qualities. We will discuss the nature of pain more later.

But if life itself is good and pleasant, it really seems to be. We can see this because everyone wants to live. Good people and very happy people especially desire life. For these people, life is the most desirable thing, and their way of living is the happiest.

Imagine someone who sees. They are aware that they are seeing. Someone who hears is aware that they are hearing. Someone who walks is aware that they are walking. This is true for all our other activities too. There is something in us that is aware we are doing things. So, if we are sensing something, we are aware that we are sensing. If we are thinking, we are aware that we are thinking.

To be aware that we are sensing or thinking is to be aware that we exist. After all, we said before that existing means sensing or thinking.

Being aware that you are alive is, by itself, one of the things that is pleasant. This is because life is naturally good. And it’s pleasant to be aware of something good that is part of you.

Life is desirable. It is especially desirable for good people. This is because, for them, existing is good and pleasant. They are pleased when they realize they have something within them that is good in itself.

A good person feels about their friend in the same way they feel about themselves. This is because a friend is like another version of oneself.

If all this is true, then just as a person’s own life is desirable to them, their friend’s life is also desirable, or nearly so. We saw that a person’s own life is desirable because they are aware of their own goodness. And being aware of this goodness is pleasant in itself.

Therefore, a person also needs to be aware of their friend’s existence. This awareness happens when they live together and share discussions and thoughts. For humans, this is what living together truly means. It’s not like cattle, who just happen to be eating in the same field.

So, if being alive is desirable in itself for a very happy person (since life is naturally good and pleasant), and a friend’s life is very much the same, then a friend is one of the things that is desirable. A person must have what is desirable for them. If they don’t have it, they will be lacking something important. Therefore, a person who wants to be happy will need good friends.

10. How Many Friends Should We Have?

Should we try to make as many friends as possible? Or is there a good rule for friendship like there is for having guests? For guests, people say it’s wise to be “neither someone with too many guests nor someone with none.” Does this advice also apply to friendship? Should a person avoid having no friends, but also avoid having too many?

Friends for Usefulness This saying seems to fit perfectly for friends we have because they are useful.

• It’s a lot of work to do favors for many people in return.
• Life isn’t long enough to do all that.
• So, having more friends than we need for our own life is pointless. They can even get in the way of living a good life. We don’t need these extra friends.

Friends for Pleasure For friends we have for fun, a few are also enough. This is like how a little seasoning is enough for food.

Good Friends (Friends Based on Virtue) But what about good friends, the ones who are friends because of their good character? Should we have as many of these as possible? Or is there a limit to the number of friends someone can have, like there’s a limit to the size of a city?

• You can’t make a city with just ten people.
• And if a city has a hundred thousand people, it stops feeling like a single city.
• The right number for a city probably isn’t one specific number. It’s likely a range between certain limits.

The same is true for friends. There is a limit to the number of good friends one can have.

• Perhaps the largest number is the amount you can actually live closely with. We found earlier that living together is a key part of friendship.
• It’s clear that you can’t live closely with many people and divide your attention well among them.

Also, these friends need to be friends with each other if they are all going to spend their days together. It’s hard to make this happen with a large number of people.

It’s also difficult to truly share deep joy and sadness with many people. It’s likely that you might need to be happy with one friend while at the same time mourning with another. This would be hard.

So, it’s probably best not to try to have as many friends as possible. Instead, we should aim for as many as are enough for living closely together. It seems truly impossible to be a great friend to many people.

This is also why you can’t be in romantic love with several people. Love, in its ideal form, is like an extreme version of friendship. That kind of strong feeling can usually only be directed towards one person. Therefore, great friendship can also only be felt towards a few people.

This seems to be true in real life.

• We don’t find many people who have the kind of close, comradely friendship with lots of others.
• The famous friendships of this type are always between two people.

People who have many friends and are close with all of them are often thought to be no one’s true friend. They might be friendly in the way people are friendly to fellow citizens. Such people are sometimes called obsequious, meaning they try too hard to please everyone.

It is possible to be a friend to many people in the way of fellow citizens. One can do this without being obsequious and still be a genuinely good person. But you cannot have friendship based on virtue and on the true character of your friends with many people. We should be happy if we find even a few such friends.

11. Do We Need Friends More in Good Times or Bad Times?

People look for friends in both good and bad situations.

• When people are facing hard times (adversity), they need help.
• When people are doing well (prosperity), they need people to live with. They also need people to whom they can do good things, because they want to help others.

So, friendship is more necessary in bad times. In this case, useful friends are what you need. But friendship is more noble or admirable in good times. So, we also look for good people as friends then. This is because it’s more desirable to give benefits to good people and to live with them.

The very presence of friends is pleasant, both in good times and in bad. This is because sadness feels lighter when friends share our sorrow. One might wonder if they actually share our burden, like carrying a weight. Or perhaps their presence is simply pleasant, and knowing they are grieving with us makes our pain feel less. We can put aside the exact reason why our grief is lightened. The important thing is that what we’ve described does happen.

But having friends present seems to involve a mix of different factors.

• Just seeing one’s friends is pleasant, especially if you are in a tough situation. It becomes a protection against sadness. A friend who is thoughtful can comfort us both by being there and by their words. They know our character and what things please us or cause us pain.
• However, it is painful to see your friend feeling pained because of your misfortunes. Everyone wants to avoid causing pain to their friends.
• For this reason, people with a strong character try to avoid making their friends grieve with them. Unless a person is unusually unaffected by pain, they can’t stand the pain their friends feel for them. In general, such a person doesn’t invite others to mourn with them because they are not naturally given to mourning themselves.
• But some people, like women and men with more “womanly” emotions, enjoy having others sympathize with their grief. They love these people as friends and as companions in their sorrow.
• In all things, though, one should clearly try to follow the example of the better type of person.

On the other hand, having friends around during our good times means two things:

• We have a pleasant way to spend our time.
• We have the pleasant thought that our friends are happy about our good fortune.

For this reason, it seems we should:

• Be quick to invite our friends to share in our good fortune. This is because being generous and doing good for others is a noble quality.
• Be hesitant to call on them when we are in bad fortune. We should try to give them as small a share of our troubles as possible. There’s a saying: “My misfortune is enough.”
• We should especially call on friends when they are likely to be able to help us a great deal by suffering only a few small inconveniences themselves.

Conversely, here’s how we should act towards friends:

• It is right to go to the aid of friends in hard times without being asked, and to do so readily. It is a characteristic of a friend to provide help, especially to those who are in need and haven’t asked for it. Acting this way is nobler and more pleasant for both people.
• When our friends are doing well, we should readily join in their activities. They need friends for these activities too.
• However, we should be slow to come forward to receive kindness or benefits from them. It is not noble to be eager to get things from others.
• Still, we must be careful not to get a reputation for being a “kill-joy” by always refusing their offers of help or kindness. This can sometimes happen.

So, it seems that having friends around is desirable in all circumstances.

12. Living Together: The Core of Friendship

Doesn’t it follow that, just as lovers find the sight of their beloved to be the thing they love most, so too for friends, the most desirable thing is living together? Lovers prefer the sense of sight above others because love depends most on it for its existence and for its beginning.

Friendship is a partnership. A person relates to their friend in the same way they relate to themselves. In a person’s own case, the awareness of their own existence is desirable. So, therefore, the awareness of their friend’s being is also desirable.

The active awareness of a friend’s existence comes about when they live together. So, it is natural that friends aim for this.

And whatever “existence” or “life” means for each type of person, whatever it is that makes them value life, that is what they want to do with their friends.

• So, some friends drink together.
• Others play dice together.
• Others join in sports and hunting together.
• Still others study philosophy together. Each group spends their days together doing whatever activity they love most in life. Because they want to live with their friends, they do and share those things that give them the feeling of living together.

This is why the friendship of bad people turns out to be an evil thing.

• Because they are unstable, they join together in bad activities.
• Besides, they become evil by becoming like each other.

On the other hand, the friendship of good people is good. It is increased by their companionship.

• Good friends are also thought to become better people through their activities and by improving each other.
• They take from each other the pattern of the characteristics they approve of. This is why there’s a saying: “Noble deeds come from noble men.”

So much, then, for the topic of friendship. Our next task must be to discuss pleasure.

BOOK X

1. Why We Should Talk About Pleasure

After discussing other topics, perhaps we should now talk about pleasure. People think pleasure is very closely tied to our human nature. This is why when we teach young people, we often guide them using pleasure and pain, like rudders on a boat.

It’s also thought that enjoying the right things and hating the right things is very important for having a good character. These feelings of pleasure and pain affect us our whole lives. They have their own power when it comes to being a good person and living a happy life. This is because people choose what is pleasant and try to avoid what is painful.

Because pleasure is so important, we should definitely discuss it. This is especially true because there are many disagreements about it.

• Some people say that pleasure is the ultimate good.
• Others, however, say that pleasure is completely bad.
  • Some of these people might truly believe this.
  • Others might think it’s better for our lives to say pleasure is bad, even if it isn’t really. They believe most people lean towards pleasure too much and become like slaves to their desires. So, they think we should lead people in the opposite direction. By doing this, people might find a healthy middle ground.

But this idea of calling pleasure bad even if it isn’t, is surely not correct. When it comes to arguments about feelings and actions, words are less trustworthy than real-life facts. So, if an argument goes against what we clearly see and experience, people will disrespect it. This also makes the truth itself seem less believable.

For example, if a person who always criticizes pleasure is seen actively looking for it, others might think this means all pleasure is worth chasing. This is because most people are not good at noticing small differences or details in arguments.

So, true arguments seem to be the most useful. They are helpful not just for gaining knowledge, but also for living a good life. Because true arguments match the facts, people believe them. This encourages those who understand these arguments to live according to them.

That’s enough introduction. Let’s now look at the different opinions people have about pleasure.

2. Is Pleasure the Ultimate Good? Different Views

Eudoxus’s Idea: Pleasure is the Good A thinker named Eudoxus believed that pleasure was the ultimate good. He had several reasons for this:

1. He saw that all beings, both those that can reason (like humans) and those that cannot (like animals), aim for pleasure.
2. He thought that in everything, what we choose is something excellent. And the thing we choose most is the greatest good. So, the fact that all beings moved towards the same thing (pleasure) showed that pleasure was the most important good for all of them. He argued that each thing finds its own good, just like it finds its own food.
3. Therefore, he concluded that what is good for all beings, and what all beings aim for, must be the good.

People believed Eudoxus’s arguments more because of his excellent personal character than just because of the arguments themselves. He was known to be remarkably self-controlled. So, people thought he wasn’t just saying these things because he loved pleasure, but because they were actually true.

Eudoxus also believed the same idea could be seen by looking at the opposite of pleasure: pain.

• Pain, by its very nature, is something all beings try to avoid.
• Therefore, its opposite, pleasure, must be something all beings naturally choose.

He also argued that the thing we choose most is something we choose for its own sake, not because it leads to something else. Pleasure is clearly like this. No one asks, “What is the purpose of your being pleased?” This suggests that pleasure is chosen for itself.

Furthermore, Eudoxus said that when pleasure is added to any other good thing, like a just action or a self-controlled action, it makes that good thing even more worth choosing. He also thought that only the good itself can be increased by itself. (This implies that if pleasure increases a good, pleasure itself must be part of the good).

A Closer Look at Eudoxus’s Argument This last argument (that pleasure makes good things better) seems to show that pleasure is one of the good things, but not necessarily more of a good than any other good thing. Any good thing becomes more worth choosing when combined with another good thing, compared to when it is alone.

Plato’s Counter-Argument: Pleasure is Not the Good Plato used a similar kind of argument to prove that the ultimate good is not pleasure.

• He argued that a pleasant life is more desirable when it includes wisdom than when it doesn’t.
• He said that if the mixture (pleasure + wisdom) is better, then pleasure by itself cannot be the good.
• This is because the ultimate good cannot become more desirable by adding anything else to it. If it could, then it wasn’t the ultimate good to begin with.

It seems clear that nothing else, including pleasure, can be the ultimate good if it becomes more desirable when any other truly good thing is added to it. So, what kind of thing fits this description – something that is the ultimate good and that we can also be part of? This is the kind of thing we are searching for.

What if “What Everyone Aims For” Isn’t Actually Good? Some people object to the idea that whatever all beings aim for must be good. We can probably say they are talking nonsense.

• We usually say that what everyone thinks is true, really is true. Anyone who attacks this basic belief would have a hard time offering something more believable instead.
• If only creatures without sense or reason desired these things, then the objection might have some merit. But if intelligent creatures also desire them, what sense can this objection make?
• Perhaps even in less complex creatures, there is some natural sense of good that is stronger than their individual selves, guiding them towards what is properly good for them.

Is the Opposite of Pain Always Good? The argument about pleasure being good because its opposite, pain, is bad also needs a closer look. Some people say:

• Just because pain is an evil, it doesn’t automatically mean pleasure is a good.
• They point out that an evil can be opposed to another evil, and at the same time, both can be opposed to a neutral state (neither good nor bad). This is true in general, but it doesn’t really apply to pleasure and pain.
• If both pleasure and pain were types of evil, then both should be things we try to avoid.
• If they both belonged to the neutral category, then neither should be avoided, or both should be avoided equally.
• But in reality, people clearly avoid pain as an evil and choose pleasure as a good. So, this shows how they are truly opposed to each other.

3. More Arguments About Pleasure

Is Pleasure Not Good Because It’s Not a “Quality”? Some argue that pleasure isn’t a good thing because it’s not a “quality” (a fixed characteristic). But this doesn’t mean it’s not good.

• The actions that come from virtue (like courageous acts) are not qualities either, and neither is happiness itself. Yet, we consider them good.

Is Pleasure Not Good Because It’s “Indeterminate”? Another argument is that the good is determinate (meaning fixed, definite, and clear), while pleasure is indeterminate (meaning it can vary and doesn’t have a fixed measure, because it admits of degrees – you can feel more or less pleasure). Let’s look at this:

• If this judgment comes from thinking about the feeling of pleasure, then the same would be true for justice and the other virtues. We clearly say that some people are more or less just, or brave. And people can act more or less justly or with more or less self-control.
• If this judgment is based on the fact that there are many different kinds of pleasures, then perhaps they are not pointing to the real reason for their argument. This is especially true if some pleasures are pure and unmixed, while others are mixed (perhaps with some discomfort).
• Think about health. Health can also vary in degrees (you can be very healthy, moderately healthy, or a little healthy), but we don’t usually call health “indeterminate.” Why should pleasure be different? The right balance or proportion isn’t the same in all things, nor is it always the same in one thing. Something can be less intense but still exist up to a point, and it can differ in degree. The case of pleasure might also be like this.

Is Pleasure Not Good Because It’s a “Movement” or a “Coming into Being”? Some people assume that the ultimate good must be perfect and complete. They also see movements (processes) and “comings into being” (things gradually developing) as imperfect. So, they try to show that pleasure is a type of movement or a process of coming into being, and therefore not the ultimate good. But they don’t seem to be right, even in saying it’s a movement.

• Speed and slowness are usually part of every movement. If a movement doesn’t have its own speed or slowness (like the movement of the stars, perhaps), it has speed or slowness in relation to something else.
• But neither of these applies to pleasure. We can start to feel pleased quickly, just as we can get angry quickly. But we cannot be pleased quickly (in the sense of performing the act of being pleased at a certain speed). We can, however, walk quickly, or grow quickly, or do similar things quickly.
• So, while we can change quickly or slowly into a state of pleasure, we cannot quickly perform the activity of pleasure – that is, we cannot “be pleased” quickly.

How can pleasure be a “coming into being”?

• It’s not thought that just any random thing can come from any other random thing. Usually, a thing dissolves back into whatever it came from.
• If pleasure is the “coming into being” of something, then pain would be the destruction of that same thing. (This idea is explored next).

Is Pleasure Just “Filling a Lack”? Some people say that pain is the lack of something that our nature needs (like food or water), and pleasure is the “replenishment” or filling of that lack. But these experiences are mainly bodily.

• If pleasure is truly just “replenishment according to nature,” then the part of us that feels pleasure would be the part where the replenishment happens – which is the body. But this is not always thought to be true (e.g., we experience mental pleasures that don’t seem to involve the body in this way).
• Therefore, the replenishment itself is not pleasure. However, a person would feel pleased while replenishment was happening, just as a person would feel pained if they were having surgery (the process of being cut is not the pain itself, but it causes pain).

This opinion about pleasure being replenishment seems to be based on the pains and pleasures connected with eating and drinking. When people have lacked food and felt pain beforehand, they are pleased by the replenishment. But this doesn’t happen with all pleasures:

• The pleasures of learning don’t require a prior pain or lack.
• Among pleasures from our senses, the pleasure of smell doesn’t require a prior lack.
• Many pleasant sounds and sights, memories, and hopes also don’t depend on a prior lack. If these pleasures don’t come from a prior lack, what “coming into being” could they be? There wasn’t any missing thing for them to be the new supply of.

What About “Bad” or “Disgraceful” Pleasures? In response to those who bring up disgraceful pleasures (like pleasures from harmful or shameful acts) as a reason why pleasure can’t be good, one might say:

1. These are not truly pleasant. If things are pleasant only to people with a bad or corrupt character, we should not assume they are also pleasant to others. It’s like how we don’t assume something is healthy or sweet just because sick people find it so. Or we don’t say something is white just because it appears white to someone with an eye disease.
2. Or, one might answer that the pleasures themselves might be desirable, but not if they come from these bad sources. For example, wealth is desirable, but not if you get it by betraying someone. Health is desirable, but not at the cost of eating anything and everything, no matter how harmful.
3. Or, perhaps pleasures differ in kind. Pleasures that come from noble and good sources are different from those that come from base and bad sources. You cannot experience the pleasure of a just person without actually being just. You cannot experience the pleasure of a musical person without actually being musical, and so on.

The fact that a friend is different from a flatterer also seems to make it clear that either pleasure is not the ultimate good, or that pleasures differ in kind.

• A friend is thought to spend time with us for our actual good.
• A flatterer is thought to spend time with us just for our pleasure.
• The flatterer is often criticized for their behavior, while the friend is praised because they associate with us for different, better reasons.

And no one would choose to live their whole life with the mind of a child, no matter how much pleasure they got from the things that please children. Nor would anyone choose to get enjoyment by doing something truly disgraceful, even if they were guaranteed never to feel any pain as a result.

There are many things we would be eager to have or do even if they brought no pleasure at all. Examples include:

• Seeing
• Remembering
• Knowing
• Having virtues (good character traits)

If pleasures happen to come along with these things, that doesn’t change the fact that we would choose these things even if no pleasure resulted from them.

It seems clear, then, that:

• Neither is pleasure the ultimate good.
• Nor is all pleasure desirable.
• Some pleasures are desirable in themselves. These differ from other pleasures either in their kind (what they are like) or in their sources (where they come from).

So much for the various things people say about pleasure and pain.

4. What Exactly Is Pleasure? A Fresh Start

What pleasure is, or what kind of thing it is, will become clearer if we look at the question again from the beginning.

Pleasure is Complete, Like Seeing The act of seeing seems to be complete at any moment it occurs. It doesn’t lack anything that, by coming into being later, will complete its form or nature. Pleasure also seems to be like this.

• Pleasure is a whole.
• At no time can you find a pleasure whose form or nature will only be completed if the pleasure lasts longer. It’s already complete in any moment you experience it.

Pleasure is Not a Movement For this reason (that it’s whole and complete at any moment), pleasure is not a movement (or a process).

• Every movement (like the process of building a house) takes time.
• It is for the sake of some end or goal.
• It is complete only when it has made what it aims at (e.g., when the house is finished). It is complete, therefore, only in the whole time it takes, or at that final moment.
• In their parts and during the time they are happening, all movements are incomplete. They are also different in kind from the whole movement and from each other.
  • For example, the fitting together of stones is different from the carving of a column. These are both different from the making of the entire temple.
  • The making of the temple is complete (because it lacks nothing needed for the proposed goal).
  • But the making of the base or of a decorative part (like a triglyph on a column) is incomplete; each is the making of only a part.
• So, these parts of a movement differ in kind. It is not possible to find, at any and every moment, a movement that is complete in its form. If it’s complete at all, it’s only in the whole time.

The same is true for walking and all other movements.

• If locomotion (moving from one place to another) is a movement from point A to point B, it, too, has differences in kind – flying, walking, leaping, and so on.
• And not only that, but in walking itself, there are such differences. The “from where” and “to where” are not the same in the whole racecourse compared to just a part of it. They are not the same in one part versus another part. Nor is it the same thing to cross this line versus that line; for one crosses not only a line but a line that is in a place, and this line is in a different place from that one.

We have discussed movement in detail in another work. But it seems that movement is not complete at any and every moment. Instead, the many movements that make it up are incomplete and different in kind, since the “from where” and “to where” give them their specific form.

But the form of pleasure is complete at any and every time. Plainly, then, pleasure and movement must be different from each other. Pleasure must be one of those things that are whole and complete.

This would also seem to be true from the fact that it is not possible to move except in time. But it is possible to be pleased (to experience pleasure) in a moment. That which takes place in a moment is a whole.

Pleasure is Not a “Coming into Being” From these points, it is also clear that those thinkers are not right when they say there is a movement or a “coming into being” of pleasure.

• These terms (movement, coming into being) cannot be applied to all things. They only apply to things that are divisible and are not wholes.
• There is no “coming into being” of seeing, nor of a point (in geometry), nor of a unit (like the number one). None of these is a movement or a coming into being.
• Therefore, there is no movement or coming into being of pleasure either, because pleasure is a whole.

Pleasure Completes an Activity Every sense (sight, hearing, etc.) is active in relation to its object (what it sees, hears, etc.). A sense that is in good condition acts perfectly in relation to the most beautiful or finest of its objects.

• Perfect activity seems to be ideally like this. (Whether we say the sense itself is active, or the organ where it resides, like the eye, can be assumed not to matter for this point).
• It follows that in the case of each sense, the best activity is that of the best-conditioned organ in relation to the finest of its objects.
• And this activity will be the most complete and the most pleasant.

There is pleasure in respect of any sense. There is also pleasure in respect of thought and contemplation. The activity that is most complete is the pleasantest. And the activity of a well-conditioned organ in relation to the worthiest of its objects is the most complete. And pleasure completes the activity.

But pleasure does not complete the activity in the same way as the combination of a good object and a good sense organ completes it. Just as health and the doctor are not in the same way the cause of a man’s being healthy. (They both contribute, but differently).

It is plain that pleasure is produced in respect to each sense; for we speak of sights and sounds as pleasant. It is also plain that pleasure arises most of all when both the sense is at its best and it is active in reference to an object that corresponds to it. When both the object being perceived and the perceiver are of the best quality, there will always be pleasure, since the necessary active part (the perceiver) and passive part (the object) are both present and well-suited.

Pleasure completes the activity, not as a permanent state that is part of the activity (like a skill being part of an action), but as an end or a finishing touch that comes upon it. It’s like the bloom of youth that appears on those in the flower of their age – an added perfection.

So long, then, as both the object of thought or sense, and the faculty that is discriminating or contemplating, are as they should be, pleasure will be involved in the activity. For when both the passive factor (what is being experienced) and the active factor (the experiencing faculty) are unchanged and are related to each other in the same way, the same result (pleasure) naturally follows.

Why Is No One Continuously Pleased? How, then, is it that no one is continuously pleased? Is it that we grow weary or tired? Certainly, all human beings are incapable of continuous activity. Therefore, pleasure is also not continuous, because it accompanies activity.

Some things delight us when they are new, but later do so less, for the same reason.

• At first, the mind is in a state of stimulation and is intensely active about them. This is like how people are with their vision when they look hard at something.
• But afterwards, our activity is not like this; it has grown relaxed. For this reason, the pleasure also is dulled or lessened.

Why People Desire Pleasure One might think that all people desire pleasure because they all aim at life.

• Life is an activity.
• Each person is active about those things and with those faculties (abilities) that he loves most.
  • For example, the musician is active with his hearing in reference to tunes.
  • The student is active with his mind in reference to theoretical questions.
  • And so on in each case.
• Now, pleasure completes these activities. And therefore, pleasure completes life, which they desire.

It is with good reason, then, that they aim at pleasure too, since for every one of them, it completes life, which is desirable.

But whether we choose life for the sake of pleasure, or pleasure for the sake of life, is a question we may dismiss for the present. For they seem to be bound up together and not to admit of separation.

• Without activity, pleasure does not arise.
• And every activity is completed by the pleasure that attends it.

5. Pleasures Differ in Kind

For this reason (that activities differ and pleasure completes activity), pleasures also seem to differ in kind. We think that things different in kind are completed by different things.

• We see this to be true both of natural objects (e.g., animals, trees – each has its own way of being complete).
• We also see it in things produced by art or skill (e.g., a painting, a sculpture, a house, an implement – each is completed in its own specific way).

Similarly, we think that activities differing in kind are completed by things differing in kind.

• Now, the activities of thought differ in kind from the activities of the senses.
• And both types of activities (thought and senses) differ among themselves in kind.
• So, therefore, the pleasures that complete them also differ in kind.

This may also be seen from the fact that each of the pleasures is bound up with the activity it completes. An activity is intensified by its proper pleasure (the pleasure that naturally belongs to it).

• Each class of things is better judged and brought to precision by those who engage in the activity with pleasure.
  • For example, it is those who enjoy geometrical thinking that become good geometers and grasp the various propositions better.
  • Similarly, those who are fond of music or of building, and so on, make progress in their proper function by enjoying it.
• So, the pleasures intensify the activities.
• And what intensifies a thing is proper (specially connected or belonging) to it.
• But things that are different in kind have properties that are different in kind.

Therefore, since activities differ in kind, and their proper pleasures (which are different in kind) intensify them, this further supports the idea that pleasures themselves differ in kind.

This connection between activities and their proper pleasures will be even clearer when we see how activities are affected by pleasures from other sources.

For example, people who love playing the flute cannot pay attention to a discussion if they overhear someone playing the flute nearby. This is because they enjoy flute-playing more than the discussion they are currently involved in. So, the pleasure from flute-playing destroys their ability to focus on the discussion.

This happens in all other similar cases. When someone is active in two things at once, the more pleasant activity drives out the other. If one activity is much more pleasant, it pushes the other out even more, sometimes causing the person to stop the less pleasant activity altogether.

This is why when we enjoy something very much, we do not try to do anything else at the same time. We also tend to do one thing only when we are not very pleased by another. For instance, in the theater, people who eat sweets usually do so most when the actors are performing poorly. The poor performance isn’t very engaging, so they turn to the pleasure of the sweets.

So, we can see two important points:

1. Activities are made more precise, more lasting, and better by their proper pleasure (the pleasure that naturally belongs to them).
2. Activities are harmed by alien pleasures (pleasures from unrelated things).

Clearly, these two kinds of pleasure are far apart. Alien pleasures do pretty much what proper pains do. Activities are destroyed by their proper pains. For example, if a person finds writing or doing math problems unpleasant and painful, they will not write, or they will not do the math problems, because the activity itself is painful.

So, an activity is affected in opposite ways by its own proper pleasures and pains. These are the pleasures and pains that arise from the very nature of the activity itself. And as we said, alien pleasures act much like pain: they destroy the activity, though perhaps not to the same extent as a direct pain associated with the activity.

Good and Bad Pleasures Activities differ in terms of how good or bad they are.

• Some activities are worthy to be chosen.
• Others are to be avoided.
• Some are neutral (neither good nor bad).

The same is true for pleasures, because each activity has its own proper pleasure.

• The pleasure proper to a worthy activity is good.
• The pleasure proper to an unworthy activity is bad. This is just like how our desires (appetites) for noble objects are praiseworthy, while desires for base or shameful objects are blameworthy.

The pleasures involved in activities are more closely connected to them than desires are.

• Desires are often separated from the activity both in time (you might desire something long before you act on it) and in their nature.
• Pleasures, however, are very close to the activities themselves. They are so hard to distinguish from the activities that it’s debatable whether the activity and the pleasure are not actually the same thing. (Still, pleasure probably isn’t the same as thought or perception – that would be strange. But because pleasure and activity are not found apart, some people think they are the same.)

So, just as activities are different, their corresponding pleasures are also different. We can even see a kind of ranking in our senses:

• Sight is considered superior to touch in its purity.
• Hearing and smell are considered superior to taste. The pleasures associated with these senses, therefore, are similarly ranked. And the pleasures of thought are considered superior to all these sensory pleasures. Within each of these two kinds of pleasure (sensory and thought-based), some are superior to others.

Each Animal’s Proper Pleasure Each animal is thought to have a pleasure that is proper to it, just as it has a proper function or work it is meant to do. This pleasure is the one that corresponds to its main activity. If we look at animals species by species, this will be clear. A horse, a dog, and a human all have different pleasures. As the philosopher Heraclitus said, “asses would prefer sweepings (garbage) to gold,” because for donkeys, food is more pleasant than gold.

So, the pleasures of creatures that are different in kind also differ in kind. It is reasonable to suppose that the pleasures of creatures within a single species do not differ in kind (for example, all horses enjoy similar “horse pleasures”).

However, pleasures vary a great deal, at least in the case of humans.

• The same things delight some people and cause pain to others.
• Things that are painful and hateful to some people are pleasant and liked by others. This also happens with sweet things. The same food might not seem sweet to a person with a fever compared to a healthy person. A room might not feel hot to a person in good physical condition, but it might to a weak person. The same happens in other situations.

The Good Person as the Standard In all such matters, what appears to be the case to the good person is thought to be what is really so. If this is correct, as it seems to be, and if virtue and the good person (by being good) are the measure of each thing, then those things will also be true pleasures which appear so to him. And those things will be truly pleasant which he enjoys.

If things that the good person finds tiresome or unpleasant seem pleasant to someone else, that is nothing surprising. People can be ruined and spoiled in many ways. But these things are not truly pleasant; they are only pleasant to these particular people and to people in this spoiled condition.

Those pleasures that are generally agreed to be disgraceful plainly should not be called pleasures at all, except to someone with a perverted or corrupted taste.

But of those pleasures that are thought to be good, what kind of pleasure, or which specific pleasure, should be called the pleasure that is proper to a human being? Isn’t it clear from looking at the activities that are proper to humans? The pleasures follow these activities.

So, whether the perfect and supremely happy person has one main activity or several, the pleasures that make these activities complete will be called, in the strictest sense, the pleasures proper to humans. The rest of the pleasures will be considered pleasures in a secondary and lesser way, just as the activities they accompany are secondary.

6. What is Happiness? A Summary and Deeper Look

Now that we have spoken about the virtues, the different kinds of friendship, and the varieties of pleasure, what remains is to discuss in outline the nature of happiness. We do this because we state that happiness is the ultimate end or goal of human life. Our discussion will be shorter if we first summarize what we have said already.

We said before that happiness is not a disposition (a tendency or state of being).

• If it were, it might belong to someone who was asleep throughout their entire life, living the life of a plant.
• Or, it could belong to someone who was suffering the greatest misfortunes. If these outcomes are unacceptable (and they are), then we must instead classify happiness as an activity, as we have said before.

Some activities are necessary and desirable for the sake of something else. Other activities are desirable in themselves. Evidently, happiness must be placed among those activities that are desirable in themselves, not among those desirable for the sake of something else. This is because happiness does not lack anything; it is self-sufficient.

Now, those activities are desirable in themselves from which nothing is sought beyond the activity itself. Actions that come from virtue are thought to be like this. To do noble and good deeds is something desirable for its own sake.

Are Amusements Happiness? Pleasant amusements are also thought to be of this nature; we often choose them not for the sake of other things. However, we are often injured rather than benefited by them, since we are led to neglect our bodies and our property.

Most of the people who are considered “happy” (often those in power) seek refuge in such pastimes. This is why those who are witty and skilled at these amusements are highly valued in the courts of tyrants. They make themselves pleasant companions in the tyrants’ favorite activities, and that is the sort of person tyrants want.

Now, these things (like amusements) are thought to be part of happiness because people in powerful positions spend their leisure time enjoying them. But perhaps such people don’t prove anything important about true happiness. Virtue and reason, from which good activities flow, do not depend on being in a powerful position.

Also, if these powerful people, who have never tasted pure and generous pleasure, take refuge in bodily pleasures, this should not make us think that bodily pleasures are more desirable. Boys, too, think that the things valued among themselves are the best. It is to be expected, then, that just as different things seem valuable to boys and to men, so different things will seem valuable to bad people and to good people.

As we have often maintained, those things are both valuable and pleasant which are such to the good person. To each person, the activity that is in accordance with his own character is most desirable. Therefore, to the good person, the activity that is in accordance with virtue is most desirable.

Happiness, therefore, does not lie in amusement. It would, indeed, be strange if the ultimate goal of life were amusement, and if a person were to take trouble and suffer hardship all their life just to amuse themselves. For, in short, everything that we choose, we choose for the sake of something else – except for happiness, which is an end in itself.

Now, to exert oneself and work hard just for the sake of amusement seems silly and utterly childish. But to amuse oneself in order that one may exert oneself (work better), as the wise man Anacharsis put it, seems right. For amusement is a sort of relaxation, and we need relaxation because we cannot work continuously. Relaxation, then, is not an end; it is taken for the sake of activity.

The happy life is thought to be a virtuous life. Now, a virtuous life requires exertion and effort, and it does not consist in amusement. We also say that serious things are better than laughable things and those things connected with amusement. We believe that the activity of the better part of us (whether it be two elements of our being, or the better of two people) is the more serious and important one. But the activity of what is better is, by that very fact, superior and more of the nature of happiness.

And any ordinary person—even a slave—can enjoy bodily pleasures no less than the best and noblest man. But no one assigns to a slave a share in happiness—unless he also assigns to him a share in a truly human life (which implies more than just basic existence and pleasure). For happiness does not lie in such occupations (like mere amusements or bodily pleasures), but, as we have said before, in virtuous activities.

7. Happiness is Activity According to the Highest Virtue: Contemplation

If happiness is activity in accordance with virtue, it is reasonable that it should be in accordance with the highest virtue. This highest virtue will be that of the best thing in us.

Whether it is reason or something else that is this element which is thought to be our natural ruler and guide, and to think about things noble and divine; whether this element is itself also divine or only the most divine element in us, the activity of this part, in accordance with its own proper virtue, will be perfect happiness. That this activity is contemplative (meaning related to deep thinking, reflection, and the pursuit of wisdom), we have already said.

Now, this idea would seem to agree both with what we said before and with the truth.

1. Best Activity: Firstly, this activity (contemplation) is the best. This is because not only is reason the best thing in us, but the objects of reason (like truth and understanding) are the best of knowable objects.
2. Most Continuous: Secondly, it is the most continuous. We can contemplate truth more continuously than we can do anything else.
3. Most Pleasant: We think happiness has pleasure mixed with it. The activity of philosophic wisdom (contemplation) is admittedly the pleasantest of virtuous activities. At any rate, the pursuit of it is thought to offer pleasures that are marvelous for their purity and their enduringness. It is to be expected that those who know will pass their time more pleasantly than those who are still inquiring or learning.
4. Most Self-Sufficient: The self-sufficiency that is spoken of as a mark of happiness must belong most to contemplative activity.
   • A philosopher, like a just man or one possessing any other virtue, needs the necessities of life (food, shelter, etc.).
   • But when they are sufficiently equipped with such things, the just man needs people towards whom and with whom he shall act justly. The temperate man, the brave man, and each of the others are in the same situation.
   • But the philosopher, even when by himself, can contemplate truth. The wiser he is, the better he can do this. He can perhaps do so even better if he has fellow-workers, but still, he is the most self-sufficient.
5. Loved for Its Own Sake: This activity alone would seem to be loved for its own sake. Nothing arises from it apart from the act of contemplating itself. From practical activities, we usually gain something more or less apart from the action itself.
6. Depends on Leisure: Happiness is thought to depend on leisure. We are busy so that we may have leisure. We make war so that we may live in peace.
   • Now, the activity of the practical virtues is shown in political or military affairs. But the actions concerned with these seem to be un-leisurely (full of business and not restful).
   • Warlike actions are completely un-leisurely. (No one chooses to be at war, or provokes war, for the sake of being at war. Anyone would seem absolutely murderous if he were to make enemies of his friends just to bring about battle and slaughter.)
   • But the action of the statesman (politician) is also un-leisurely. Apart from the political action itself, it aims at gaining power and honors, or at all events, happiness for himself and his fellow citizens—a happiness that is different from political action itself, and is clearly sought as being something different.

So, if among virtuous actions, political and military actions are distinguished by nobility and greatness, yet these are un-leisurely, aim at some further end, and are not desirable for their own sake; but the activity of reason, which is contemplative:

• seems both to be superior in serious worth,
• aims at no end beyond itself,
• has its pleasure proper to itself (and this pleasure increases the activity),
• and has self-sufficiency, leisureliness, unweariedness (as far as this is possible for humans),
• and all the other attributes given to the supremely happy person are clearly connected with this activity, …it follows that this (contemplative activity) will be the complete happiness of man, if it is allowed a complete term of life (for none of the attributes of happiness should be incomplete).

A Life Too High for Man? But such a life (of pure contemplation) would be too high for man. For it is not just because he is a man that he will live so, but because something divine is present in him. And by as much as this divine part is superior to our composite nature (body and soul combined), its activity is superior to the activity which is the exercise of the other kind of virtue (practical virtues).

If reason is divine in comparison with man, then the life according to reason is divine in comparison with human life. But we must not follow those who advise us, being men, to think of human things, and, being mortal, of mortal things. Instead, as far as we can, we must make ourselves immortal and strain every nerve to live in accordance with the best thing in us. For even if this best thing (reason) is small in physical bulk, it much more surpasses everything in power and worth.

This (reason) would seem, too, to be each man himself, since it is the authoritative and better part of him. It would be strange, then, if he were to choose not the life of his true self but the life of something else.

And what we said before will apply now: that which is proper to each thing is by nature best and most pleasant for each thing. For man, therefore, the life according to reason is best and pleasantest, since reason, more than anything else, is man. This life, therefore, is also the happiest.

8. Happiness in a Secondary Degree: The Life of Moral Virtue

In a secondary degree, the life in accordance with the other kind of virtue (the moral or practical virtues) is happy. For the activities in accordance with this kind of virtue fit our human condition. We perform just and brave acts, and other virtuous acts, in relation to each other. We do this by observing our respective duties with regard to contracts and services, and all manner of actions, and also with regard to our passions and emotions. All of these seem to be typically human.

Some of these virtues even seem to arise from the body. Virtue of character seems in many ways to be bound up with the passions. Practical wisdom (good judgment in action) is also linked to virtue of character, and virtue of character is linked to practical wisdom. This is because the principles of practical wisdom are in accordance with the moral virtues, and rightness in morals is in accordance with practical wisdom.

Being connected with the passions, the moral virtues must belong to our composite nature (our nature as beings of both body and soul). And the virtues of our composite nature are human virtues. So, therefore, are the life and the happiness which correspond to these virtues.

The excellence of pure reason (contemplation) is a thing apart. We must be content to say this much about it, because to describe it precisely is a task greater than our current purpose requires.

It would seem, however, that the contemplative life also needs external equipment (resources) but little, or at least less than moral virtue does.

• Grant that both kinds of virtuous life need the basic necessities, and perhaps equally so. Even if the statesman’s work (an example of practical virtue) is more concerned with the body and things of that sort, the difference in basic needs might be small.
• But in what they need for the actual exercise of their activities, there will be a much bigger difference.
  • The liberal (generous) man will need money for doing his liberal deeds.
  • The just man too will need resources for returning services or debts. (For wishes are hard to discern, and even people who are not just will pretend that they wish to act justly).
  • The brave man will need power or strength if he is to accomplish any of the acts that correspond to his virtue.
  • The temperate (self-controlled) man will need opportunity; for how else is either he or any of the others to be recognized as virtuous?

It is also debated whether the will (intention) or the deed (action) is more essential to virtue, which is assumed to involve both. It is surely clear that virtue’s perfection involves both. But for deeds, many things are needed, and more things are needed the greater and nobler the deeds are.

But the person who is contemplating the truth needs no such external things, at least not for the exercise of his contemplative activity. Indeed, such things are, one may say, even hindrances, at any rate to his contemplation. But, insofar as he is a man and lives with a number of people, he chooses to do virtuous (practical) acts. He will therefore need such aids for living a human life among others.

Perfect Happiness is Contemplative: Another Perspective That perfect happiness is a contemplative activity will also appear from the following consideration. We assume the gods to be above all other beings blessed and happy. But what sort of actions must we assign to them?

• Acts of justice? Will not the gods seem absurd if they make contracts and return deposits, and so on?
• Acts of a brave man, then, confronting dangers and running risks because it is noble to do so?
• Or liberal (generous) acts? To whom will they give? It will be strange if they are really to have money or anything of that kind.
• And what would their temperate (self-controlled) acts be? Is not such praise rather tasteless, since they have no bad appetites to control?

If we were to run through all the practical virtues, the circumstances of action would be found trivial and unworthy of gods. Still, everyone supposes that they live and therefore that they are active. We cannot suppose them to sleep like Endymion (a figure in myth who slept eternally).

Now, if you take away from a living being action, and still more, take away production (making things), what is left but contemplation? Therefore, the activity of God, which surpasses all others in blessedness, must be contemplative. And of human activities, therefore, that which is most like this (contemplation) must be most of the nature of happiness.

This is also indicated by the fact that the other animals have no share in happiness, being completely deprived of such contemplative activity.

• For while the whole life of the gods is blessed, and that of men too (insofar as some likeness of such activity belongs to them), none of the other animals is happy, since they in no way share in contemplation.
• Happiness extends, then, just as far as contemplation does. And those to whom contemplation more fully belongs are more truly happy—not as a mere side effect, but because of the contemplation itself, for this is in itself precious.
• Happiness, therefore, must be some form of contemplation.

But, being a man, one will also need external prosperity. For our human nature is not self-sufficient for the purpose of contemplation. Our body also must be healthy and must have food and other attention.

Still, we must not think that the person who is to be happy will need many things or great things, merely because he cannot be supremely happy (through pure contemplation) without some external goods.

• Being self-sufficient and able to act does not mean you need an excessive amount of things.
• We can do noble and good acts without ruling over the entire earth and sea.
• Even with moderate advantages and resources, a person can act virtuously. This is clear enough to see. Private individuals are thought to do worthy acts no less than powerful rulers—indeed, sometimes even more.
• It is enough that we should have a moderate amount. The life of the person who is active in accordance with virtue will be a happy one.

The wise statesman Solon, too, was perhaps describing the happy man well. He said the happy man is moderately supplied with external things but has done (as Solon believed) the noblest acts and has lived with self-control. For one can do what one ought to do even with moderate possessions.

Anaxagoras, another philosopher, also seems to have supposed that the happy man is not necessarily rich or a powerful ruler. He said that he would not be surprised if the happy man were to seem like a strange person to most people. This is because most people judge by external things, since these are all they can perceive.

The opinions of wise thinkers, then, seem to agree with our arguments. But while even such opinions carry some conviction, the truth in practical matters (like how to live) is understood from the facts of life. These facts are the decisive factor. We must therefore examine what we have already said by testing it against the facts of life.

• If our ideas match the facts, we must accept them.
• But if they clash with the facts, we must suppose them to be mere theories.

Now, the person who exercises his reason and cultivates it seems to be both in the best state of mind and most dear to the gods. For if the gods have any care for human affairs, as they are thought to have, it would be reasonable that:

• They should delight in that which is best in humans and most like themselves (which is reason).
• They should reward those who love and honor reason the most. These people are seen as caring for the things that are dear to the gods and acting both rightly and nobly.

It is clear that all these qualities belong most of all to the philosopher (the lover of wisdom, who cultivates reason). He, therefore, is the dearest to the gods. And he who is dearest to the gods will presumably also be the happiest. So, in this way too, the philosopher will be more happy than any other person.

9. From Knowing Virtue to Living Virtuously: The Role of Laws and Education

If these matters—and the virtues, and also friendship and pleasure—have been discussed sufficiently in outline, are we to suppose that our program or plan has reached its end? Surely not. As the saying goes, when there are things to be done, the end is not just to study and recognize the various things, but rather to do them. So, with regard to virtue, it is not enough just to know about it. We must try to have virtue and use it, or try any other way there may be of becoming good.

Now, if arguments written in books were in themselves enough to make men good, they would justly, as the poet Theognis says, have won very great rewards, and such rewards should have been provided. But as things are, arguments seem to have some power:

• They can encourage and stimulate open-minded young people.
• They can help a character which is naturally good, and a true lover of what is noble, to be ready to be possessed by virtue.
• However, arguments are not able to encourage the majority of people to nobility and goodness.

Most people do not by nature obey a sense of shame; they only obey fear. They do not stop doing bad acts because those acts are morally low, but because they fear punishment. Living by their passions, they chase their own pleasures and the ways to get them. They try to avoid the pains that are opposite to those pleasures. They do not even have a concept of what is noble and truly pleasant, since they have never tasted it.

What argument could reshape such people? It is hard, if not impossible, to remove by argument the traits that have long since been built into their character. Perhaps we must be content if, when all the influences by which we are thought to become good are present, we manage to get some small amount of virtue.

How People Become Good Now, some think that we are made good by nature. Others think we are made good by habituation (forming good habits). Still others think we are made good by teaching.

• Nature’s part evidently does not depend on us. It is present as a result of some divine causes in those who are truly fortunate.
• Argument and teaching, we may suspect, are not powerful with all people. The soul of the student must first have been cultivated by means of habits for noble joy and noble hatred. The soul must be like rich earth which is ready to nourish the seed.
• For the person who lives as his passion directs will not hear an argument that tries to dissuade him from his ways, nor will he understand it if he does. And how can we persuade someone in such a state to change?
• In general, passion seems to yield not to argument but to force. So, the character must somehow be there already with a natural leaning towards virtue, loving what is noble and hating what is base.

But it is difficult to get the right training for virtue from youth upwards if one has not been brought up under good laws. To live with self-control and to endure hardship is not pleasant to most people, especially when they are young. For this reason, their upbringing and their daily activities should be fixed by law. These things will not be painful when they have become customary.

But it is surely not enough that young people should get the right upbringing and attention. Since they must, even when they are grown up, continue to practice and be habituated to good things, we shall need laws for this as well. Generally speaking, we need laws to cover the whole of life. For most people obey necessity (the force of law) rather than argument, and punishments rather than the sense of what is noble.

This is why some people think that legislators (lawmakers) ought to:

• Stimulate men to virtue and urge them forward by appealing to their sense of what is noble. (This is on the assumption that those who have been well brought up through good habits will listen to such influences).
• Impose punishments and penalties on those who disobey and are of an inferior nature.
• Completely banish those who are incurably bad. They think a good man, since he lives with his mind fixed on what is noble, will submit to argument. A bad man, however, whose desire is for pleasure, is corrected by pain, like a beast of burden. This is also why they say the pains inflicted should be those that are most opposed to the pleasures such men love.

However that may be, if (as we have said) the man who is to be good must be well trained and habituated, and then go on to spend his time in worthy occupations and neither willingly nor unwillingly do bad actions; and if this can be brought about if men live in accordance with a sort of reason and right order, provided this system has force—if this is so, then:

• A father’s command does not have the required force or compulsive power. (Nor, in general, does the command of one man, unless he is a king or someone with similar authority).
• But the law has compulsive power. At the same time, it is a rule that comes from a sort of practical wisdom and reason.
• And while people hate men who oppose their impulses (even if those men oppose them rightly), the law, in its ordering of what is good, is not burdensome in the same way.

In the Spartan state alone, or almost alone, the legislator seems to have paid attention to questions of upbringing and daily activities. In most states, such matters have been neglected. Each man lives as he pleases, in a “Cyclops-fashion” (a reference to mythical giants who lived without law), making his own rules for his wife and children.

Now, it is best that there should be public and proper care for such matters of moral development. But if they are neglected by the community, it would seem right for each individual man to help his children and friends towards virtue. They should have the power, or at least the will, to do this.

It would seem from what has been said that a person can do this better if he makes himself capable of legislating (understanding law-making and principles of good governance).

• Public control is clearly brought about by laws, and good control by good laws.
• Whether these laws are written or unwritten would seem to make no difference. Nor does it matter whether they are laws providing for the education of individuals or of groups—any more than it does in the case of music or gymnastics and other such pursuits.
• For just as in cities, laws and prevailing types of character have force, so in households do the instructions and the habits of the father. These have even more force because of the tie of blood and the benefits the father provides, for children start with a natural affection and tendency to obey.

Furthermore, private education has an advantage over public education, just as private medical treatment has advantages.

• For example, while in general, rest and avoiding food are good for a man with a fever, for a particular man they may not be.
• And a boxing coach presumably does not prescribe the exact same style of fighting to all his pupils. It would seem, then, that the details are worked out with more precision if the control is private, for each person is more likely to get what suits his individual case.

But the details can be best looked after, one by one, by a doctor or a gymnastic instructor or anyone else who has general knowledge of what is good for everyone or for people of a certain kind. (For the sciences both are said to be, and indeed are, concerned with what is universal or general). This is not to say that some particular detail may not, perhaps, be well looked after by an unscientific person, if he has studied accurately by experience what happens in each case. This is like how some people seem to be their own best doctors, though they could give no help to anyone else. Nonetheless, it will perhaps be agreed that if a man does wish to become master of an art or science, he must go to the universal principles and come to know them as well as possible. For, as we have said, it is with these universal principles that the sciences are concerned.

And surely, he who wants to make men better by his care—whether many men or few—must try to become capable of legislating. This is true if it is through laws that we can become good. For to get anyone whatever—any one who is put before us—into the right condition is not a task for the first chance comer. If anyone can do it, it is the man who knows, just as in medicine and all other matters which allow for care and prudence.

How Does One Learn to Legislate? Must we not, then, next examine where or how one can learn how to legislate?

• Is it, as in all other cases, from statesmen (politicians)? Certainly, it was thought to be a part of statesmanship.
• Or is there a difference between statesmanship and the other sciences and arts?
  • In the others, the same people are often found offering to teach the arts and practicing them (e.g., doctors or painters).
  • But while the Sophists (a group of teachers) profess to teach politics, politics is practiced not by any of them but by the politicians. Politicians would seem to do so by means of a certain skill and experience rather than by deep thought.
  • Politicians are not found either writing or speaking much about such theoretical matters (though doing so would perhaps be a nobler occupation than composing speeches for the law-courts and public assemblies).
  • Nor again are they found to have made statesmen of their own sons or any other of their friends. But it was to be expected that they should try if they could. For there is nothing better than such a skill that they could have left to their cities, or could prefer to have for themselves, or, therefore, for those dearest to them.
  • Still, experience seems to contribute a great deal. Otherwise, they could not have become politicians just by being familiar with politics. And so it seems that those who aim at knowing about the art of politics need experience as well.

But those of the Sophists who profess to teach the art of politics seem to be very far from actually teaching it.

• To put the matter generally, they do not even know what kind of thing politics is, nor what kinds of things it is about.
• Otherwise, they would not have classed it as identical with rhetoric (the art of persuasive speaking) or even inferior to it.
• Nor would they have thought it easy to legislate simply by collecting all the laws that are thought to be good. They say it is possible to select the best laws, as though even the selection did not demand intelligence, and as though right judgment were not the greatest thing, just as it is in matters of music.

For while people experienced in any department judge rightly the works produced in it, and understand by what means or how they are achieved, and what harmonizes with what, the inexperienced must be content if they do not fail to see whether the work has been well or ill made—as in the case of judging a painting. Now, laws are, so to speak, the “works” of the political art. How then can one learn from them to be a legislator, or to judge which laws are best? Even medical doctors do not seem to be made simply by studying textbooks. Yet people try, at any rate, to state not only the treatments but also how particular classes of people can be cured and should be treated—distinguishing the various habits of body. But while this information seems useful to experienced people, to the inexperienced it is valueless.

Surely, then, while collections of laws, and of constitutions also, may be serviceable to those who can study them and judge what is good or bad and what laws suit what circumstances, those who go through such collections without a practiced ability to judge will not have right judgment (unless it comes as a spontaneous gift of nature). However, they may perhaps become more intelligent in such matters.

The Path Forward: Studying Constitutions Now, our predecessors have left the subject of legislation to us unexamined. It is perhaps best, therefore, that we should ourselves study it, and in general study the question of the constitution (the way a state is organized and governed). We do this in order to complete, to the best of our ability, our philosophy of human nature.

First, then, if anything has been said well in detail by earlier thinkers, let us try to review it. Then, in the light of the constitutions we have collected, let us study:

• What sorts of influence preserve and destroy states.
• What sorts preserve or destroy the particular kinds of constitution.
• To what causes it is due that some states are well-administered and others are poorly administered.

When these things have been studied, we shall perhaps be more likely to see with a comprehensive view:

• Which constitution is best.
• How each type of constitution must be ordered.
• What laws and customs it must use if it is to be at its best.

Let us make a beginning of our discussion.